ESSAYS

AND

TREATISES

ON MORAL, POLITICAL, AND VARIOUS PHILOSOPHICAL SUBJECTS.

By EMANUEL KANT, M. R. A. S. B.

AND PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF KOENIGSBERG.

FROM THE GERMAN BY THE TRANSLATOR OF THE PRINCIPLES OF CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

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— Accurate and just reasoning is the only catholic remedy, fitted for all persons and all dispositions; and is alone able to subvert that abstruse philosophy and metaphysical jargon, which, being mixed up with popular superstition, renders it in a manner impenetrable to careless reasoners, and gives it the air of science and wisdom.

DAVID HUME.

PREFACE

BY THE TRANSLATOR.

Whatever he may have, the Author certainly has no occasion of the reader's indulgence; for in these Essays and Treatises the argumentation is highly consequential, and their subjects are both edifying and sublime. They contain the seeds of a philosophy which, though not long sown, have already shotten up in all the Universities of Germany, and choked the noxious weeds of former systems. It is not the first time we have imported wholesome seeds from that country. Witness, those of the Reformation.

The merits and intrinsic value of this work, however, will not be obvious to the herd of vulgar readers, that is, those who read for pastime only.* Let them not deceive them-

selves,

* These Essays having been printed in a remote part of Germany, where no better paper could possibly be got, and where even this is looked upon as an extravagance (a proof that the sciences in that country, happily, have made more progress, than has luxury), no further apology will be necessary on this head to the class of readers for whom they were designed, namely, not the frivolous, but the wise and thinking; if however, this homely garb notwithstanding,

selves, for them these Essays were not intended. Nor were they written, or even translated, with a view to gain, or to favour any party. But, whoever has a mind to penetrate into the deep recesses of morals and of politics, and to investigate the fundamental principles of DUTY and of RIGHT, than which nothing can be more interesting, or more important to mankind, will not be disappointed, we trust, by our labours.

The first edition of one of these treatises (Eternal Peace) was translated, in 1796, from a very erroneous french version, wherein the Author's philosophical periods are frittered away to little hopping french ones, and his terms entirely misunderstood, of course the whole disfigured; for which reason the translator thought it of consequence to endeavour after a more correct translation of this most excellent work. The public will judge between these performances, and, he is confident, will not accuse him of plagiarism.

It is impossible, says Kant in his PROLEGOMENA, when knowledge in process of time advances

withstanding, these Essays shall have the fortune to meet with a favourable reception (and that they will the translator has reason to presage), the next time they make their appearance in public, their dress shall be more suitable to their dignity. Towards the beginning of next year he hopes to be able to present the public with the second volume, which will likewise contain weighty philosophic matter. THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS (dividing into Metaphysical Elements of Law and of Ethics) has been long ready for the press, but, as it is a work on which even KANT himself found it necessary to reflect upwards of 40 years, before he published it, and which may justly be said to be the masterpiece of human reason, the translator, in order to have an opportunity of revising it, wishes to keep it in his desk a few months longer.

advances farther, to hinder certain expressions, which became classical but in the infancy of science, from being afterwards found insufficient, or even unsuitable, and it is equally impossible to hinder a certain new and more apposite use of those expressions from being, now and then, in danger of being confounded with the old use. Faithfully to transfuse the sense of the Author with as much perspicuity as the subject is susceptible of, and at the same time to preserve the character of his style as far as is consistent with the idiom of the English language, were the translator's sole aim; but he was under the unavoidable necessity of introducing several alien scientific terms, which he hopes, however, will be deemed, by major critics,* not unworthy of naturalization, especially as great attention has been bestowed on analogy, and as there are but few, if any, of those terms, whose meaning may not be easily discovered without the help of the context, and as the others will be found explained, either in going on, or in the translator's preface to THE PRINCIPLES OF CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY; he hopes likewise, that in this he shall not have incurred the reproach of a licentious affectation of novelty.

* All the nugatory remarks, as well of those that are doomed to creep along the inferiour walks of literature, as of those who have not taken sufficient pains to study this philosophy, the translator is resolved to pass over in silence, and to attend to the criticisms and observations of none but competent judges. Verbal disputes and cavilling at expressions, how momentous soever they may seem to minor critics, are far beneath his notice. He aspires to move in a higher sphere.

Meanwhile, a few expositions, taken from Kant's other writings, may be neither out of place here, nor uninteresting to the learned, they are as follows:

In critical philosophy the distinction between practical, and what belongs to the praxis, must be well attended to. We consider something (says this great man) THEORETICALLY, when we have in view that merely, which pertains to a thing, but PRACTICALLY, when we reflect on what *ought* to pertain to it through liberty; whereas PRAXIS is, Application to cases occurring in experience.

In the whole of all possible experience lie all our cognitions, and in the universal reference to these consists TRANSCENDENTAL TRUTH, which precedes all empirical truth, and renders it possible. The merely LOGICAL criterion of TRUTH is, The consension of a cognition with the universal and formal laws of the understanding and of reason. MATERIAL (objective) TRUTH consists in the harmony or agreement of a cognition with its object. But of the truth of cognition, as to the matter, no universal criterion can be required, because it in itself is contradictory.

FANATICISM must always be distinguished from ENTHUSIASM. The fanatic believes to feel an immediate and extraordinary intercourse with a higher nature; but the enthusiast is he, whose mind is heated by any one principle beyond the proper degree, whether it be by the maxims either of patriotic virtue, of friendship, or of religion, without the imagination's being occupied about any thing of a super-

supernatural intercourse. Again, enthusiasm may be said to be, The idea of the good with affection,*

Wonder is, Affection in the representation of what is new, which surpasses expectation; admiration, A wondering, which does not cease with the loss of what is new.

The words analysis and synthesis have commonly two different meanings. The synthesis is either *qualitative*, a progression in the series of the *subordinate* from the condition to the conditional, or it is *quantitative*, a progression in the series of the *co-ordinate* from the given part through its collateral parts to the whole. Thus is circumstanced the analysis likewise which, in the former case, signifies a regression from the conditional to the condition, and in the latter, a regression from the *whole to its possible parts*, or to the mediate, that is, the parts of the parts, and by consequence is no partition, but a subdivision of a given composite.

Humour, in the good sense, signifies the talent, to be able to transpose one's self arbitrably into a certain state of mind, in which all things are judged quite otherwise, than they commonly are (conversely), and yet in such a turn of mind agreeably to certain principles of reason.

* See this word explained in the translator's Preface (p. xxxvi) to The Principles of Critical Philosophy by E. Kant. Sold by W. Richardson under the Royal Exchange London.

The votaries of empirical philosophy have of late endeavoured to stigmatize metaphysics, nay, to reprobate their very name, yet, if the learned author of the doctrine of the indeclinables, who, from a rash judgment,* appears to be one of those votaries, would condescend to quit his favourite field of experience but for a while, and to desist from his attempts to catch the philosophic eel by the tail, he might easily convince himself, especially as he seems to be of the few who think for themselves, that metaphysic is not only not nonsense (though in fact it could never pretend to the name of a science till Kant entered the lists), but the utmost completion of all culture of human reason, and that perhaps more by withholding from errours, than by enlarging knowledge. Every body knows, that metaphysics derived their name but from their having been taught by the ancient Greeks after physics; we will not however descend to dispute about (what is of little consequence) a word; whoever is not satisfied with the denomination, let him term them as he pleases. In the interim take our exposition of the thing:

The legislation of human reason [philosophy] has two objects, nature and liberty, and therefore contains the law of nature, as well as the moral law, at first in two particular systems,

* 'The very term *Metaphysic* being nonsense; and all the systems of it, and controversies concerning it, that are or have been' (happily he has not prejudged and said, or will be) 'in the world, being founded on the grossest ignorance of words and of the nature of speech.'

See ΕΠΕΑ ΠΤΕΡΟΕΝΤΑ. page 450.

systems, but at last in one single philosophical system. The philosophy of nature refers to all that *exists;* that of morals, only to what *ought* to exist.

But all philosophy is either cognition from pure reason, or cognition of reason from empirical principles. The former is named *pure* philosophy, the latter *empirical.*

The philosophy of pure reason now is either pre-exercitation, which investigates the faculty reason relatively to all pure cognition *à priori*, and is entitled *Critic*, or the system of pure reason [science], the whole (true as well as specious) philosophical cognition from pure reason in a systematical coherence, and is distinguished by the appellation METAPHYSIC; though this name may be given to the whole pure philosophy comprising the critic, in order to comprehend as well the investigation of all that can ever be cognised *à priori*, as the exhibition of that which constitutes a system of pure philosophical cognition of this species, but which is distinguished from all empirical, as also from the mathematical, use of reason.

Metaphysic is divided into that of the speculative and of the practical use of pure reason, and consequently is metaphysic, either of nature, or of morals. That contains all pure principles of reason from mere conceptions (therefore with exclusion of the mathematics) of the theoretical cognition of all things; this the principles, which determine *à priori* and render necessary the actions. Now morality is the sole legality of actions,

which

which can be deduced from principles fully *à priori*. Hence metaphysic is properly the pure moral, which is bottomed upon no anthropology (no empirical condition). The metaphysic of speculative reason is what is usually styled in the narrower sense metaphysic; so far however as pure moral philosophy appertains to the particular stock of human philosophical cognition from pure reason, we shall continue to give it that discriminative appellation. The idea of such a science, though hitherto not purified from heterogeneous matter, is as old as speculative human reason; and What reason is it that does not speculate, in either a scholastic, or a popular manner?*

To conclude: There is a definition, which, for aught we know, has hitherto baffled the efforts of all philosophers, namely, that of laughter. In whatever excites a hearty shaking laugh there must be something nonsensical (in which the understanding, in itself, can find no complacency). LAUGHTER (says Kant) *is an affection from the sudden turning into nothing of a sanguine expectation.* Even this turning, which is certainly not pleasing to the understanding, pleases nevertheless for a moment very much, indirectly. The cause must therefore consist in the influence of the representation on the body and its reaction on the mind; and indeed not on condition that the representation be objectively an object of pleasure

* This subject is fully handled in *Kant's Critic of pure Reason*, a work which ought to be the *breviary* of all philosophers.

pleasure (for how can a disappointed expectation afford pleasure?), but barely because it, as a mere play of representations, produces an equilibrium of the vital powers in the body. When, for instance, it is related, that an Indian, who saw at the table of an Englishman in Surate a bottle of ale opened, and all the ale, turned into froth, running out, expressed his great wonder by a number of exclamations, and, on the Englishman's inquiring, What is there in this that occasions so much wonder and outcry? answered, I'm not surpris'd, that it runs out, but only how you cou'd 've got it all into the bottle; we laugh at this heartily, and it yields us great pleasure; not because we find ourselves wiser than this ignorant person, or otherwise in something which the understanding suggested to us in this; but our expectation was great and vanished suddenly. Or when the heir of a deceased rich relation wishes to conduct his funeral with great solemnity, but complains, that he cannot succeed in this; for (continues he), the more money I give my mourners, to seem sorrowful, the more gay and sprightly do they appear; this occasions laughter, because the expectation is suddenly turned into nothing. It must be well observed, that it must not be transformed into the positive opposite of an expected object — for that is always something, and may frequently occasion sorrow — but turned into nothing. For, when one raises our expectation greatly by the narration of an occurrence, and we immediately at the conclusion discover its falsehood, it

occasions

occasions a displacency in us; as, for example, that of people, whose hair grew quite gray in one night, through grief. Whereas, when, by way of retaliating such a story, another wag relates very circumstantially the vexation of a certain merchant who, returning from India to England with all his fortune, in goods, was obliged, in a storm, to throw every thing over board, and was so much concerned for his loss, that, in the very same night, by a miraculous violation of the established laws of nature, his *periwig* grew gray; we naturally laugh, and it affords us pleasure, because we reflect on falsely seizing an object otherwise indifferent to us, or rather tossing to and fro for a while the idea we pursued, like a ball, thinking to catch it merely and hold it fast. It is not the refutation of a liar here or of a blockhead, which yields pleasure; for the latter story, told with proper seriousness, would of itself set a whole company in a roar; whereas the former would commonly not merit attention.

It is remarkable, that in all such cases the jest must always comprise in itself something, which can deceive for a moment; therefore, when the appearance vanishes, the mind looks back, in order to essay it once more, and thus, by tension and laxation following one another quickly, is made to spring backwards and forwards and is put into a fluctuancy which, since the leap from what in a manner wound up the strings happened suddenly (not by a gradual remission), must occasion a movement of the mind and an internal bodily motion,

motion, which continues involuntarily, and produces not only a lassitude but a serenity at the same time (the effects of an exercise tending to health) harmonizing with it.

For, when it is supposed, that with all our thoughts some one motion or other is at the same time harmoniously combined in the organs of the body; it will be pretty well comprehended, how to that sudden metathesis of mind, now in the one, then in the other station, in order to contemplate its object, a reciprocal tension and relaxation of the elastic parts of our viscera, which communicate themselves to the diaphragm, can correspond (such as that which ticklish persons feel): whereby the lungs eject the air at periods following one another quickly, and thus occasion a motion useful to health, which motion only, and not what passes in the mind, is the proper cause of the pleasure in a thought, that at bottom represents nothing. Heaven, says Voltaire, hath given us two things to counterbalance the many troubles and difficulties of life, to wit, *hope* and *sleep*. He might have added *laughter* to the number; if the means to excite it in reasonable persons were but as ready at hand, and wit, or the originality of humour, which is thereto requisite, were not just as rare, as is abundant the talent for fiction, *head-breaking*, like mystical speculators or fancymongers, *neck-breaking*, like geniuses, or *heart-breaking*, like sentimental romance-writers, (or, if you please, like sentimental moralists).

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ER-

ERRATA.

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5	32, 33, 34 for *dont*, read *don't*.
6	5 read *answer*. 14 read *whole*.
8	9 for *is*, read *must be*. 12 for *this* read *it*. 19 read *dares*.
9	17 for *eon-*, read *con*. 23 for *Wheter* read *Whether*.
10	7 for *continue with the old*, read *adhere to the old oeconomy*.
13	16 for *prevents* read *presents*. 32 for *it profitable for itself to treat*, read *its advantage in treating*.
21	32 read *genuineness*.
22	15 read *propaideitic*. 19 for *For this reason*, read *Just*.
29	10 for *eyen*, read *even*. 23 dele *comma*.
37	4 for *id a*, read *idea*.
40	8 for *dstermine*, read *determine*.
64	28 for *because*, read *that*.
81	24 after *me*; insert an *
138	19 for *necessary*, read *contingent*.
140	6 for *negatives*, read *negative ones*.
169 Note	for *cooperation*, read *co-operation*.
171	14, 16 always read *so far*.
172	at the bottom for *which*, read *This*.
192 2d Note	1 for *ihe*, read *the*.
208	17 dele *in order*.
246	2 for *beneath*, read *no less beneath*, for *as* read *than*.
256 Note	9 after *another*, dele *comma*.
271 Note	18 for *Thibeth*, read *Thibet*.
284 Note	8 read *Those books can therefore*.
286	2 for *negociations*, read *negotiations*.
328	5 for *Emil* read *Emile*.
352	25 dele *comma*.
382	30 for *s mething*, read *something*.
452	7 insert a *comma* after *circumstantiality*.

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ANSWER TO THE QUESTION,

WHAT IS ENLIGHTENING?

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ANSWER TO THE QUESTION,

WHAT IS ENLIGHTENING?

Enlightening is, *Man's quitting the nonage occasioned by himself. Nonage* or minority is the inability of making use of one's own understanding without the guidance of another. This nonage is *occasioned by one's self*, when the cause of it is not from want of understanding, but of resolution and courage to use one's own understanding without the guidance of another. *Sapere aude!* Have courage to make use of thy own understanding! is therefore the *dictum* of enlightening.

Lazineſs and cowardice are the causes, why so great a part of mankind, after nature has long freed them from the guidance of others (*naturaliter majorennes*), willingly remain minors as long as they live; and why it is so easy for others, to set themselves up as their guardians. It is convenient to be a minor. If I have a book, which has understanding for me, a curate, who has conscience for me, a physician, who judges of diet for me, etc. I need not give myself any trouble. I have no occasion to think, if I can but pay; others

 will

will save me the trouble of that irksome busi-neſs. Those guardians, who have graciously undertaken the superintendence of mankind, take sufficient care, that by far the greater part of them (and all the fair) shall hold the step to majority, besides the trouble attending it, very dangerous. After these superintendents have first made them as stupid as their domestic animals, and carefully prevented those peaceable creatures from daring to venture a single step beyond the go-cart, in which they are inclosed; they point out to them the danger that threatens them, if they should try to go alone. Indeed this danger is not so very great, for, at the expence of a few falls, they would learn to walk at last; but an example of this sort renders timid, and commonly discourages from all further attempts. It is therefore difficult for every single man to extricate himself from the nonage, which is almost become natural to him. Nay, it is even become agreeable to him, and he is for the present actually incapable of using his own understanding, because he never was allowed to make the trial. Ordinances and formules, the mechanical instruments of a rational use, or rather misuse, of his gifts of nature, are the fetters of an everlasting minority. Whoever shook them off, would take but an uncertain leap over the smallest ditch even, because he is not accustomed to such a free motion. Hence there are but few, who have succeeded to emancipate themselves from nonage by their own labour, and yet to walk firmly.

But

But it is sooner poſsible for a nation to enlighten itself; nay, when it has the liberty, it is almost infallible. For a few who think for themselves will always be found, even among the installed guardians of the multitude, who, after they themselves have thrown off the yoke of nonage, will spread about them the spirit of a rational estimation of the proper value and of the vocation of every man to think for himself. It is singular in this, that the public, which was formerly brought under this yoke by them, afterwards compels them themselves to remain under it, when this public is thereto stirred up by some of its guardians, who are themselves totally incapable of enlightening; so pernicious is it to fill with prejudices; as they are revenged at last on those themselves who, or whose predeceſsors, were their authors. Hence a nation can attain enlightening but slowly. A deliverance from personal despotism, and interested and tyrannical oppreſsion, may perhaps be obtained by a revolution, but never a true reform of the cast of mind; new prejudices will serve, just as well as the old, for leading-strings to the thoughtleſs multitude.

To this enlightening however nothing is required but LIBERTY; and indeed the most harmleſs of all that may be named liberty, to wit, that, to make *a public use* of one's reason in every point. But I hear exclaimed from all sides: *dont reason!* The officer says: dont reason, but exercise! The financier: dont reason, but pay! The clergyman: dont reason, but believe! (Only one master in the world

world says: *reason*, as much as you please, and on what you please, *but obey!*) Here is every-where restriction of liberty. But what restriction is a hinderance to enlightening? what not, but even favourable to it? — My anwser is this: the *public* use of one's reason must always be free, and that only can bring about enlightening among men; but the *private use* of it may often be very strictly limited, without much hindering the progrefs of enlightening. By the public use of one's own reason however I understand that, which every one *as a man of letters* makes of it in the eyes of the wole reading world. I name the private use that, which he may make of his reason in a certain *civil post*, or office, intrusted to him. There is necefsary to many businefses, which run in with the interest of the commonwealth, a certain mechanism, by means of which some members of the commonwealth must conduct themselves pafsively merely, in order, by an artificial unison directed by the government to public ends, to be withholden at least from the destruction of these ends. Here indeed it is not allowed to reason; but one must obey. But so far as this part of the machine considers itself at the same time as a member of the whole commonwealth; nay, even of the cosmopolitical society, consequently in the character of a man of letters, who addrefses himself by writings to the public in the proper sense; he may by all means reason, without doing any injury thereby to the businefs, to which he is appointed, partly as a pafsive member. It would be

be very hurtful, if an officer, to whom his superiour gives an order, should in actual service reason loudly on the conformity-to-end, or expediency of this order; he must obey. But he, as a man of letters, cannot in justice be hindered from making his observations on the faults of the military service, and from submitting these to the judgment of the public. The citizen cannot refuse to pay the taxes imposed on him; even a forward censure of such taxes, when they are to be paid by him, may be punished as a scandal (which might occasion universal opposition). The very same person, notwthstanding that, does not act contrary to the duty of a citizen, when he, as a man of letters, publishes his thoughts on the unfitneſs or even the injustice of such imposts. In like manner is a clergyman bound, to deliver himself to his congregation in all points according to the symbol of the church, which he serves; for he was ordained on this condition. But as a man of letters he has full liberty, nay, it is his call, to communicate to the public all his carefully proved and well-meant thoughts on what is faulty in that symbol, and to make his proposals for the better regulation of the affairs of religion and of the church. There is nothing in this, which can be burdensome to the conscience. For, what he teaches pursuant to his office, as agent of the church, he represents as something, in respect of which he has not a free power to teach according to his own sentiments, but he is ordered to propound that according to precept and in the name of another. He may

say: our church inculcates this, or that doctrine; these are the arguments it makes use of. He then draws all practical profit to his congregation from ordinances, to which he himself would not subscribe, perhaps with full conviction, to whose propounding however he can bind himself, because it is not quite impofsible that truth may lie therein concealed, but at all events nothing is found in them inconsistent at least with the internal religion. For, did he believe to find in them any thing repugnant to this, he could not administer his office with a safe conscience; he must resign it. The use, therefore, which an established teacher or pastor makes of his reason before his hearers, is a *private use* merely; as this is never but a domestic congregation, though ever so great; and in regard to which he, as *a priest*, is not free, and dare not be so, because he executes the commifsion of another. Whereas, as a man of letters, who speaks by writings to the proper public, namely, the world, consequently the ecclesiastic, in the *public use* of his reason, enjoys an unlimited liberty, to use his own reason and to speak in his own person. For it is an absurdity, which tends to the perpetuating of absurdities, that the guardians of the people (in spiritual things) shall themselves be again in a state of nonage.

But should not a society of clergymen, for instance, a church-afsembly, or a reverend clafs (as the Dutch clergy name themselves) be intitled to bind one another by oath to a certain unalterable symbol, in order to exer-

cise

cise an incefsant supreme guardianship over every one of their members and by their means over the people, and even to eternize this? I maintain that that is totally impofsible. Such a contract, entered into for the purpose of withholding for ever all farther enlightening from the human species, is absolutely void; and should it be confirmed by the chief power even, by diets of the empire, and by the most solemn treaties of peace. An age cannot league itself, and by oath too, to put the following age into a state, wherein it must be impofsible for it to enlarge its knowledge (especially a knowledge so very important), to purge away errors, and in general to make progrefs in enlightening. That were a crime against human nature, whose original destination consists directly in this progrefsion; and posterity is therefore completely entitled to reject those resolutions, as at once incompetently and presumptuously formed. The test of all that can be finally determined with regard to a nation, lies in the question, Wheter a nation itself could institute such a law? This would, as it were, in the expectation of a better, be pofsible for a determinate short time, with a view to introduce a better order; if at the same time all the citizens, principally the clergy, had the liberty, in the character of men of letters, to make their observations publicly, that is, by writings, on that which is faulty of the present œconomy, but the established order might still continue, till the insight into the nature of these things attained such a degree, that they (the citizens)

by uniting their voices (though not of all) could make a proposal to the throne, to take under its protection those congregations, which had united themselves in an altered œconomy of religion according to their conceptions of a better introspection, without however molesting those, who rather chuse to continue with the old. But to unite one's self in a permanent constitution of religion, to be questioned by nobody publicly, even but during the life-time of one man, and thereby, as it were, annihilate a period in the progression of humanity to amendment, to render it fruitless and by that means even detrimental to posterity, is absolutely not allowed. A man may indeed, as to his own person, defer, and even then but for a time, the enlightening in that, which is incumbent on him to know; but to renounce it, let it be for his own person, but still more for posterity, is to violate and to trample on the sacred rights of humanity. But what a nation cannot finally determine with regard to themselves, still less can the monarch determine that finally with regard to the nation; for his legislative dignity rests upon his uniting in his own will the common will of the nation. If he but takes care, that all true or opiniative improvement be consistent with the civil order; as for the rest, he may let his subjects themselves do what they find necessary to be done for the sake of the welfare of their own souls; that does not concern him, but it concerns him to take care that the one shall not violently prevent the other from labouring with all his strength at the

the determination and furtherance of that welfare. He derogates from his own majesty, when he interferes with the writings, by which his subjects endeavour to perfectionate their insights, and thinks them worthy of the inspection of his government, as well as when he does this from his own profound introspection, where he exposes himself to the exprobration, *Cæsar non est supra grammaticos*, as also, and still more, when he humbles his supreme power so far, as to support the ecclesiastic despotism of a few tyrants in his state against his other subjects.

If it is now enquired, do we live at present in an *enlightened* age? The answer is, No, but by all means in an age of *enlightening*. There is still a great deal wanting to men, as things are at present, on the whole, to be in a state, or to be but able to be put in a state, to make a safe and a good use of their own understanding in affairs of religion without the guidance of another. But we have distinct proofs, that the field is now opened for them to labour in freely, and the hinderances of universal enlightening, or of quitting the nonage occasioned by themselves, become by degrees fewer. In this respect the present age is the age of enlightening, or FREDERICK'S century.

A prince, who does not think it unworthy of himself to say, that he holds it *duty*, not to prescribe any thing to men in matters of religion, but to allow them full liberty therein, who declines, even the lofty *name of being tolerating*, is himself enlightened, and merits

merits to be esteemed as such by the grateful world and by posterity, a prince, who first freed the human species from nonage, at least on the part of government, and gave them liberty, in all that is an affair of conscience, to use their own reason. Under him could respectable clergymen, in the character of men of letters, without prejudice to the duty of their office, freely expose to the world to be proved their judgments and insights, here and there deviating from the received symbol; and still more every other person, who is limited by no duty of office. This spirit of liberty diffuses itself outwardly also, even where it has to struggle with external impediments of a government misunderstanding itself. For it gives an example to that government, that it needs not, on account of liberty, be under the smallest solicitude for the tranquillity, and union of the commonwealth. Men naturally extricate themselves insensibly from the state of rudeneſs and barbarity, when invention is not purposely plied to keep them in it.

The streſs of the principal point of enlightening, that of men's quitting the nonage occasioned by themselves, I have laid upon *matters of religion* chiefly; because, with regard to arts and sciences, our rulers have no interest in playing the guardian over their subjects; besides, that state of nonage is not only the most pernicious, but the most dishonourable of any. But the way of thinking of a head of the state, who favours enlightening penetrates farther and perspects, That even

even in regard of his *legislation* there is no danger in allowing his subjects to make a *public* use of their reason," and to lay before the world their thoughts on a better constitution, and even a free and honest criticism of the present; we have an eminent example of this, in which no monarch ever surpaſsed him, whom we honour.

But only he, who, enlightened himself, is not only not afraid of his shadow, but has at hand a well-disciplined numerous army as a security for the public tranquillity, can say, what a free state dares not risk: *reason as much as you please, and on what you please, but obey!* Thus a strange unexpected course of human affairs prevents itself here; so that, when it is contemplated in the groſs, almost every thing is paradoxical in it. A greater degree of civil liberty seems advantageous to the liberty of the *spirit of the nation*, and yet places insuperable barriers to it; whereas a degree leſs of that gives this full scope to extend itself to the utmost of its faculty. When nature has then unfolded under this rough rind the germe, of which she takes the most tender care, namely, the propensity * and the call to *thinking freely*; this gradually reacts on the minds of the people (whereby they become by degrees more capable *of the liberty of acting*), and finally, even on the principles of the government, which finds it profitable for itself to treat

* See the proper signification of this word in the translator's preface (page XXXV.) to *The Principles of Critical Philosophy by E. Kant*.

man,

man, who is now more than a mere *machine*, conformably to his dignity. *

* In Buesching's weekly Intelligencer of the 13th. Sept. I read to day (the 30th. inst.) the notice of the Berlin monthly publication of this month (Septr. 1784), wherein Mr. Moses Mendelssohn's answer to this very question is mentioned. It has not yet reached me; else it would have prevented the present, which may now remain for the purpose of experimenting, how far chance can effectuate a consonancy of sentiments.

THE GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS of MORALS.

— Happy, if we can unite the boundaries of the different species of philosophy, by reconciling profound inquiry with clearneſs, and truth with novelty! And still more happy, if, reasoning in this easy manner, we can undermine the foundations of an abstruse philosophy, which seems to have hitherto served, only as a shelter to superstition, and a cover to absurdity and error!

D. HUME.

PREFACE.

The ancient Greek philosophy is divided into three sciences, namely, *physics*, *ethics*, and *logic*. This division is perfectly suitable to the nature of the subject, and cannot be improved, except, perhaps, by superadding but the principle of it, partly in order to ascertain its completenefs, and partly to be able to determine accurately the necefsary subdivisions.

All cognition of reason is either *material*, and contemplates some one object or another; or *formal*, and is conversant about the form of the understanding merely, and of reason itself, and the universal rules of thinking in general, without distinction of objects. The formal philosophy is denominated *logic*, but the material, which has to do with determinate objects and the laws, to which they are subjected, is again twofold. For these laws are laws of either *nature* or *liberty*. The science of the former is distinguished by the appellation of *physics*, that of the latter is *ethics*; that is named natural philosophy also, this moral.

Logic can have no empirical part, that is, such a part, where the universal and necefsary laws of cogitation would rest upon grounds, taken from experience; else it would not be logic, that is, a canon for the understanding, or for reason, which is valid in all thinking, and must be demonstrated. Whereas both natural and moral philosophy have each their empirical part, because that must determine the laws of nature, as an object of experience, but this the laws of the will of man, so far as it is affected by nature, the former as laws, according to which every thing happens, the latter as such, according to which every thing *ought* to happen, but with consideration of the conditions neverthelefs, under which it frequently doth not happen.

All philosophy, so far as it rests upon grounds of experience, may be termed *empirical*, but that, which propounds its doctrines from principles *à priori* merely, *pure*, philosophy. The latter, when it is formal barely, is styled *logic;* but when it is limited to determinate objects of the understanding, it takes the name of *metaphysics*.

In the same manner arises the idea of twofold metaphysics, to wit, *metaphysics of nature* and *those of morals.* Natural philosophy has its empirical, but also a rational part; ethics likewise; though here the empirical part may be denominated *practical anthropology* in particular, but the rational, properly *moral.*

Trades, handicrafts and arts, have all reaped great advantage from the distribution of the work, as one man does not make every thing, but

but every person, in order to be able to perform a work to the greatest perfection and with more facility, limits himself to a certain one which, according to the manner of elaborating it, distinguishes itself sensibly from others. Where the work is neither distinguished nor distributed in this way, and where every one person exercises all the various branches, the arts are still but in their infancy. It may be an object not altogether unworthy of consideration, to examine whether pure philosophy too doth not require a different person for all its parts, and whether it would not be better for the whole learned profeſsion, if those, who are accustomed to vend the empirical together with the rational, mixed according to all sorts of relations unknown to themselves, conformably to the taste of the public, and who appropriate to themselves the name of *thinkers for themselves*, but to others, who prepare the merely rational part, that of speculators, were warned, not to transact two affairs at once, which are very different in the mode of treatment, and to which perhaps a peculiar talent is requisite, and whose conjunction in one person produces but bunglers; the question is here however, only, Whether the nature of the science doth not require, always carefully to separate the empirical part from the rational, and that the proper (empirical) physics shall be preceded by the metaphysics of nature, but the practical anthropology, by the metaphysics of morals, which must be carefully purified from all that is empirical, in order to know, how much pure reason can accomplish in both

 cases,

cases, and from what sources it draws this its instruction *à priori*; the latter may be executed either by all moral philosophers (of whom there are legions,) or but by a few, who feel their abilities adequate to the task.

As moral philosophy is properly my object here, I limit the proposed question to this only, Whether one be not of opinion, that it is of the utmost necefsity to elaborate a moral philosophy, which is purified from every thing that is but empirical and belongs to anthropology; for, it is obvious of itself from the common idea of duty and from the moral law, that there must be such a one. Every body must allow, that a law, if it is to be valid morally, that is, as ground of an obligation, must carry with it absolute necefsity; that the commandment, Thou shalt not lie, is not valid for men barely, and that other rational beings need not take any notice of it; and thus all the other proper moral laws; that therefore the ground of the obligation here must be sought for, neither in the nature of man, nor in the circumstances in the world, wherein he is placed, but *à priori* merely in conceptions of pure reason, and that every other precept, which is founded upon principles of mere experience, and even in a certain respect an universal precept, so far as it, in the smallest part, perhaps but in a motive, rests upon empirical grounds, may indeed be named a practical rule, but never a moral law.

Therefore not only the moral laws, together with their principles, are, among all practical cogni-

cognitions, eſsentially distinguished from all others, wherein there is any thing whatever empirical, but every moral philosophy rests entirely upon its pure part, and, applied to man, borrows not the smallest from the knowledge of him, (anthropology), but gives him, as a rational being, laws *à priori*, which, it is true, still require judgement whetted by experience, in order partly to distinguish in what cases they have their application, and partly to procure to them entrance into the will of man, and energy for the exercise, as he, being affected by so many inclinations, is indeed susceptible of the idea of a practical pure reason, but not so easily capable of rendering it effective *in concreto* in his life.

The metaphysics of morals are then indispensably neceſsary, not merely from a motive of speculation, with a view of investigating the source of the practical principles lying in our reason *à priori*, but because morals themselves remain subjected to all sorts of corruption, so long as that guide and chief *norma* of their right judgment is wanting. For in that, which is to be morally good, it is not sufficient that it be *conformable* to the moral law, but it must be *for the sake of it* also; on the contrary that conformity is but very contingent and uncertain, because the immoral ground produces now and then legal actions, it is true, but more frequently illegal ones. But the moral law, in its purity and genuineſs (which, in the practical field, is of the greatest moment), is nowhere else to be sought for, than in a pure philosophy, therefore this

(metaphysics) must precede, and without it there can be no moral philosophy any where; even that, which mixes those pure principles with the empirical ones, merits not the name of philosophy (for philosophy is precisely distinguished from the common cognition of reason, by propounding in a separate science that, which the latter comprehends but mingled), and much lefs of moral philosophy, because, by this very mingling, it proves derogatory even to the purity of morals themselves, and acts contrary to its own end.

Let it not however be imagined, that what is here required, is already to be found in the *propodeutic* (pre-exercitation) to the moral philosophy of the celebrated Wolf, to wit, *universal practical philosophy*, so named by him, and that a quite new road is not to be taken here. For this reason, because it is to be an universal practical philosophy, it has no will of any one peculiar sort, for instance, such a one, as without all empirical motives is determined fully by principles *à priori*, and which may be denominated a pure will, but volition in general taken into consideration with all actions and conditions, which belong to it in this universal signification, and in this is it distinguished from the metaphysics of morals, in the same manner as universal logic from transcendental philosophy,* the former of which propounds the actions and rules of thinking *in the general*, but the latter the peculiar actions merely and

* See *transcendental philosophy* in THE PRINCIPLES OF CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY by E. KANT.

and

and rules of *pure* thinking, that is, those, whereby objects are cognised *à priori* entirely. For the metaphysics of morals ought to investigate the idea and the principles of a possible pure will, and not the actions and conditions of the human volition in general, which are drawn for the most part from psychology. That moral laws and duties are spoken of (though contrary to every right) in the universal practical philosophy, makes out no objection to my assertions. For the authors of that science remain in this constant to their idea of it; they do not distinguish the motives, which, as such, must be represented *à priori* entirely by reason merely and are properly moral, from the empirical ones, which the understanding elevates by comparison of the experiences merely to universal conceptions, but contemplate them, without attending to the distinction of their sources, only according to the greater or less sum of them, (they being all considered as homogeneous), and thereby form to themselves their conception of *obligation* which is indeed nothing less than moral, but of such a nature nevertheless, as can be required in a philosophy, which passes no judgment whatever on the *origin* of all possible practical conceptions, whether they have place either *à priori* or merely *à posteriori*.

Intending one day or other to present the public with the Metaphysics of Morals * I let

* These are published, translated, and will be printed soon.

this Groundwork precede. Indeed there is properly no other foundation for them, than the Critic of pure practical Reason, in the same manner as for metaphysics, the Critic of pure speculative Reason already published in German. But, in the first place, that is not of the utmost necefsity, like this, because human reason in the moral use, even with the most common understanding, may be easily brought to the greatest correctnefs and copiousnefs, whereas in the theoretical, but pure, use, it is dialectical entirely; and, secondly, I require of the critic of a pure practical reason, that, when it shall be finished, its unity must at the same time be able to be exhibited in a common principle with the speculative; because at last it can be but the very same reason, which must be distinguished in the application merely. I could not however bring it to such a completenefs here, without mixing contemplations of quite another sort, and confusing the reader. For which reason, instead of the title, Critic of pure practical Reason, I have used that of, Groundwork of the Mataphysics of Morals.

But, thirdly, as the metaphysics of morals, notwithstanding the forbidding title, are susceptible of a great degree of popularity and suitablenefs to the common understanding of mankind, I find it expedient, to separate this work, that is preparatory to the foundation of those metaphysics, in order not to have occasion afterwards to add what is subtile, which is therein inevitable, to more comprehensible doctrines.

The

The present groundwork, however, is nothing but the seeking out and the fixing of the *highest principle of morality*, which of itself, in its design, constitutes an entire affair, that requires to be separated from all other moral investigations. My aſsertion, concerning this important main question hitherto not yet resolved by any means in a satisfactory manner, will receive much light by the application of the same principle to the whole system, and, through the sufficiency which it every-where discloses, great confirmation: but I must relinquish this advantage, which at the bottom would be more gratifying to self-love, than of public utility, because the ease in the use and the seeming sufficiency of a principle do not give a perfectly sure proof of its rightneſs, but rather awake a certain partiality, not to investigate and to ponder it for itself strictly, without any consideration of the consequence.

In this work I have arranged my method, as I believe to be the most suitable, when one chuses to set out from the common cognition to the determination of its chief principle, analytically, and to return from the examination of this principle and from its source to the common cognition, wherein its use is found, synthetically.

THE

GROUNDWORK

OF THE

METAPHYSICS OF MORALS.

SECTION I.

TRANSITION FROM THE COMMON MORAL COGNITION OF REASON TO THE PHILOSOPHICAL.

There is nothing in the world, nay, generally speaking, even out of it, poſsible to be conceived, which can, without limitation, be held good, but a GOOD WILL. Understanding, wit, judgement, and however the *talents* of the mind may be named, or courage, resolution, and perseverance in the design, as properties of the *temperament*, are no doubt good, in many views, and worthy of being wished for; but they may become bad too and pernicious in the highest degree, when the will, which is to make use of these gifts of nature, and whose peculiar quality is on that account denominated *character*, is not good. In the very same manner are circumstanced

stanced the *gifts of fortune*. Power, opulence, honour, even health and the whole wellbeing and contentment with one's situation, under the name of *felicity*, give courage and by this frequently superciliousneſs also, where there does not exist a good will, which corrects and renders universally conformable-to-end their influence on the mind, and with this at the same time the whole principle of action; not to mention, that a reasonable impartial spectator, in viewing an uninterrupted prosperity of a being, whom no stroke of a pure and good will ornaments, can never feel a complacency; and thus the good will seems to constitute the indispensable condition of the worthineſs even, to be happy.

Some properties are even favourable to this good will itself and can lighten its work very much, but have, notwithstanding that, no intrinsic unconditional value, but always presuppose a good will, that limits the estimation, in which one justly holds them, and does not allow them to be considered as absolutely good. Moderation in affections and passions, self-government and cool reflection are not only in many views good, but seem to constitute a part even of the intrinsic value of the person; there is however much wanting still, to declare them without limitation good, (how unconditional soever they may have been esteemed by the antients). For without principles of a good will they may become highly bad, and the cold blood of a villain renders him not only much more dangerous, but immediately in our eyes still more detestable,

able, than he would have been held without this.

The good will is not good through that, which it causes, or effectuates, not by its fitneſs, for attaining any one end proposed, but by volition only, that is, good in itself, and, contemplated apart, beyond comparison to be valued much more, than all that could be accomplished by means of it in favour of any one inclination, ay, even the sum of all the inclinations. Though by a peculiar disfavour of fate, or through a scanty portion of a stepdame nature, this will should totally want the ability to obtain its end; if notwithstanding its greatest exertion nothing should be effected by it, and the good will only (not a mere wish, but, as it were, the collecting of all the means, as far as they are in our power) should remain: it would nevertheless, like a jewel, shine of itself, as something, which has in itself its full value. Neither the utility nor the uselessness can increase or diminish this value. It (the utility), would be like the setting of a diamond, in order to be able to handle it more easily, or to draw to it the attention of those, who are not sufficient connoisseurs, but not to recommend it to connoisseurs, and to determine its value.

There lies however in this idea of the absolute value of the mere will, without bringing to account any advantage by the estimation of it, something so singular, that, notwithstanding all the concurrence with it of common reason itself, a suspicion must arise, which

which is perhaps secretly founded on nothing but high-soaring phantastry, and may have ill understood nature in her design, why she has attributed to our will reason as a governour. Therefore from this point of view we shall put this idea to the test.

In the natural predispositions of a being, organized, that is, adjusted to the purpose of life, we assume as a principle, That no instrument for any one end whatever is found in that being, but what is the fittest for it and the most conformable to it. Were now in a being that is endowed with reason and with a will, its *preservation*, its *prosperity*, in a word, its *felicity*, the proper end of nature, she has contrived it very ill indeed in making choice of the reason of the creature for the executor of this her design. For all the actions, which this being has to perform with a view to its happiness, and the whole rule of its conduct would be much more exactly prescribed to it by instinct, and that end had thereby been much more certainly attained, than it ever can be by reason, and, should this over and above be bestowed on the favoured creature, it must only be of use to this creature, in order to contemplate the happy predisposition of its nature, to admire this, to rejoice in it, and to be grateful for it to the beneficent cause; but not in order to submit its appetitive faculty to the weak and deceitful guidance of reason and to bungle in the design of nature; in short, she would have prevented reason from manifesting itself in the PRACTICAL USE, and from having the auda-

audaciousnefs with its feeble insights to excogitate for itself the project of felicity, and the means of obtaining it; nature would have taken upon herself not only the choice of the ends, but the means, and had with wise care intrusted both to instinct merely.

In fact we find, that, the more a cultivated reason meddles with the purpose of the enjoyment of life and of felicity, so much the more doth man stray from the real contentment, out of which, with many, and indeed with the most experienced in the use of it, if they are but candid enough to own it, arises a certain degree of *misology*, that is, hatred of reason, because, after the calculation of every advantage, which they derive, I will not say from the invention of all the arts of common luxury, but even from the sciences (which seem to them at last a luxury likewise of the understanding), they find, that in fact they have brought more trouble on themselves, than they have gained felicity, and finally rather envy, than despise the common sort of men, which is nearer to the guidance of mere instinct, and which does not grant its reason much influence on its actions. And so far it must be acknowledged, that the judgment of those, who greatly moderate, and even, if I may be allowed the expression, put below null, the vain-glorious commendations of the advantages, which reason, in regard to the felicity and contentment of life, ought to procure us, is by no means ill-humoured, or ungrateful for the goodness of the government of the world, but that, the idea of another

and

and much more worthy design secretly forms the basis of the existence of these judgments, for which design, and not for felicity, reason is properly destined, and to which, on that account, as chief condition, the private views of man must for the most part give place.

For as reason is not sufficiently fit to guide the will safely with regard to its objects and to the supplying of all our wants (that reason in part multiplies even), to which end an innate instinct would have led much more certainly, however reason, as a practical faculty, that is, as such a one, as shall have influence on the *will*, is allotted us; so its real destination must be to produce a will, not in another view *as a mean*, but a *will good in itself*, to which reason was absolutely necessary, since nature every-where else in the distribution of her predispositions went to work in a manner conformable-to-end. This will needs not then be the only and the whole, but it must be the chief, good, and the condition to all the rest, even to all desire of felicity, in which case it may be perfectly united with the wisdom of nature, when it is perceived, that the culture of reason, which is requisite to the first and inconditional design, limits in various manners, at least in this life, the attainment of the second, which is always conditional, namely, felicity, nay, it may bring it under null even, without nature's proceeding therein unconformably-to-end, because reason, which cognises its highest practical destination in the founding of a good will, is in the attaining of this purpose capable

capable but of a contentment of its own sort, namely, from the accomplishment of an end, which reason itself only determines, even should this be combined with many detriments, which happen to the ends of inclination.

In order however to unfold the conception of a will highly estimable and without further views good in itself, such as natural sound reason is already endowed with, and which needs not be very learned, but rather enlightened, this conception always stands uppermost in the estimation of the whole value of our actions, and constitutes the condition of all the rest; we shall now take into consideration the conception of DUTY, which comprises that of a good will, though under certain subjective limitations and impediments, but which duty, instead of concealing and making them unknowable, points them out and renders them perfectly conspicuous.

I pass over here all the actions which, though they may in this or that view be useful, are already cognised as contrary to duty; for with regard to them the query cannot have place, Whether they may have been performed *out of duty*, as they are even repugnant to this; I set aside the actions likewise, which are actually contrary to duty, but to which men have immediately *no inclination*, yet do them, because they are spurred on by another inclination. For there it may be easily distinguished, whether the action conformable to duty be performed *out of duty* or from a selfish

 motive.

motive. This distinction is much more difficult to be remarked, where the action is conformable to duty and the subject has besides an *immediate* inclination to it. For instance, it is by all means conformable to duty, that the shop-keeper shall not over-reach the unexperienced purchaser, and, where there is much trade, the prudent trader does not over-reach, but fixes an universal price for every body, so that a child can purchase from him, as easily, as any other person. One is therefore *honestly* served; but this is not enough to induce belief, that the trader acts in this manner out of duty and from principles of honesty; his interest requires it; but that he should over and above have an immediate inclination for the purchasers, in order, as it were, out of love, to give no preference in point of price to either, cannot here be supposed. Therefore the action is performed, neither out of duty, nor from immediate inclination, but merely with a self-interested view.

Whereas, to preserve one's life is duty, and more than that every body has thereto an immediate inclination. But the anxious care, which the greater part of mankind often takes of it, has on that account no intrinsic value, and its maxim no moral worth. They preserve their lives *conformably to duty*, it is true, but not *out of duty*. On the other hand, when adversity and hopeleſs sorrow have entirely taken away the taste for life; when the unfortunate, of a vigorous mind, more exasperated against his fate, than pusillanimous,

or

or dejected, wishes for death, and yet preserves his life, without loving it, not from inclination, or from fear, but from duty; then has his maxim a moral worth.

To be beneficent, where one can, is duty, and besides there are many souls so attuned to participation, that they, without any other motive, either of vanity, or of self-interest, feel an inward pleasure, to spread joy around them, and who can take delight in the contentment of others, so far as it is their work. But I maintain, that in a like case such an action, let it be ever so agreeable to duty, ever so amiable, has nevertheless no true moral value, but is on the very same footing with other inclinations, for example, the inclination for honour, which, when it happily hits on what in fact is of public utility and conformable to duty, consequently respectable, merits praise and encouragement, but not high esteem; for the moral worth is wanting to the maxim, namely, not to perform such an action from inclination, but *from duty*. Let us suppose also, that the mind of that philanthropist is clouded with proper sorrow, which extinguishes all participation in the fate of others, that he has still the ability to do good to those suffering want, but the wants of others touch him not, because he is sufficiently occupied about his own, and now, as no inclination incites him more, should he force himself out of this mortal insensibility, and do the action without any inclination whatever, merely out of duty, then has the action first its genuine moral

 value,

value. Again, when nature has bestowed little sympathy of heart on a person, when he (otherwise an honourable man) is by temperament cold and indifferent to the sufferings of others, perhaps, because he himself, endowed with the peculiar gifts of patience, fortitude, and persevering strength in supporting his own, presupposes such in others likewise, or even requires them; when nature has not properly formed such a man (who indeed would not be her worst production) for being a philanthropist, would he then not find in himself still a source of means to give himself a much higher value, than that of a temperament of a good quality may be? Certainly! the worth of the character, which is moral and beyond all comparison the highest, begins exactly here, namely, to do good, not from inclination, but from duty.

To secure one's own felicity is duty, (at least indirectly), for the discontent with one's situation, in a multitude of cares and among unsupplied wants, may easily become a great *temptation to the transgression of duties.* But, without considering duty here, men have of themselves the most powerful and most intimate inclination to felicity, because exactly in this idea all the inclinations unite themselves into one sum. Only, the precept of felicity is for the most part of such a nature, as to derogate greatly from some inclinations, and yet man cannot form to himself a determinate and certain conception of the sum of the satisfaction of them all, under the denomination of felicity; wherefore it is

not

not surprising, how a single determinate inclination, in regard of what it promises, and of the time, wherein its satisfaction may be obtained, can preponderate a wavering id a, and how man, for instance, one afflicted w th the gout, can chuse to enjoy what is agreeable to him and to suffer what he can, because he, according to his calculation, has not, here at least, deprived himself of the enjoyment of the present moment by perhaps groundlefs expectations of a fortune, which is to lie in health. But also in this case, should the universal inclination to felicity not determine his will, should health not be so necessary for him in this calculation at least, there still remains here, as in all other cases, a law, namely, to promote his felicity, not from inclination, but from duty, and only then has his conduct the proper moral value.

Thus without doubt are to be understood the parts of the scripture, wherein it is commanded, to love one's neighbour, even our enemy. For love as inclination cannot be commanded, but to do good from duty itself, though no inclination at all incites thereto, nay, even though natural and insuperable aversion opposes, is not *pathological*, but *practical* love, which lies in the will and not in the propensity of sensation, in principles of action and not in melting participation; practical love only can be commanded.

The second position is, An action from duty has its moral value *not in the purpose* which shall thereby be answered, but in the

 maxim,

maxim, according to which it is resolved on, doth not therefore depend on the actuality of the object of the action, but merely on the *principle* of *volition*, according to which the action, abstracting from all the objects of the appetitive faculty, is performed. From the preceding it is clear, that the intentions, which we may have by actions, and their effects, as ends and springs of the will, can confer no unconditional and moral value on the actions. Wherein then can this value lie, if it shall not consist in the will, in reference to their hoped for effect? It can lie nowhere else, *than in the principle of willing*, abstracting from the ends, which may be effected by such an action; for the will is in the middle between its principle *à priori*, which is formal, and its spring *à posteriori*, which is material, as if on a crossway, and, as it must be determined by something or other, it must in general, being deprived of every material principle, when an action is done out of duty, be determined by the formal principle of volition.

The third position, as a consequence of the two preceding ones, I would express thus, *Duty is the necessity of an action out of reverence for the law.* For the object as the effect of my intended action I can have *inclination*, indeed, but *never reverence*, because it is an effect merely and not activity of a will. In the same manner I cannot have reverence for inclination in general, whether it be mine or another's, I can in the first case approve of it at most, in the second sometimes even love it,

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that is, consider it as favourable to my own advantage. Only that, which is connected with my will as ground merely, but never as effect, which doth not serve my inclination, but out-weighs it at least excludes this entirely from its calculation in the choice, consequently the mere law of itself, can be an object of reverence and herewith a commmand. Now an action from duty ought to separate totally the influence of inclination, and with it every object of the will, therefore nothing remains for the will, which can determine it, but, objectively, the *law*, and subjectively, *pure reverence* for this practical law, by consequence the maxim,* to obey such a law, even in derogation to all my inclinations.

The moral value of the action then lies not in the effect, which is expected therefrom, therefore not in any one principle of the action, which requires to borrow its motive from this expected effect. For all these effects (agreeableness of one's situation, nay, even promoting other's happiness) could be brought to pass by other causes also, and it therefore requires not thereto the will of a rational being; wherein only the highest and unconditional good can be met with. Wherefore nothing but the *representation of the law in itself, which indeed has place but in rational beings,* provided it, but not the hoped for effect, be

* *Maxim* is the subjective principle of volition; the objective principle (that is, that, which would serve all rational beings subjetively also for a practical principle, if reason had full potency over the faculty of appetition) is the practical *law*.

the determination of the will, constitutes the so preferable good, that we name moral, which is already present in the person himself, who acts accordingly, but must not be first expected from the effect.*

But what sort of a law can that be, whose representation, even without having regard to the effect expected therefrom, must dstermine the will, that this may absolutely and without limitation be denominated good? As I have deprived the will of all the incitements that could arise to it from the obeying of any

* One might upbraid me, as if I sought but shelter in an obscure feeling behind the word *reverence*, instead of giving distinct information on the question by a conception of reason. But though reverence is a feeling, it is no feeling *received* by influence, but *self-effectuated* by a conception of reason, and therefore specifically distinguished from all feelings of the first sort, which may be reduced to either inclination or fear. What I immediately cognise as law for me, I cognise with reverence, which signifes the consciousness merely of the *subordination* of my will to a law, without the mediation of other influences on my sense. The immediate determination of the will by the law and the consciousness of it is named *reverence*, so that it is considered as the *effect* of the law on the subject and not as the *cause* of it. Reverence is properly the representation of a value, which derogates from my self-love. It is therefore something, which is contemplated, neither as object of inclination, nor of fear, although it has something analogical with both at the same time. The *object* of reverence then is the *law*, and indeed that, which we impose on *ourselves* and nevertheless as necessary in itself. As law we are subject to it, without inquiring of self-love; as imposed on us by ourselves, it is however a consequence of our will, and has in the first consideration analogy with fear, in the second with inclination. * All reverence for a person is properly but reverence for the law (for the righteousness etc.), of which he gives us the example. Since we consider the improvement of our talents as duty likewise, we represent to ourselves in a person of talents, as it were, the *example of a law* (by exercise to become similar to him in this) and that constitutes our reverence. All moral *interest*, commonly so termed, consists entirely *in the reverence for the law.*

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one law, nothing remains but the universal legality of actions in general, which only must serve the will for a principle, that is, I ought never to act otherwise, than so, *that I can be willing that my maxim shall become an universal law.* Here is now the mere legality in the general (without bottoming upon any one law destined for certain actions), that which serves the will for a principle, and must serve it for such, if duty shall not be every-where an empty fancy and a chimerical conception; herewith harmonises completely the common reason of mankind in its practical judgment, and has the said principle always in view.

Let the question be, for example, May I not, when I am in a pressing necessity, make a promise, with a view not to perform it? I easily make the distinction here, which the meaning of the question can have, whether it be prudent, or whether it be conformable to duty, to perform a false promise. The former no doubt may often have place. I perceive perfectly, that it is not sufficient, to relieve myself from a present embarrassment by means of this subterfuge, but it must be well considered, whether a greater inconveniency may not afterwards arise to me out of this lie, than this is, from which I at present free myself, and, as the consequences, notwithstanding all my imaginary *cunning*, are not so easily foreseen, that a confidence once lost may be much more disadvantageous to me, than all the evil that I think to avoid at present, whether it be not more *prudently* acted,

acted, to proceed in this according to an universal maxim, and to acquire a habit, not to promise any thing, but with the intention to perform it. But it occurs to me immediately, that such a maxim always bottoms upon the dreaded consequences only. Now it is however quite a different thing, to be veracious out of duty, and out of dread of the disadvantageous consequences; because in the first case, the conception of the action comprises in itself a law for me, but in the second, I must first look round me every-where, to see what effects for me may possibly be combined with it. For, when I deviate from the principle of duty, it is most certainly bad; but if I quit my maxim of prudence, it may nevertheless be sometimes very advantageous to me, though it is indeed the safest, not to quit it. But in order to inform myself in the shortest and yet the most infallible manner with regard to the solution of this problem, I put the question to myself, Would I be contented, that my maxim (to disembarrass myself by the false promise) should be valid as an universal law (as well for me as for others), and could I say to myself, Every one, when he finds himself in an embarrassment, from which he cannot otherwise relieve himself, may make a false promise? Thus I immediately perceive, that I may indeed will the lie, but by no means an universal law to lie; for according to such a one, there would be properly no promise, because it were in vain to declare my will with respect to my future actions to others, who do not believe

believe this declaration, or, if they should inadvertently, would however repay me with the same coin, consequently my maxim, the moment of its being ordained an universal law, must destroy itself.

I therefore require no great acumen to know what I have to do, in order that my volition shall be morally good. Unexperienced with regard to the course of the world, incapable of comprehending all the events happening in it, I question myself, only, Canst thou will, that thy maxim become an universal law? if not, it is rejectable, and that not on account of a disadvantage accruing to you, or to others, but because it is not congruent as a principle in a possible universal legislation, but for this reason obliges me to have an immediate reverence, of which at present I do not yet *perspect* upon what it bottoms (let the philosopher investigate that), but I understand this much at least, that it is an estimation of the value, which surpasses by far all the value of what is commanded by inclination, and that the necessity of my action out of *pure* reverence for the practical law is that, which constitutes duty, to which every other motive must yield, because it is the condition of a will good *in itself*, whose value exceeds every thing.

Thus are we arrived in the moral cognition of the common reason of man to its very principle, which, it is true, it doth not think separated in this manner in an universal form, but has it always actually in view nevertheless and uses it as the standard of its judgment.
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It would be very easy to show here, with this compass in hand, how it knows exactly in all occurring cases to distinguish, what is good, what bad, conformable to duty, or contrary to duty, when, without teaching it any thing in the least new, one makes it attentive, as Socrates did, to its own principle, and that there is no science or philosophy necessary, in order to know what one has to do, to be honest and good, nay, even wise and virtuous. It was easy to be presumed, that the knowledge of what is to be done, consequently, to be known (scire) is incumbent on every man, and becomes the affair of every one, even of the most common man. One cannot however contemplate here without admiration, how the practical faculty of judging has so much the advantage of the theoretical in the common understanding of man. In the latter, when common reason ventures to swerve from the laws of experience and from the perceptions of the senses, it falls into mere incomprehensibilities and contradictions with itself, or at least into a chaos of uncertainty, obscurity, and inconstancy. But in the practical field the power of judgement begins but just then to shew itself the most advantageously, when the common understanding excludes all sensible springs from practical laws. It then becomes even subtile, it may happen, that it will chicane its conscience, or other pretensions relatively to what shall be named right, or will also sincerely determine the value of the actions of its own instruction, and, what is more, it may

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in the latter case hope to hit it justly, as well as any philosopher can ever promise to himself, nay, it is in this almost surer still, than even the latter, because he can have no other principle than it, but his judgment may, by a multitude of considerations foreign to the affair, easily be perplexed and made to deviate from the straight direction. Were it not consequently more adviseable in moral things to acquiesce in the judgment of common reason, and at most but to apply philosophy in order to exhibit more conveniently the system of morals so much the more complete and more conceivable (but still more for the purpose of disputing), but not in order to dissuade, even in a practical view, the common understanding of man from its happy simplicity, and to bring it by means of philosophy to a new way of investigation and instruction.

Innocence is an excellent thing, but it is on the other hand very bad, that it cannot be easily preserved, and is not difficult to be seduced. Wherefore wisdom itself — which otherwise consists more in acting, than in knowing — stands in need of science, not in order to learn from it, but to procure for its precept at once an inlet and stability. Man feels in himself a powerful counterpoise to all the commandments of duty, which reason represents to him so worthy of high reverence, in his wants and inclinations, whose whole satisfaction he comprises under the name of felicity. Now reason commands the observance of its precepts, incessantly, without however promising the inclinations any thing,

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consequently, as it were, by slighting and not paying attention to those pretensions so impetuous and yet seeming so equitable (which will not suffer themselves to be annulled by any command). But from this arises a *natural dialectic*, that is, a propensity to reason against that strict law of duty, and to doubt of its validity, or at least of its purity and strictness, and, if possible, to render it more suitable to our wishes and inclinations, that is, to corrupt it entirely and to deprive it of its dignity, of which however, even the common practical reason cannot at last approve.

The *common reason of man*, then, is never incited by any need of speculation, (which need never occurs to it, so long as it is contented to be mere sound reason), but from practical grounds, to go out of its sphere, and to take a step into the field of a *practical philosophy*, and there, concerning the source and proper determination of its principle in comparison with its maxims, which bottom upon need and inclination, to receive information and guidance, in order to be relieved from the embarrassment on account of pretensions on both sides, and to run no risk by the ambiguity, into which it easily falls, to be deprived of all genuine moral principles. Therefore there arises, imperceptibly, as well in the practical common reason, when it cultivates itself, a *dialectic*, which obliges it to seek assistance in philosophy, as in its theoretical use, and on that account the former will find as little rest, as the latter, any where else, than in a complete critic of our reason.

SECTION

SECTION II.

TRANSITION FROM THE POPULAR MORAL PHILOSOPHY TO THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS.

Though we hitherto have taken our conception of duty from the common use of our practical reason, it is by no means to be concluded therefrom, that we have treated it as a conception of experience. But rather, when we attend to the actions of men, we meet with many, and as we ourselves acknowledge, just complaints, that no sure example at all can be produced of the mindedness, to act from pure duty, that, though many things may be done *conformably* to what *duty* commands, it is still always doubtful, whether they be done *out of duty*, and have therefore a moral value. Hence there have at all times been philosophers, who absolutely denied the actuality of this mindedness manifested in human actions, and have ascribed every thing to the more or less refined self-love, without however on that account entertaining a doubt of the rightness of the conception of morality, but rather mention, with inward regret, the fragility and impurity of human nature, which indeed is noble enough, to make an idea so worthy of reverence its precept, but at the same time too weak, to observe it, and uses reason, which ought to serve it for legislation, but in order to take care of the interest of

of the inclinations, either singly, or, when it rises higher, in their greatest concord with one another.

In fact it is absolutely impossible to make out with perfect certainty a single case by experience, where the maxim of an action otherwise agreeable to duty rested upon moral grounds entirely and upon the representation of one's duty. For it is sometimes the case, it is true, that, in the strictest self-trial, we meet with nothing at all which, besides the moral ground of duty, could have been powerful enough to move us to this or that good action and so to a great sacrifice; but it cannot therefrom be concluded with any certainty at all, that actually no secret incentive of self-love whatever, under the mere appearance of the idea of duty, was the proper determining cause of the will, we however flatter ourselves willingly with a nobler motive which we appropriate to ourselves falsely, but in fact, by even the severest trial cannot fully detect the secret springs, because, when the moral value is the subject in agitation, it doth not depend on the actions which one sees, but on that internal principle of them, which one doth not see.

One cannot do those, who deride all morality, as a mere phantom, or an offspring of a human phansy transcending itself through self-conceit, any service more wished for, than to grant them that the conception of duty (as one, for the sake of ease, willingly persuades one's self, that all other conceptions are likewise of the same nature), must be taken

taken from experience entirely; for in that case one prepares for them a certain triumph. Out of philanthropy I shall grant, that the most of our actions are conformable to duty; but when one observes their aims more closely, one sees every-where the dear self always prominent, upon which, and not upon the strict command of duty, which for the most part would require self-denial, rests their design. One needs not just be an enemy to virtue, but only a cool observer, who does not immediately take the most eager wish for the good to be its reality, in order (principally in advanced years and with a judgement partly tried by experience, and partly sharpened for observation) in certain moments to become doubtful, whether any where in the world real virtue is actually to be met with. And here nothing can guard us against the total apostasy from our ideas of duty, and preserve a grounded reverence for its law in the soul, but the clear conviction, that, though there never were actions, which arose from such pure sources, it is by no means the question here, whether this thing or the other happens, but reason of itself and independently on all phenomena commands, what ought to happen, consequently actions, of which the world hitherto hath perhaps given no example whatever, of whose feasibility he, who grounds every thing upon experience, might doubt very much, are nevertheless absolutely commanded by reason, and that, for instance, pure sincerity in friendship may not be the less required of every one, though

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as yet there may not at all have been a sincere friend, because this duty, as duty in general, lies before all experience in the idea of a reason determining the will by grounds *à priori.*

When it is added, that, if one doth not oppugn the conception of morality and dispute all its truth and reference to any one possible object, one cannot deny, that its law is of such extensive meaning, that it must be valid not only for men, but for all *rational beings in general*, not merely under casual conditions and with exceptions, but *absolutely necessary;* thus it is clear, that no experience ever can be the cause of concluding the possibility even of such apodictical laws. For by what right can we bring into illimited reverence that, which is valid perhaps but under the fortuitous conditions of humanity, as universal precept for every rational nature, and how are laws of the determination of *our* will to be held laws of the determination of the will of a rational being in general, and, but as such, how are they to be held our laws even, if they were empirical merely, and did not take their origin fully *à priori* from pure, but practical reason?

Morality cannot be worse hit, than by endeavouring to borrow it from examples. For every example, which is represented to me of it, must itself first be judged according to principles of morality, whether it be worthy of serving for the original example, that is, for a pattern, but it can by no means furnish its highest conception. Even the Holy of the Gospel must previously be compared with our ideal

ideal of moral perfection, ere he is cognised as such; he says of himself, Why do ye name me (whom ye see) good? nobody is good (the archetype of the good) but the only God (whom ye do not see). But whence have we the conception of God, as the chief good? Entirely from the IDEA, which reason frames *à priori* of moral perfection, and inseparably connects with the conception of a free will. Imitation has no place at all in the moral field, and examples serve but for encouragement, that is, they put beyond a doubt the practicability of what the law commands, they render intuitive that, which the practical rule expresses more universally, but can never justify, to set aside their true original, which lies in reason, and to accommodate one's self to them.

If there is then no genuine chief principle of morality, which must not independently on all experience rest upon pure reason merely, I am inclined to believe, that it is not necessary, even but to inquire, whether it be good to propound in the universal (*in abstracto*) these conceptions, as they, together with the principles appertaining to them, stand firm *à priori*, unless the cognition shall distinguish itself from what is vulgar and be denominated philosophical. But in our times this may be needful. For, were the suffrages to be collected, Whether the preference is to be given to pure cognition of reason separated from all that is empirical, by consequence metaphysics of morals, or to popular practical

 philo-

philosophy; it is easy to conjecture on which side would be the preponderance.

This condescendence to popular conceptions is certainly very laudable, when the elevation to the principles of pure reason has previously taken place and is attained to full satisfaction, and that would be said to be *grounding* the doctrine of morals upon metaphysics, but afterwards, when it is once established, to procure it *entrance* by means of popularity. It is however highly absurd to be willing to comply with this in the first investigation, upon which depends all rightness of principles. Not only, that this procedure can never lay claim to the very rare merit of a true *philosophical popularity*, but because there is no art whatever in making one's self generally understood, when one chuses to renounce all manner of solid well-grounded insight into a matter; thus is produced a nauseous hodge-podge of compiled observations and half digested principles, with which shallow brains regale themselves, because it is nevertheless very useful for tabletalk, but where those, who can penetrate into the matter, feel confusion, and dissatisfied, without being able to help themselves, turn away from it, although philosophers, who perfectly see through the illusion, are but little attended to, when they divert for a while from the pretended popularity, in order but first, after acquired precise introspection, to dare with right to be popular.

One needs but look at the attempts towards morality in that favourite taste, to meet with a wonderful farrago, sometimes the peculiar destina-

destination of human nature, (therewith however the idea of a rational nature in general), sometimes perfection, sometimes, happiness, here moral feeling or sentiment, there the fear of God, of this something, of that likewise something, without its ever occurring to inquire, whether any where in the knowledge of human nature (which we can have but from experience) the principles of morality are to be looked for, and, if this is not, if the latter are to be met with fully *à priori*, free from all that is empirical, absolutely in pure conceptions of reason and nowhere else, not even in the smallest degree, to form the design, rather to separate entirely this perquisition as pure practical philosophy, or (if a name so much decried dare be mentioned) as metaphysics * of morals, to bring it of itself only to its whole perfection, and to amuse the public, which requires popularity, till the issue of this undertaking.

It is however such metaphysics of morals completely isolated, as are mixed with no anthropology, with no theology, with neither physics, nor hyperphysics, and still less with occult qualities (which, if you please, may be termed hypophysical), not only an indispensable substratum of all theoretical precise

* One may distinguish, if one pleases, (as the pure mathematics and logic are distinguished from the applied) the pure philosophy of morals (metaphysics) from the applied (namely, to human nature). By these denominations one is put in mind, that the moral principles must not be founded upon the properties of human nature, but must subsist of themselves *a priori;* from such however, as for every rational nature, therefore for the human, practical rules must be able to be derived.

cognition of duties, but at the same time a desideratum of the utmost importance to the actual fulfilling of their precepts. For the pure representation of duty with no allay of empirical incitements, and of the moral law in general, has on the human heart by the way of reason only (which hereby first perceives, that it of itself can also be practical) an influence more powerful, than all other springs,* which may be called in from the empirical field, as it in the consciousness of its dignity despises the latter, and can by degrees become their master; instead of which a mixt moral philosophy, that is composed of springs of feelings and inclinations and at the same time of conceptions of reason, must occasion the mind to waver between motive causes, which cannot be brought under any principle, and which can lead but very accidentally to the good, but frequently to the bad likewise.

* I have a letter of the worthy Sultzer's, wherein he asks me, What is the reason why the teachers of ethics, notwithstanding that they have so much of what is convincing for reason, effectuate so little? My answer was delayed by the preparation, to give it completely. However it is no other, than that the teachers themselves have not rendered their conceptions distinct, and, endeavouring to do it too well, by collecting all sorts of motive causes of the moral good, in order to make the medecine very strong, they spoil it. For the most common observation shows, that, when an honest action is represented, how it, separated from all views of any one advantage, either in this world, or in another, is performed with a stedfast soul, even under the greatest temptations of want, or of allurement, it leaves far behind it and obscures every similar action, which was but in the smallest degree affected by a foreign spring, it elevates the soul and excites the wish, to be able so to act likewise. Even children of a middle age feel this impression, and duties ought never to be represented to them otherwise.

From

From what has been said it is evident, that all moral conceptions have their seat and origin in reason totally *à priori*, and this in the most common reason of man, as well as in that of the speculative in the most eminent degree; that they cannot be derived from any empirical and, on that account, merely casual cognition; that in this purity of their origin lies their dignity even, to serve us for the highest practical principles; that as much as one adds any thing empirical, so much does one diminish their genuine influence and the unlimited value of the actions; that it does not only require the greatest necessity in a theoretical view, when speculation merely is concerned, but it is of the greatest practical import also, to draw their conceptions and laws from the well of pure reason, to propound them purely and unmingled, nay, to determine the circuit of this whole practical or pure cognition of reason, that is to say, the whole faculty of pure practical reason, but not in this, as speculative philosophy allows, ay, even finds necessary sometimes, to render the principles dependent on the peculiar nature of human reason, but, because moral laws ought to be valid for every rational being in general, to derive them from the universal conception of a rational being in general, and in this manner to propound completely (which in this species of quite separate cognition may be easily performed) all moral, which for its *application* to men stands in need of anthropology, first independently on this, consequently as pure philosophy, that is, as meta-

 physics,

physics, well knowing, that it is in vain, without being in possession of them, I will not say, to determine precisely for the speculative judgment the moral of duty in all that, which is conformable to duty, but that it is impossible in even the merely common and practical use, especially in the moral instruction, to found morals upon their genuine principles and thereby to effectuate, and to graft in the minds for the highest welfare of the world, pure moral sentiments.

In order however in this elaboration not to proceed by the natural steps from the common moral judgment merely (which is here very worthy of reverence) to the philosophical, as was hitherto the case, but from a popular philosophy, which goes no farther, than it can through groping by means of examples, to metaphysics (which allow themselves to be detained no longer by any thing empirical, and, as they must measure the whole complex of the cognition of reason of this sort, even proceed to ideas, where examples leave us), we must follow and distinctly exhibit the practical faculty of reason from its universal rules of determination, to where the conception of duty springs out of it.

Every one thing of nature acts according to laws. Only a rational being has the faculty of acting *according to the representation* of laws, that is, according to principles, or a *will*. As, to the derivation of actions from laws *reason* is requisite, so is the will nothing else, than practical reason. If reason infallibly determines the will, the actions of such

such a being, which are cognised as objectively necessary, are subjectively necessary likewise, that is to say, the will is a faculty, to choose *that only*, which reason, independently on inclination, cognises as practically necessary, that is, good. But when reason of itself only doth not determine the will sufficiently, when this is subjected to subjective conditions still (to certain springs), which do not always harmonise with the objective ones; in a word, when the will is not *in itself* fully conformable to reason (as is actually the case in men); thus are the actions, which are objectively cognised as necessary, subjectively contingent, and the determination of such a will, agreeable to objective laws, is *necessitation*; that is, the relation of the objective laws to a will not thoroughly good is represented as the determination of the will of a rational being by grounds of reason, it is true, but to which this will from its nature is not necessarily obedient.

The representation of an objective principle, provided it be necessitating for a will, is named a commandment (of reason) and the formule of the commandment, an *imperative*.

All imperatives are expressed by *shall* or *ought*, and thereby denote the relation of an objective law of reason to a will, which according to its subjective quality is not thereby necessarily determined, (a necessitation). They say, that to do or to forbear something would be good, but they say it to a will, which doth not always do something, because it is represented to it, that to do it is good. Practically good, however, is what determines the will

by means of representations of reason, by consequence not from subjective but objective causes, that is, from grounds, which are valid for every rational being, as such. It is distinguished from the *agreeable*, as that, which has influence on the will but by means of sensation * from subjective causes merely, that are valid for the sense of but this one or the other, and not as a principle of reason, which is valid for every body.

A perfectly good will would therefore rank just as well under objective laws (of the good), but not thereby be able to be represented as *necessitated* to legal actions, because it of itself, according to its subjective quality, can be determined but by the representation of the good. Wherefore no imperatives are valid for the *Divine* will, nor in general for a *sacred* one; here the word *shall* is improper, because the *volition* is already of itself necessarily

* The dependence of the appetitive faculty on sensations is denominated inclination, and this always evinces a *want*. But the dependence of a casually determinable will on principles of reason is termed an *interest*. This therefore has place but in a dependent will, which is of itself not always conformable to reason; in the Divine will one cannot conceive any interest. But the human will may take an *interest* in a thing, without *acting*, on that account, *out of interest*. That signifies the *practical* interest in the action, this the *pathological* interest in the object of the action. That denotes but dependence of the will on principles of reason in itself, this on its principles for the behoof of inclination as reason furnishes but the practical rule, how the wants of inclination are to be supplied. In the first case the action interests me, in the second the object of the action, (provided it be agreeable to me). In the first section we have already seen, that in regard to an action out of duty the interest in the object must not be considered, but merely in the action itself and its principle in reason (the law).

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consonant to the law. Hence imperatives are but formules, to express the relation of objective laws in general to the subjective imperfection of the will of this or of that rational being, for instance, the human will.

All *imperatives* now command, either *hypothetically*, or *categorically*. Those represent the practical necessity of a possible action as a mean to attain something else that one wills (or is possible to be willed). The categorical imperative is that, which represents an action apart, without reference to another end, as objectively necessary.

As every practical law represents a possible action as good and therefore, for a subject practically determinable by reason, as necessary, so all imperatives are formules of the determination of an action which, according to the principle of a will in any one way good, is necessary. When now the action is good but *for something else*, as a mean, the imperative is *hypothetical*; if it is represented as good *in itself*, consequently as necessary in a will, as its principle, conformable in itself to reason, it is *categorical*.

The imperative then inquires, which action possible through me would be good, and represents the practical rule in relation to a will, that doth not immediately do an action, because it is good, partly as the subject does not always know, that it is good, and partly because, if he knew this even, his maxims might be contrary to the objective principles of a practical reason.

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The hypothetical imperative therefore says, only, that the action is good for any one *possible*, or *actual*, design. In the former case it is a *problematical*, in the latter, an *assertive*, practical principle. The categorical imperative, which explains the action as objectively necessary, without reference to any one purpose, that is, without any other end for itself, is valid as an *apodictical* (practical) principle.

One may conceive that, which is possible but by the powers of any one rational being, as a possible design for any one will, and for which reason there are in fact an infinite number of principles of action, provided this be represented as necessary, in order to accomplish a possible design thereby to be effected. All sciences have some one practical part, which consists of problems, that some one end is possible for us, and of imperatives, how it may be attained. These may therefore be named imperatives of *address* in general, Whether the end be reasonable and good, is by no means the question here, but only what is to be done, in order to attain it.

The recipes of the physician, for the purpose of curing his patient radically, and those of a poisoner, for the purpose of poisoning him with certainty, are of equal value in as much as each serves to obtain its object perfectly. As one in youth does not know what ends may occur in life, parents endeavour to make their children learn a great variety of things, and take care of the *address* or dexterity in the use of the means to all sorts of ends *at pleasure* of which

which they cannot determine, whether it may not actually become in future a design of their pupil, but which it is *possible*, that he may one day or other have, and this care is so great, as to occasion their neglecting to form and to correct the judgment of their children on the value of things, which they might perhaps make their ends.

There is however an end, which may actually be presupposed of all rational beings, (so far as imperatives are applicable to them, to wit, as dependent beings), and also a design, which they not only *may* have, but which one may presuppose with certitude, that they *have* according to a necessity of nature, and that is the design of *felicity*. The hypothetical imperative, which represents the practical necessity of the action, as a mean to the promotion of felicity, is *assertive*. It must not be propounded as merely necessary to an uncertain, barely possible design, but to a design, which may be presupposed in every man with certainty and *à priori*, because it pertains to his very being. Now the address in the choice of the means to his own greatest wellbeing may in the strictest sense be distinguished by the name of *prudence*.* Therefore

* The word prudence is taken in a twofold signification in the one it may bear the name of mundane prudence, and in the other that of private prudence. The former is the address of a person to have influence on others, in order to use them for his own purpose. The latter is the knowledge of uniting all these purposes for his own permanent advantage. The latter is properly that to which the value of even the former is reduced, and whoever is prudent in the former manner, but not in the latter, of him may rather be said, that he is acute and cunning, but in the main imprudent.

the imperative, which refers to the choice of the means to the proper felicity, that is, the precept of prudence, is always *hypothetical;* the action is not absolutely commanded, but as a mean only to another purpose.

In fine there is an imperative, which, without founding as a condition upon any other design to be accomplished by a certain conduct, immediately commands this conduct. This imperative is *categorical.* It doth not concern the matter of the action and what is to follow it, but the form and the principle, from which it issues itself, and the essential good of it consists in the mindedness, let the consequence be what it will. This imperative may be entitled that of *morality.*

The volition according to these three sorts of principles is clearly distinguished by the *inequality* of the necessitation of the will. In order now to render these conspicuous, I believe they would be named in their order the most suitably, were it said, That they are either *rules* of address, or *counsels* of prudence, or *commandments* (*laws*) of morality. For the law only carries with it the conception of an *unconditional* and indeed objective and by consequence universally valid *necessity*, and commandments are laws, which must be kept, that is, obeyed even contrary to inclination. *Counsel*, it is true, comprehends necessity, but which may be valid under subjective conditions merely at pleasure, whether this or the other man counts this or that to his happiness; whereas the categorical imperative is limited by no condition whatever, and may

properly

properly as absolutely, objectively, practically necessary be denominated a law. The first imperative might be named *technical* also (belonging to art), the second *pragmatical** (belonging to welfare), and the third *moral* (belonging to the free conduct in general, that is, morals).

The question now occurs, How are all these imperatives possible? This question does not require to know, how the accomplishment of the action, which the imperative commands, can be thought, but how the necessitation of the will merely, which the imperative expresses in the problem, can. How the imperative of address is possible, requires no particular exposition. Who wills the end, wills (provided reason have a decisive influence on his actions) the thereto indispensably necessary mean also, which is in his power. The position, as to the volition, is analytical; for in the volition of an object, as my effect, is thought my causality, as acting cause, that is, the use of the mean, and the imperative draws the conception of actions necessary to this end fom the conception of a volition of this end, (to determine the means themselves to a proposed design, thereto belong by all means synthetical positions, but which do not concern the ground, the act of the will, but to render the

* Meseems, the proper meaning of the word *pragmatic* might be thus determined the most precisely. For the *sanctions* are named *pragmatic*, which properly do not flow from the right of states, as necessary laws, but from the *care* of the universal welfare. A *history* is pragmatically composed, when it renders prudent, that is to say, instructs the world, how they may take better care of their own advantage, or at least as good, as former ages.

object

object actual). That, in order according to a sure principle to bisect or divide a line into two equal parts, I must describe from its ends two segments of a circle, this the mathematics teach by synthetical propositions only; but that, when I know, that the said effect cannot take place but by such an action, I, if I will the effect completely, will the action also, which is thereto requisite, in an analytical position; for to represent something as an effect possible by me in a certain manner, and to represent myself, with regard to it, acting in the same manner, are quite identical.

The imperatives of prudence, were it but as easy to give a determinate conception of felicity, would entirely coincide with those of address, and be in the same manner analytical. For here, as well as there, it would run, Whoever wills the end, wills (conformably to reason, of necessity) the sole means too, which are thereto in his power. But it is a misfortune, that the conception of felicity is a conception so indefinite, that, though every one wishes to attain felicity, he never can say precisely and in unison with himself, what he properly wishes and wills. The reason is, because all the elements, which appertain to the conception of felicity, are collectively empirical, that is, must be borrowed from experience, that to the idea of felicity is requisite an absolute whole, a *maximum* of being-well in one's present and in every future state. Now it is impossible, that the most perspicacious and at the same time

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the most powerful, but finite being should form a precise conception to himself of what he wills here. If great knowledge and penetration be the objects of his will, perhaps these might become but a sharper eye, to show him the more horribly the evils, which at present hide themselves from him, and yet cannot be avoided, or to heap up still more wants for his appetites, which already create him troubles enow. Does he desire long life; who can answer for its not being a long misery? If he wish for health, how often has a valetudinary state of body withheld from debauchery, into which illimited health would have allowed to fall, etc. In short, he is not able, according to any one principle, to determine with full certainty, what would really make him happy, because to this would be requisite omnisciency. Therefore one cannot act according to determinate principles, in order to be happy, but according to empirical counsels, for instance, of diet, of œconomy, of politeness, of reserve, etc. which experience teaches, that they one with another promote the most the being-well. Hence follows, that the imperative of prudence, strictly speaking, cannot command at all, that is, represent actions objectively as practically *necessary*, that they are rather to be considered as advices, than as commandments of reason, that the problem, To determine certainly and universally what action would promote the felicity of a rational being, is totally insolvable, consequently no imperative in respect of it possible, which in the

strict sense could command to do what renders happy, because felicity is not an ideal of reason, but of the imagination, which rests upon empirical grounds merely, of which one expects in vain, that they should determine an action, whereby the totality of in fact an infinite series of consequences would be attained. This imperative of prudence however, when it is supposed, that the means to felicity can be certainly furnished, would be an analytical practical position; For it is distinguished from the imperative of address but herein, that in this the end is possible merely, but in that, given: as both however command the means barely to the accomplishment of that, of which it is presupposed, that one willed it as end; so the imperative, which commands the volition of the means for him, who wills the end, is in both cases analytical. There is then no difficulty with regard to the possibility of such an imperative.

On the other side, how the imperative of *morality* is possible, is beyond a doubt the only query, which stands in need of a solution, as it is by no means hypothetical, and therefore the necessity objectively represented cannot rest upon any prior position, as in the hypothetical imperatives. It must always be remembered, that it is to be made out *by no example*, by consequence not empirically, whether there be any where any such imperative, but to take care, that all those, which seem categorical, may not be in a hidden manner hypothetical. For example, when it is said, Thou shalt not make a false promise;

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and it is supposed, that the necessity of this forbearance is not mere counsel to avoid any other evil, so that it might run thus, Thou shalt not promise falsely, in order, were it known, not to destroy thy credit; but an action of this species must be considered as bad of itself, the imperative of the interdiction is therefore categorical; thus it cannot be evinced with certitude in any example, that the will is determined here without other springs, merely by the law, although it seems so; for it is always possible that in secret, fear of shame, perhaps obscure apprehension of other dangers too, may have influence on the will. Who can prove through experience the nonexistence of a cause, since that teaches nothing more, than that we do not perceive it? In such a case however the moral imperative, so named, which as such appears categorical and unconditional, in fact would be but a pragmatical precept, that makes us attentive to our advantage, and teaches us to take care of this merely.

We therefore shall have to investigate totally *à priori* the possibility of a *categorical* imperative, as the advantage here is of no use to us, that the actuality should be given in experience, and thus the possibility not necessary to the establishment, but merely to the explication. So much however may be previously introspected, That the categorical imperative only is a practical *law*, the other imperatives in general may indeed be denominated *principles* of the will, but not laws; because, what is necessary to be done to ac-

complish a design, may be considered as contingent in itself, and we may always get rid of the precept, when we renounce the design, on the contrary the unconditional commandment, with regard to the opposite, leaves no choice free to the will, consequently carries with it that sole necessity, which we require to the law.

In the second place, with respect to this categorical imperative or law of morality, the ground of the difficulty (the possibility of perspecting it) is very great. It is a synthetic practical position* *à priori*, and as the possibility of perspecting laws of this sort is attended with so much difficulty in the theoretical cognition, it may be easily conjectured, that in the practical they will not be attended with less.

In this problem we shall first essay, whether the mere conception of a categorical imperative does not furnish its formule that contains the position, which only can be a categorical imperative; for to know how such an absolute commandment is possible, notwithstanding our being acquainted with its tenour, will still require a peculiar and a difficult labour, but which we shall defer till the last section.

* I connect with the will, without a presupposed condition from any one inclination whatever, the fact, *à priori*, consequently necessarily, (though but objectively, that is, under the idea of a reason, which has full power over all subjective motive causes). This is then a practical position, which doth not derive analytically the volition of an action from another which is already foreseen, (for we have no such perfect will), but immediately connected with the conception of the will as a rational being, as something, which is not comprised in it.

When

When I conceive a *hypothetical* imperative in general, I do not know beforehand, what it will contain, till the condition is given me. But when I conceive a *categorical* imperative, I know directly what it contains. For as the imperative, besides the law, contains but the necessity of the maxim,* to be conformable to this law, but the law contains no condition, to which it is limited, so nothing remains, but the universality of a law in general, to which the maxim of the action must be conformable, and which conformity solely represents the imperative as necessary,

The categorical imperative is therefore but a single one, and runs thus; ACT ACCORDING TO THAT MAXIM ONLY, WHICH THOU CANST AT THE SAME TIME WILL TO BECOME AN UNIVERSAL LAW.

If now all imperatives of duty may be derived from this single imperative, as their principle, we, though we leave it undetermined, whether that in general, which is named duty, be not a void conception, will however be able to point out at least, what we thereby think and what this conception means.

As the universality of the law, according to which effects happen, constitutes what is termed

* *Maxim* is the subjective principle of acting, and must be distinguished from the *objective principle*, namely, the practical law. That comprehends the practical rule, which reason determines conformably to the conditions of the subject (but frequently to its ignorance or even its inclinations), and is therefore the principle, according to which the subject acts; but the law is the objective principle, valid for every rational being, and the principle, according to which it *ought to act*, that is, an imperative.

termed *nature* in the most general sense (as to the form), that is, the existence of things, on condition that it be determined according to universal laws; so the universal imperative of duty may likewise be expressed thus: ACT IN SUCH A MANNER, AS IF THE MAXIM OF THY ACTION WERE BY THY WILL TO BECOME AN UNIVERSAL LAW OF NATURE.

We shall now enumerate a few duties, according to the usual division of them, into duties towards ourselves and towards other men, into perfect and imperfect duties.*

1. One who, by a series of evils, that is increased to despair, feels *a tædium vitæ*, but is still so far in the possession of his reason, as to be able to interrogate himself, whether it be not contrary to the duty towards himself, to take his own life. Now he tries, Whether the maxim of his action can become an universal law of nature. But his maxim is, I make it my principle from self-love, when life by prolonging it threatens with more evil, than it promises agreeableness, to abridge it. The question is, whether this principle of self-love can become an universal law of nature. It is however instantly perceived, that a nature, whose law it is, to destroy life itself

* I request the reader to remember, that I totally reserve the division of duties for the future *Metaphysics of Morals* this division then is made but at pleasure (for the purpose of ordering my examples). However I understand here by a perfect duty, that, which allows no exception for the advantage of inclination, and not only external, but internal *perfect duties* are included in this, which runs counter to the language adopted in the schools, but my intention is not to account for this at present, because it is indifferent to my purpose, whether it be granted me or not.

by

by the same sensation, whose destination it is to excite to the promotion of life, would be inconsistent with itself and therefore not subsist as nature, consequently that maxim cannot possibly have place as an universal law of nature, and of course is totally repugnant to the chief principle of all duty.

2. Another finds himself compelled by necessity to borrow money. He knows perfectly that he never can repay it, but perceives that it would not be lent him, unless he positively promised to repay it on a certain day. He is inclined to make such a promise; but has still so much conscience, as to question himself; Is it not illicit and contrary to duty to relieve one's self in such a manner from want? Let us however suppose that he resolved on it, his maxim would then be to this purpose, When I am in want of money, I will borrow and promise to pay, though I know it will never be performed. This principle of self-love, or of proper advantage, may perhaps coincide very well with my future welfare, but the question is at present, Whether it be right? In order to answer this, I shall transform the demand of self-love into an universal law, thus, What would be the consequence, were my maxim an universal law? It is immediately obvious that this maxim never can be valid as an universal law of nature and consonant with itself, but must of necessity contradict itself. For the universality of a law, that every one, who thinks himself in want, may promise whatever he pleases with the intention not to perform it,

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would render impossible both the promise and the end, which one might have in view, because nobody would believe that any thing was promised, but would laugh at every such utterance as a mere pretext.

3. A third discovers in himself a talent, which by means of a little culture might render him in every respect a useful member of society. But he finds himself easy in his circumstances, and prefers rather to addict himself to pleasure, than to exert himself in extending and improving the happy natural predispositions, with which he is endowed. He inquires however, Whether, besides the agreement, that his maxim of the neglect of his gifts of nature has in itself with his propensity to pleasure, it harmonise with that, which is named duty. He now perceives, that a nature may indeed subsist according to such an universal law, though man (like the inhabitants of the southsea) neglected his talents, and thought about passing his life in idleness merely, amusements, propagation, or in one word, enjoyment; but it is impossible he can *will*, that this shall become an universal law, or as such be implanted in us by instinct For as a rational being he wills of necessity, that all the faculties in him shall be developed, because they are serviceable and given to him for all sorts of possible purposes.

A *fourth* still, who is favoured by fortune, thinks, when he sees that others have to struggle with great difficulties (which he might easily remove), What's that to me? let every one be as happy, as heaven pleases, or as he can

can make himself, I would not lessen it in the least, nay, nor even envy him his happiness; only, I have no idea of contributing any thing, either to his welfare, or to his assistance in time of need! Were such a way of thinking an universal law of nature, the human species might by all means subsist very well, and no doubt still better, than when every one talks of participation and benevolence, and also strives, on occasion, to exercise these, but, on the other hand, cheats, wherever he can, and either sells the rights of mankind, or at least, derogates from them. But, though it is possible that, according to that maxim, a universal law of nature might subsist, it is impossible to *be willing*, that such a principle shall be every-where valid as a law natural. For a will, which resolved on this, would clash with itself, as many cases may happen, where one stands in need of the love and participation of others, and where he, by such a law of nature arisen from his own will, would deprive himself of all hope of the assistance, for which he wishes.

These are now a few of the many duties actual, or at least held such by us, whose division is evident from the sole principle already mentioned. One must *be able to will*, that a maxim of our action shall become an universal law; this is the canon of the moral judgment of it in general. Some actions are of that nature, that their maxim cannot without a contradiction be even *thought* as an universal law of nature; much less, can one *be willing*, that it shall become one. In others

that internal impossibility is not to be found, but it is nevertheless impossible to *will*, that their maxim be elevated to the universality of a law of nature, because such a will would be in contradiction with itself. It is obvious, that the former collide with the stricter or narrower (indispensable) duty, but the latter with the larger (meritorious) duty only, and thus all duties, as to the mode of obligation (not the object of their action), are by these examples completely displayed in their dependence on the sole principle.

When we attend to ourselves in every transgression of a duty, we find, that we are really not willing, that our maxim shall become an universal law, for that is impossible, but its opposite shall rather remain universally a law; only, we take the liberty, for ourselves, or (but for this once) in favour of our inclination, to make an *exception*. Consequently, if we considered every thing from the same point of view, namely, from reason, we should meet with a contradiction in our own will, to wit, that a certain principle is objectively necessary as a universal law, and yet must not be universally valid subjectively, but must allow exceptions. But, in the first place, as we contemplate our action from the point of view of a will totally conformable to reason, but secondly contemplate likewise the very same action from the point of view of a will affected by inclination, there is actually no contradiction here, but by all means a resistance of the inclination against the precept of reason, (*antagonismus*) by which the universality

versality of the principle (*universalitas*) is transformed into a mere generality (*generalitas*), that the practical principle of reason; to use the expression, may meet the maxim half way. Though in our own judgment impartially formed this cannot be justified, it evinces, that we actually acknowledge the validity of the categorical imperative, and allow ourselves (with all the reverence for it) but a few exceptions, as it seems to us, unimportant and extorted from us.

We have then proved so much at least, that, if duty is a conception, which is to comprise meaning and actual legislation for our actions, it can be expressed in categorical imperatives only, but by no means in hypothetical; in like manner, we have already performed a great deal, in having distinctly exhibited and determined for every use the matter of the categorical imperative, which must embrace the principle of all duty (if there be in general any such). But we are not yet so far advanced, to prove *à priori*, that such an imperative actually has place, that there is a practical law, which absolutely commands of itself and without all springs, and that the obeying of this law is duty.

With the view of attaining it, it is of the utmost consequence, to let this serve for a warning, not even to frame in the imagination an endeavour to derive the reality of this principle from the *peculiar property of human nature*. For duty ought to be the practical unconditional necessity of the action; it must therefore be valid for all rational beings (whom only

only an imperative can affect), and *but on that account* be a law for all human wills. What, on the contrary, is derived from the peculiar natural predisposition of humanity, what from certain feelings and propensions, nay, if possible, even from a peculiar bent, which is proper to human reason, and must not necessarily be valid for the will of every rational being, can furnish, it is true, a maxim for us, but no law, a subjective principle, according to which we have a propensity and inclination to act, but not an objective one, according to which we are *directed* to act, though all our propensity, inclination and natural œconomy were contrary, it even verifies the more the sublimity and internal dignity of the commandment in a duty, the less the subjective causes are for it, the more they are against it, without on that account either weakening but in the smallest degree the necessitation by the law, or abating any thing of its validity.

Here now we see philosophy placed, in fact, in a very dangerous station, which, notwithstanding it is neither hung on, nor supported by any thing, either in heaven, or on earth, must be firm. There she is to evidence her purity, as emperess of her laws, but not as herald of those, that an implanted sense, or who knows what guardian nature infuses into her, which, though they may be better than nothing at all, can collectively never yield principles that reason dictates, and which must absolutely have their source totally *à priori*, and herewith at the same time their commanding

commanding authority; to expect nothing from the inclination of man, but every thing from the supremacy of the law and the reverence due to it, or on the contrary to condemn men to self-contempt aud internal aversion.

All therefore that is empirical, is, as an *additamentum* to the principle of morality, not only totally unsuitable to it, but highly disadvantageous to the purity of morals themselves, as the proper value of an absolutely good will raised above all price consists exactly in the principle of action being free from every influence of contingent grounds, which experience only can furnish. One cannot warn too much or too often against the negligence or even the low cast of mind in searching for the principle among empirical motive causes and laws, because human reason in its lassitude willingly reposes upon this pillow, and in the dream of sweet delusions (which surround it, instead of Juno, however, with a cloud,) substitutes in the room of morality a bastard production patched up of members of a totally different nature, that looks like every thing one pleases, except virtue, to those, who have once beheld her in her true form.*

The question then is this, Is it a necessary law *for all rational beings*, always to judge their actions according to such maxims, as

* To behold virtue in her true form, is nothing but to exhibit morality, devested of all mixture of the sensible, and of all false ornament of reward, or of self-love. How much she then eclipses every thing else, which seems charming to the inclinations, every one, by means of the smallest exertion of his reason, that is not become entirely useless for all abstraction, may easily perceive.

they

they themselves can be willing to ordain universal laws? If there is such a one, it must be combined (totally *à priori*) with the conception of the will of a rational being in general. But in order to discover this connection, one must, let the aversion be ever so great, take a step into metaphysics, though into a district of them, which is different from that of speculative philosophy, namely, the metaphysics of morals. In a practical philosophy, where it is not our business, to assume grounds from that, which *happens*, but laws from that, which *ought to happen*, though it never happens, that is, objective practical laws: there it is not necessary to make investigations of the grounds, why something pleases or displeases, how the pleasure of mere sense is distinguished from taste, and whether this be different from a universal complacency of reason; upon what rests feeling of pleasure and displeasure, and how from this spring appetites and inclinations, but from these, by the cooperation of reason, maxims; for all that belongs to an empirical psychology, which would make up the second part of physics, when they are contemplated as *philosophy of nature*, so far as it is founded upon *empirical laws.* But objective practical laws are in present agitation, consequently the relation which a will bears to itself, so far as it determines itself by reason merely, as then all that has reference to the empirical drops of course; because, when *reason of itself only* determines the conduct, (of which

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we shall just now inquire into the possibility,) it must of necessity do this *à priori*

The will is thought as a faculty; to determine itself to action, *conformably to the representation of certain laws.* And such a faculty can be met with in rational beings only. That which serves the will for the objective ground of its self-determination, is the END, and this, when it is given by mere reason, must be equally valid for all rational beings. What, on the other hand, contains the ground of the possibility of the action merely, whose effect is end, is named the MEAN. The subjective ground of appetition is the SPRING, the objective ground of volition the MOTIVE: hence distinction between subjective ends, which the rest upon springs, and objective ones, that depend on motives, which are valid for every rational being. Practical principles are FORMAL, when they abstract from all subjective ends; but they are MATERIAL, when they lay these, consequently certain springs, as a foundation. The ends, which a rational being proposes to himself at pleasure as effects of his action (material ends) are altogether but relative; for only their relation merely to a peculiarly natured appetitive faculty of the subject gives them the value, which for that reason can furnish no universally valid and necessary principles for all rational beings, and for every volition too, that is, practical laws. Hence all these relative ends are but the ground of hypothetical imperatives.

But let us take for granted, that there is something, *whose existence in itself* has an absolute

solute value, which, as *end in itself*, can be a ground of determinate laws; there would lie in it, and in it only, the ground of a possible categorical imperative, that is, a practical law.

Now I say, Man or generally speaking every rational being, *exists* as an end in itself, *not barely as a mean* for the use of this or of that will at pleasure, but must, in all his actions directed, as well towards himself, as towards other rational beings, always be contemplated *at the same time as an end.* All the objects of inclination have but a conditional value; for, were not the inclinations and the wants founded upon them, their object would be of no value. The inclinations themselves however, as sources of the wants, have so little an absolute value, in order to wish for them themselves, that rather, to be entirely exempt from them, must be the universal wish of every rational being. Therefore the value of all objects *to be acquired* by our action is always conditional. The beings, whose existence depends not, it is true, on our will, but on nature, have, when they are irrational beings, but a relative value, as means, and on that account are denominated THINGS, whereas rational beings are named PERSONS, because their nature distinguishes them as ends in themselves, that is, as something, which dares not be used as a mean, consequently limits so far all arbitrament (and is an object of reverence). These are then not merely subjective ends, whose existence, as effect of our action, is of value *to us;* but

objective

objective ends, that is, things, whose existence is an end in itself, and indeed such a one, in whose place no other end can be put, if they were to serve for means *barely*, because without this, nothing at all of *absolute value* would be to be metwith; were value however conditional, and of course contingent, no highest practical principle could be any-where met with for reason.

If then there shall be a chief practical principle, and, in regard of the human will, a categorical imperative, such a one must be, as constitutes an *objective* principle of the will, the representation of that, which is an end for every body, because it is *an end in itself*, consequently can serve for a universal practical law. The ground of this principle is, *Rational nature exists as an end in itself.* Thus man necessarily represents to himself his own existence; so far is it therefore a *subjective* principle of human actions. But every other rational being represents to himself in the like manner his existence, in pursuance of the very same ground of reason, which is valid for me; therefore it is at the same time an objective principle, from which, as a chief practical ground, all the laws of the will must be able to be derived. The practical imperative is then: ACT SO, THAT THOU ALWAYS USE THE HUMANITY, AS WELL IN THY PERSON, AS IN THE PERSON OF EVERY OTHER, AT THE SAME TIME AS AN END, BUT NEVER AS A MEAN BARELY. Let us see, whether this can be put in execution.

* This position we set forth here as a postulate. The grounds of this will be found in the last section.

To adhere to the foregoing examples, *First*, according to the conception of the necessary duty towards one's self, he, who designs suicide, will put the question to himself, Whether his action can subsist with the idea of humanity, *as an end in itself*. When he, in order to escape from a tiresome state, destroys himself, he makes use of a person, barely as *a mean*, to the preservation of a supportable state till the end of life. But man is not a thing, consequently not something, which can be used as a mean *barely*, but must in all his actions be considered always as an end in itself. Therefore I cannot dispose of the man in my person, to mutilate, to destroy, or to kill him. (I must here pass by the nearer determination of this principle for the purpose of avoiding all misunderstanding, for instance, of the amputation of members, in order to preserve my life, the danger, to which I expose my life, in order to preserve it etc. that determination belongs to moral properly so named).

Secondly, as to the necessary duty, or the duty due towards others, he, who has a mind to make a false promise to others, will directly perceive, that he has the intention of making use of another man *as a mean barely*, without his comprising at the same time the end in itself. For he, whom I intend to employ for my purposes, cannot possibly consent to my manner of proceeding with him, and therefore comprise in himself the end of this action. This collision with the principle of other men becomes more conspicuous, when examples

are

are given of attacks on the liberty and the property of others. For there it is evident, that the transgressor of the rights of men intends to make use of the person of others as a mean barely, without taking notice that they, as rational beings, ought always to be considered at the same time as ends, that is, only as such, as must be able to contain in themselves the end of the very same action.*

Thirdly, with regard to the casual (meritorious) duty towards one's self, it is not sufficient, that the action is not repugnant to the humanity in our person, as end in itself, it must *harmonise therewith* also. Now there are in humanity predispositions to greater perfection, which pertain to the end of nature in respect of the humanity in our subject; to neglect these might however subsist with the *preservation* of humanity, as end in itself, but not with the *promoting* of this end.

Fourthly, concerning the meritorious duty towards others, the natural end, which all men propose, is their own felicity. Humanity would indeed subsist, were one not to contribute to the felicity of another, but also not to lessen it intentionally; however it is

* Let it by no means be imagined, that the trivial, *quod tibi non vis fieri etc.* can serve here for a rule or principle. For it is, though with different limitations, but derived from the foregoing principle; it cannot be a universal law, for it comprehends not the ground either of the duties towards one's self, or of the duties of love towards others, (for many would willingly agree, that others should not befriend them, provided they were but freed from conferring a benefaction on others,) or, finally, of the duties owe to others; for the criminal would from this ground argue against the judge who punishes him, etc.

but a negative and not a positive consension with *humanity*, *as end in itself*, when every one does not endeavour to forward the ends of others, as much as he can. For the ends of the subject, which is an end in itself, must, if that representation of humanity shall have *every* effect on me, be *my* ends likewise, as much as possible.

This principle of humanity and of every rational being in general, *as end in itself*, (which is the chief limiting condition of the liberty of the actions of every man,) is not borrowed from experience, in the first place, by reason of its universality, as it refers to all rational beings in general, concerning which to determine any thing no experience suffices: secondly, because therein humanity is not represented as end of man (subjectively) that is, as an object, which one, of one's self, actually makes one's end, but as an objective end, which, whatever ends we may have, ought as a law to constitute the chief limiting condition of all subjective ends, consequently must spring from pure reason. The ground of all practical legislation lies *objectively in the rule* and the form of the universality, which makes it capable of being a law (at all events a law of nature), (according to the first principle) but *subjectively* in the *end*; the subject of all ends however is every rational being, as end in itself (according to the second principle: to this now is consequential the third practical principle of the will, as chief condition of its agreement with universal practical

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reason, the idea *of the will of every rational being as an universally legislative will.*

According to this principle all maxims, which cannot consist with the proper universal legislation of the will, are rejected. The will is then not subjected to the law entirely, but subjected in such a manner, that it must be considered *as self-legislative* too, and on that account first subjected to the law (of which it may contemplate itself as even author).

The imperatives, according to the preceding mode of representation, namely, the universal legality of actions similar to an *order of nature*, or the universal *prerogative of end* in itself of rational beings, excluded by their commanding authority all mixture of any interest whatever, as spring, because they were represented as categorical; they were however *assumed* as categorical, only, because such like must be assumed, if one would explain the conception of duty. But that there are practical positions which command categorically, could not be proved by themselves, and cannot yet be done here; however one thing might have been done, namely, that the renunciation of all interest in the volition out of duty, as the specifical mark of distinction between the categorical and the hypothetical imperative, be notified in the imperative itself, by any one determination, which it contains, and this takes place in the present third formule, to wit, the idea of the will of every rational being, as an *universally legislative will.*

For when we conceive such a one, though a will, *which ranks under laws*, may still by means of an interest be bound to this law, a will, which is itself supremely legislative, cannot possibly depend so much on any one interest; for such a dependent will would need another law still, to limit the interest of its self-love to the condition of a validity for an universal law.

Therefore the principle of every human will, as *an universally legislative will by all its maxims*,* if it were otherwise perfectly clear, would be *very apposite* to the categorical imperative, as it, just for the sake of the idea of the universal legislation, *grounds* itself *upon no interest* and therefore among all possible imperatives can be the only *unconditional* one; or still better, when we reverse the position, if there is a categorical imperative, (that is, a law for every will of a rational being,) it can command, to do from the maxim of its will only, as such, every thing, which at the same time can have itself as universally legislative for its object; for then only is the practical principle and the imperative, which it obeys, unconditional, because it can have no interest at all at the bottom.

When we take a retrospect of all the efforts, which have hitherto been made, in order to discover the principle of morality, it is no wonder why they collectively could not but fail. Man was considered as bound to laws

* I need not here give examples to illustrate this principle, as those, which explain the categorical imperative and its formule, may all serve for this purpose.

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by his duty, but it never occurred, that he is subjected *but to his own* and yet *universal legislation*, and that he is bound to act conformably to his own, but, according to the end of nature, legislative, will only. For, were he thought as bound but to one law (whatever it be), this must carry with it some one interest or other as incentive or coaction, because it did not arise as a law from *his* will, but this was legally necessitated by *something else*, to act in a certain manner. By this quite necessary consequence however, all labour to find a chief ground of duty was irretrievably lost. For duty never resulted, but only necessity of action from a certain interest. This might now be either a proper or a foreign interest. But then the imperative must fall out to be conditional, and could not at all be fit for the moral commandment. I shall therefore name this principle the AUTONOMY of the will, in contradistinction to every other, which I for that reason count to the HETERONOMY.

The conception of every rational being, who must consider himself by all the maxims of his will as universally legislative, in order from this point of view to judge himself and his actions, leads to a very fecund conception of his, namely that of *a kingdom of ends*.

I understand by a *kingdom* the systematical conjunction of different rational beings by common laws. As laws determine the ends according to their universal validity, so, when the personal difference of rational beings, as also all the matter of their private ends, is abstracted from, a whole of all ends (as well of

of rational beings as ends in themselves, as of the proper ends, which every one may propose to himself,) may be conceived in a systematical connection, that is, a kingdom of ends, which is possible according to the above principles.

For all rational beings rank under the law, That every one of them shall treat himself and others *not as means barely*, but always at the same time as ends in themselves. Hereby arises however a systematical conjunction of rational beings by common objective laws, that is, a kingdom which, since these laws have in view the reference of these beings one to another, as ends and means, may be denominated a kingdom of ends (though indeed but an ideal).

A rational being belongs to the kingdom of ends as *a member*, when he is therein universally legislative, but also subjected himself to these laws. He belongs thereto as *a Sovereign*, when he as legislative is not subjected to any will of another.

The rational being must contemplate himself always as legislative in a kingdom of ends possible by liberty of the will, whether it be as a member, or as a Sovereign. But he cannot fill the place of the latter by the maxim of his will merely, but then only, when he is a totally independent being, without wants and limitation of his faculties adequate to the will.

Morality consists in the reference of all actions to the legislation, by which only a kingdom of ends is possible. This legislation however must be in every rational being himself,

self, and arise from his will, whose principle then is, To perform no action according to another maxim, than so, that that can consist with this being a universal law, and therefore so only, that *the will can contemplate itself at the same time as universally legislative by its maxim.* If the maxims are not by their nature necessarily concordant with the objective principle of rational beings, as universally legislative, the necessity of the action according to that principle is named practical necessitation, that is, DUTY. Duty is not incumbent on the Sovereign in the kingdom of ends, but it is by all means on every member, and on all of them in an equal measure.

The practical necessity, according to this principle, to act, that is, duty, rests not at all upon feelings, incitements and inclinations, but merely on the relation which rational beings bear one to another, in which the will of a rational being must always be considered at the same time as *legislative*, because it could not else conceive them *as ends in themselves.* Reason, therefore, refers every maxim of the will as universally legislative to every other will, and also to every action towards itself, and this not for the sake of any other practical motive whatever or future advantage, but from the idea of the *dignity* of a rational being, who obeys no law, but that, which he at the same time gives himself.

In the kingdom of ends every thing has either a PRICE, or a DIGNITY. What has a price, something else can be put in its place, as an *equivalent;* whereas that, which is raised

raised above all price, consequently admits of no equivalent, has a dignity.

What refers to the universal human inclinations and necessities, has a *marketprice;* that, which, without presupposing a necessity, is agreeable to a certain taste, that is, a complacency in the mere play of the powers of our mind to no end, *a price of affection*, but that, which constitutes the condition, on which only something can be an end in itself, has not merely a relative value, that is, a price, but an intrinsic value, that is, DIGNITY.

Now morality is the condition, on which only a rational being can be an end in itself; because it is possible but by it to be a legislative member in the kingdom of ends. Therefore morality and humanity, so far as it is susceptible of the other, are that only which has dignity. Address and diligence in labour have a marketprice; wit, a lively imagination, and humour, a price of affection: whereas veracity in promising, and benevolence from principle, (not from instinct,) have an intrinsic value: Neither nature, nor art contains any thing which, were they wanting, could be put in their place; for their value consists not in the effects which follow, not in the advantage and use, which they afford, but in the sentiments, that is, the maxims of the will, which are ready to manifest themselves in this manner in actions, though the consequences should not be favourable to them. These actions require no recommendation from any subjective disposition or taste whatever, to consider them with immediate favour and compla-

complacency, no immediate propension or feeling for them: they exhibit the will, which performs them, as an object of immediate reverence, to which nothing but reason is required, to *impose* them on the will, not to *obtain* them from it *by flattery*, which, with regard to duties, would be a contradiction. This estimation enables to cognise the value of such a cast of mind, as a dignity, and puts it infinitely above all price, with which it can be neither computed, nor compared, without a violation, in a manner, of its sacredness.

What is it, now, which entitles the moral good mindedness or virtue to have so great pretensions? It is nothing less than the *share*, which it procures the rational being *in the universal legislation*, and hereby renders him fit to be a member in the possible kingdom of ends, to which he is destined by his own nature, as end in itself, and for that reason as legislative in the kingdom of ends, in regard of all laws of nature as free, obedient to those only, which he himself gives and according to which his maxims can belong to an universal legislation (to which he at the same time submits himself). For nothing has a value, but what the law determines to it.

The legislation itself, however, which determines all value, must on that account have a dignity, that is, an unconditional, incomparable value, for which the word *reverence* only furnishes the suitable expression of the estimation, in which a rational being holds it. AUTONOMY is therefore the ground of

of the dignity of the human and of every rational nature.

The three mentioned modes, to represent the principles of morality, are at bottom but so many formules of the same law, one of which unites in itself the other too. However there is a distinction in them, which is rather subjectively than objectively, practical, namely, for the purpose of bringing an idea of reason (according to a certain analogy) nearer to intuition and thereby to feeling. All maxims have

1. *A form*, which consists in the universality, and here the formule of the moral imperative is expressed thus, That the maxims must be so chosen, as if they should be valid as universal laws;

2. *A maxim*, to wit, an end, and the formule runs thus, That the rational being, as an end according to his nature, by consequence as an end in itself, must serve every maxim for limiting condition of all merely relative and arbitrable ends.

3. *A complete determination of all maxims* by the formule, That all maxims from the proper legislation shall harmonise, with a possible kingdom of ends, as a kingdom of nature.* The progression is made here, as by the categories of the UNITY of the form of the will, (its universality,) of the PLURALITY of

* Teleology considers nature as a kingdom of ends, Moral as a possible kingdom of nature. There the kingdom of ends is a theoretical idea, for the explication of what exists. Here it is a practical idea, to bring to pass that, which doth not exist, but which may by our actions become actual, and indeed conformably to this very idea.

the matter, (the objects, that is, the ends,) and of the TOTALITY of the system of it. It is better however, in this moral *judgment*, always to proceed according to the strict method, and to build upon the universal formule of the categorical imperative, namely, ACT ACCORDING TO THAT MAXIM, WHICH CAN AT THE SAME TIME CONSTITUTE ITSELF AN UNIVERSAL LAW. But in order to procure an *inlet* into the minds for the moral law, it is very useful to carry the same action through the said three conceptions, and to let it approach, as much as possible, towards intuition.

We may now end with what we began, to wit, the conception of an unconditionally good will. That *will is absolutely good*, which cannot be bad, consequently whose maxim, were it made an universal law, never can jar with itself. Its chief law is this principle: Always act according to that maxim, whose universality as a law thou canst at the same time will; this is the only condition, on which a will can never be inconsistent with itself, and such an imperative is categorical. As the validity of the will, as an universal law for possible actions, has analogy to the universal connection of the existence of things according to universal laws, which is the formal of nature in general, so the categorical imperative may be thus expressed also: ACT ACCORDING TO MAXIMS, WHICH AT THE SAME TIME CAN HAVE THEMSELVES AS UNIVERSAL LAWS OF NATURE FOR OBJECT. Thus stands the formule of an absolutely good will.

Rational

Rational nature distinguishes itself from other natures, by proposing an end for itself. This would be the matter of every good will. But, as in the idea of an absolutely good will without a restricting condition (of the attaining of this or of that end), every end to be effected, must be entirely abstracted from, (as that would make every will but negatively good,) so the end here must be thought, not as an end to be effectuated, but a SELF-SUFFICIENT end, consequently but negatively, that is, which must never be acted against, nor esteemed as a mean barely, but always as an end at the same time in every volition. This cannot be but the subject of all possible ends, because this is at the same time the subject of a possible absolutely good will; for this cannot, without implying a contradiction, be less valued than another object. The principle, Act in reference to every rational being (thyself and others) so, that thy maxim may at the same time be valid as an end in itself, is therefore identical at the bottom with the principle, Act according to that maxim, which comprises in itself at the same time its proper universal validity for every rational being. For, that I shall limit my maxim in the use of the means to every end to the condition of its universal validity, as a law for every subject, says as much, as that the subject of ends, that is, the rational being himself, must never ground the maxims of actions as a mean barely, but as chief limiting condition in the use of all means, that is, always as an end at the same time.

Hence

Hence follows indisputably, That every rational being, as end in itself, must consider himself in regard of all laws, to which he may be subjected, at the same time as universally legislative, because this very fitness of his maxims for universal legislation distinguishes him as an end in itself, in like manner, as this his dignity (prerogative) will have it so in preference to all mere beings of nature, that he must always take his maxims, if I may so express myself, from the point of view of himself, but at the same time of every other rational being as legislative, (who is on that account named person). In this manner is a world of rational beings, (*mundus intelligibilis*) as a kingdom of ends, possible, and that by the proper legislation of all the persons as members. Accordingly every rational being must act, as if he were always by his maxims a legislative member in the universal kingdom of ends. The formal principle of these maxims is, Act as if thy maxim should at the same time serve for an universal law (of all rational beings). A kingdom of ends is but possible according to the analogy with a kingdom of nature, but that according to maxims only, that is, rules imposed on one's self, this according to laws only of efficient causes externally necessitated. Notwithstanding which, the whole of nature, though it is considered as a machine, yet, so far as it has reference to rational beings, as their ends, is for this reason denominated a kingdom of nature. Such a kingdom of ends would actually be brought about by maxims, *were they universally*

sally observed, whose rule the categorical imperative of all rational beings prescribes. But, though the rational being, notwithstanding he himself should punctually observe this maxim, cannot expect, that every other will on that account be true to it, or that the kingdom of nature, and its order conformable-to-end, will harmonise with him, as a suitable member, to bring to pass a kingdom of ends possible by himself, that is to say, will favour his expectation of felicity; the law, Act according to maxims of an universally legislative member of a merely possible kingdom of ends, remains in its full force, because it is categorically commanding. And herein consists the paradox, That the dignity of humanity merely, as a rational nature, without any other end whatever to be accomplished by it, or advantage, consequently the reverence for a mere idea, should serve for an indispensable precept of the will, and that the sublimity of it directly consists in their independence of the maxim on all such springs, and the worthiness of every rational subject to be a legislative member in the kingdom of ends; else he would need to be represented as subjected but to the natural law of his wants. Though the kingdom of nature, as well as that of ends, should be thought as united under a Sovereign, and the latter should thereby remain no longer a mere idea, but obtain true reality, that would indeed receive by this the accession of a strong spring, but never an augmentation of its intrinsic value; for, this notwithstanding, even this only illimited law-

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giver must always be represented, as if he judged the value of rational beings but according to their disinterested conduct prescribed by themselves from that idea merely. The essence of things is not altered by their external relations, and what only, without thinking of the latter, constitutes the absolute value of man, according to this must he be judged, by whomsoever it be, even by the Supreme Being himself. MORALITY then is the relation of actions to the autonomy of the will, that is, the possible universal legislation by the maxims of the will. The action, which can consist with the autonomy of the will, is LICIT; what doth not agree with it, is ILLICIT. The will, whose maxims necessarily harmonise with the laws of autonomy, is a SACRED, absolutely good will. The dependence of a will not absolutely good on the principle of autonomy (the moral necessitation) is OBLIGATION. This cannot therefore extend to a sacred being. The objective necessity of an action from obligation is named DUTY.

It may now be easily explained from what has been briefly said, how it happens, that, though we conceive by the conception of duty a subjection to the law, we thereby represent to ourselves at the same time a certain sublimity and *dignity* in that person, who discharges all his duties. For there is indeed no sublimity in him, so far as he is *subjected* to the moral law, but by all means, so far as he, with regard to the very same law, is at the same time *legislative*, and but on that account subordinate to it. We have likewise shown

 above,

above, that neither fear, nor inclination, but merely reverence for the law, is that spring, which can give the action a moral value. Our own will, so far as it acts but under the condition of universal legislation possible by its maxims, this will, I say, possible to us in idea, is the proper object of reverence, and the dignity of humanity consists in this very ability of being universally legislative, though on condition of being subjected itself at the same time to this legislation.

The Autonomy of the Will *as* *chief Principle of Morality.*

Autonomy of the will is that quality of the will, by which it is a law to itself (independently on every quality of the objects of volition). The principle of autonomy then is, Not to chuse otherwise, than so, that the maxims of one's choice are at the same time comprehended as an universal law in the same volition. That this practical rule is an imperative, that is, the will of every rational being is of necessity bound to it as a condition, cannot be proved by the mere dissection of the conceptions comprised in it, because it is a synthetic position; we would need to pursue our researches beyond the cognition of objects to a critic of the subject, that is, to pure practical reason, for this synthetic position,

position, which commands positively, must be cognised totally *à priori*, but this business does not belong to the present section. However, it may be perfectly evinced by the mere dissection of the conceptions of morality, that the said principle of autonomy is the only principle of moral: For by that operation it is found, that its principle must be a categorical imperative, but this commands nothing more or less, than does directly this autonomy.

THE HETERONOMY OF THE WILL *as* *the Source of all spurious Principles of Morality.*

When the will seeks the law that is to determine it *any where else*, than in the fitness of its maxims for its own universal legislation, consequently, when it, prosecuting its inquiries without itself, seeks that law in the quality of any one of its objects whatever, the result is always *heteronomy*. The will then doth not give itself the law, but the object by its relation to the will gives the law to the will. This relation, whether it rests upon inclination, or upon representations of reason, allows but hypothetical imperatives to become possible: I ought to do something, *because I have a mind to do something else.* Whereas the moral, consequently categorical imperative says, I ought to act so or so, though I should have a mind to nothing else. For example, that says, I ought not to lie, if I wish to pre-

serve my credit; but this, I ought not to lie, though it should not be productive of the smallest disgrace to me. The latter must therefore abstract so far from every object, that this shall have no *influence* at all on the will, in order that practical reason (will), not merely foreign interest, may administer, and show its chief legislation by its own commanding authority. I ought, for instance, to endeavour to promote the happiness of others, not as if I had an interest in it, (whether by immediate inclination, or any one complacency indirectly by reason,) but merely because the maxim, which excludes it, cannot be comprehended in the same volition as an universal law.

DIVISION
of all possible Principles of Morality from the adopted fundamental Conceptions of Heteronomy.

Human reason, as well here, as every-where else in its pure use, took hitherto, so long as a critic was wanting to it, every possible wrong way, ere it succeeded in finding out the right one.

All principles, which arise from heteronomy, are either *empirical* or *rational.* The *former*, from the principle of FELICILY, are built upon either the physical or the moral feeling, the *latter*, from the principle of PERFECTION, either upon its conception of reason, as possible effect, or upon the conception of a self-sufficient perfection (the will of God), as determining cause of our will.

Empirical principles are by no means fit for a foundation of moral laws. For the universality, by which moral laws ought to be valid for all rational beings without distinction, the unconditonal practical necessity, which is thereby imposed on them, vanishes, when their ground is taken from the *peculiar œconomy* or *disposition of human nature*, or from the casual circumstances attending it. The principle of *proper felicity*, however, is the most repudiable, not merely because it is false, and that experience contradicts the pretence, that welfare depends on good conduct, and not merely

merely because it contributes nothing at all to the founding of morality, as it is totally different to make a happy man, and to make a good man, to make him prudent and skilful in attending to his own interest, and to make him virtuous; but, because it bottoms morality upon springs, which undermine it, and destroy its whole sublimity, as they put the motive causes of virtue and those of vice into the same class and teach, only how to make the best calculation, but blot out entirely the specific distinction between them; whereas the moral feeling or sentiment, this opiniative peculiar sense (however superficial the reference to it is, as those, who cannot *think*, believe to help themselves by *feeling*, even in what concerns universal laws merely, however little feelings, which, according to the degree, are by nature infinitely different from one another, furnish an equal standard of good and of bad, nay, one by his feeling cannot judge at all for others in a valid manner), this opiniative peculiar sense * remains nearer to morality and to its dignity, by doing virtue the honour to ascribe to her *immediately* the complacency, and the high esteem for her, and, as it were, does not say to her face, that it is not her beauty, but interest or profit, which binds us to her.

* I reckon the principle of the moral feeling to that of felicity, because every empirical interest, by the agreeableness, which yields but something, whether it be immediately and without a view to advantage, or in consideration of this, promises an addition to welfare. In like manner must one reckon, with HUTCHESON, the principle of participation in the happiness of others to the same moral sense adopted by him.

Among

Among the *rational* principles or grounds of reason, of morality, the ontological conception of *perfection*, (however void, however vague, consequently useless it is, to find out in the immense field of possible reality the greatest sum suitable to us, how much soever it has, in order to distinguish the reality, in agitation at present, specifically from every other, an inevitable propensity to go in a circle, and cannot avoid to presuppose in secret the morality, which it ought to explain,) the ontological conception of *perfection* is better than the theological, to derive it from a divine all-perfect will, not merely because we cannot apprehend its perfection immediately, but can derive it from our conceptions only, among which that of morality is the most eminent, but because, when we do not do this, (as it, were it done, would be a gross circle in explaining) the yet remaining conception of this will from the attributes of ambition and desire of dominion, combined with the dreadful representations of potency and of emulation, must lay the foundation of a system of morals, which is directly opposed to morality.

But were I obliged to choose between the conception of the moral sense and that of perfection in general, (both which do not derogate, at least, from morality, though they as foundations are not at all fit to support it), I would determine for the latter, because it witholds, at least, the decision of the question from the sensitive faculty and appeals to the tribunal of pure reason; and though it even decides nothing

nothing here, it preserves unadulterated the indefinite idea (of a will good in itself) for a nearer determination.

Besides I believe I may be excused from a prolix refutation of all these systems. Their refutation is so easy, it is in all probability so well understood by those, whose office requires of them to declare themselves for one of these theories, (as auditors may not brook the delay of the judgment), that it would be but a very superfluous labour. But what interests us more at present, is, to know, That these principles set forth nothing but heteronomy of the will as the first ground of morality, and for that reason must of necessity miss their aim.

Wherever an object of the will must be laid as a foundation, in order to prescribe to the will the rule, which determines it, the rule is nothing but heteronomy; the imperative is conditional, *if* or *because* one wills this object, one ought to act so or so; consequently it never can command morally, that is categorically. Whether the object determine the will by means of inclination, as in the principle of proper felicity, or by means of reason directed to objects of our possible will in general, in the principle of perfection, the will never determines itself *immediately* by the representation of the action, but only by the spring, which the foreseen effect of the action produces; *I ought to do something, because I will something else*, and here another law must be laid as a foundation in my subject, according to which I of necessity will

this other thing, which law again requires an imperative, to limit this maxim. For, as the incentive, which the representation of an object possible by our powers is, according to the natural quality of the subject, to exercise on his will, belongs to the nature of the subject, whether it be to the sensitive faculty, (inclination and taste,) or to understanding and to reason, which, according to the peculiar œconomy of their nature, exercise themselves on an object with complacency; so nature gives the law, which, as such, must not be cognised and proved by experience only, consequently it is in itself contingent and thereby unfit for an apodictical practical rule, such as the moral rules must be, but it is *always heteronomy only* of the will, the will does not give itself the law, but a foreign incentive gives it, by means of a nature of the subject's, disposed for the receptibility of this incentive.

The absolutely good will, whose principle must be a categorical imperative, comprises then, with regard to all objects indeterminately, merely the FORM OF VOLITION in general; as autonomy, that is, fitness of the maxim of every good will, to constitute itself an universal law, which the will of every rational being imposes on himself, without forming a basis of any other spring or interest whatever.

How such a synthetic practical position à priori is possible, and why it is necessary, are problems, whose solution lies no longer within the sphere of the metaphysics of morals,

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no, nor have we maintained its truth here, much less pretended to have a proof of it in our power. We showed but by unfolding the conception of morality, about to be in universal use, That an autonomy of the will adheres to it, or rather founds it. Whoever then holds morality something, and not a chimerical idea without truth, must at the same time admit the above-mentioned principle of it. This section, as well as the first, is analytical merely. That morality now is no fancy, which follows when the categorical imperative together with the autonomy of the will is true and as a principle *à priori* absolutely necessary, requires to be evinced by a POSSIBLE SYNTHETICAL USE OF PURE PRACTICAL REASON, but which we dare not hazard, without letting a CRITIC of this faculty of reason itself precede, of which we have to trace in the following and last section the principal lineaments sufficient for our purpose.

SECTION

SECTION III.

Transition from the Metaphysics of Morals to the Critic of pure practical Reason.

The Conception of Liberty is the Key to the Exposition of the Autonomy of the Will.

The will is a species of causality of living beings, so far as they are rational, and liberty is that property of this causality, that it can be efficient independently on foreign causes *determining* it; in the same manner as the necessity of nature is the property of the casuality of all irrational beings, to be determined to activity by the influence of extraneous causes.

The above exposition of liberty is *negative*, and therefore of no use, in order to perspect its essence: however a *positive* conception, which is more abundant and fructuous, arises out of it. As the conception of a causality carries with it that of *laws*, according to which, by something, which we denominate cause, something else, namely, the effect, must be posited or laid down; so liberty, though it is not indeed a property of the will according to laws natural, is not for that reason entirely lawless, but must rather be a causality according to immutable laws, but of a peculiar sort; for otherwise a free will would be a nonentity. The necessity of nature

nature is a heteronomy of efficient causes; for every effect is possible but according to the law, that something else determines the efficient cause to causality; What then can the liberty of the will be, but autonomy, that is, the property of the will, to be a law to itself? But the position, The will is in all actions a law to itself, denotes but the principle, to act according to no other maxim, than what can have itself as an universal law for object. But this is exactly the formule of the categorical imperative and the principle of morality: therefore a free will and a will under moral laws are identical.

When liberty of the will is presupposed, morality together with its principle follows, by the mere dissection of its conception. However the latter is always a synthetic position: an absolutely good will is that, whose maxim can always comprehend itself, contemplated as an universal law, in itself, for that property of the maxim cannot be found by dissection of the conception of an absolutely good will. But such synthetic positions are possible but by both cognitions being conjoined by the connection with a third, wherein they are both to be met with. The *positive* conception of liberty creates this third, which cannot be, as in physical causes, of the nature of the sensible world, (in whose conception the conceptions of something as cause, in relation to *something else* as effect, coincide). What this third is, which liberty points out to us, and of which we have an idea *à priori*, cannot be yet shown, nor the deduction

tion of the conception of liberty from pure practical reason, and with it the possibility of a categorical imperative, rendered conceivable, but requires still some preparing.

Liberty *must be presupposed as a Property of the Will of all rational Beings.*

It is not euough, that we ascribe liberty to our will, whatever be the ground, if we have not sufficient reason to attribute the same liberty to all rational beings likewise. For as morality serves us for a law as *rational beings* merely, it must be valid for all rational beings too, and as it must be derived from the property of liberty only, so liberty must be evinced to be a property of the will of all rational beings, and it is not enough, to prove it from certain opiniative experiences of human nature (though this is impossible and it can be proved *à priori* only,) but it must be proved as an activity of rational beings in general who are endowed with a will. Every being, which cannot act but *under the idea of liberty*, is on that account, in a practical view, actually free, that is, all laws, which are inseparably conjoined with liberty, are valid for it, as much, as if its will in itself even were declared free and valid in theoretical philosophy.* I maintain, That we

* I adopt this method, sufficient to our purpose; of but assuming liberty as laid as a foundation *in idea* merely by rational beings in their actions, in order not to be obliged to prove liberty in its theoretical view also. For though the latter should even be left undecided, those laws are valid for a being, which cannot act otherwise, than under the idea of its liberty, laws, which would bind a being, were it actually free. We can therefore ease ourselves here of a burden, which lies heavy upon the theory.

must

must necessarily lend to every rational being, who has a will, the idea of liberty, under which only he acts. For in such a being we cogitate a reason, which is practical, that is, has causality in regard of its objects. Now a reason cannot possibly be thought, which, with its own consciousness in respect of its judgments, receives a direction, from any thing else, for then the subject would ascribe the determination of judgement, not to this reason, but to an incitement. Reason must consider itself as author of its principles, independently on foreign influences, consequently it must, as practical reason, or as the will of a rational being, be contemplated by itself as free; that is, the will cannot be a proper will but under the idea of liberty, and must therefore be attributed in a practical view to all rational beings.

Of the Interest which is inseparable from the Ideas of Morality.

We have at last reduced the precise conception of morality to the idea of liberty; but we cannot prove this, as something actual, in ourselves and in human nature; we perceive that we must but presuppose it, if we would conceive a being as rational, and endued with consciousness of his casuality with regard to actions, that is, a will, and thus we find, that for the same reason we must attribute to that being endowed with reason and a will this property, to wit, to determine himself to action under the idea of his liberty.

The

The consciousness of a law of action, however, flows from the presupposition of these ideas: that the subjective principles of actions, i. e. maxims, must always be so adopted, that they may be valid objectively too, that is, universally as principles, consequently may serve for our own universal legislation. But why ought I to subject myself as a rational being in general to this principle, consequently thereby all other beings also, endowed with reason? I grant, that no interest *spurs* me *on* to this, for that would yield no categorical imperative; I must however of necessity *take* an interest in this, and perspect how that happens; for this *ought* is properly a volition, which is valid for every rational being on condition that reason were practical with him without impediments; for beings who, like us, are affected by a sensitive faculty, as springs of another sort, with whom that, which reason of itself would do, doth not always happen, that necessity of action is named but *ought*, and the subjective necessity is distinguished from the objective one.

Thus it seems, as if we presupposed in the idea of liberty but the moral law, namely, the principle of the autonomy of the will itself, and could not prove its reality and objective necessity of itself, and in that we would gain something very considerable indeed, by having determined the genuine principle, at least more precisely, than had otherwise been done, but with respect to its validity, and the practical necessity of subjecting ourselves to it, we would have made no progress; for we could give

give no satisfactory answer to him, who inquired, why the universal validity of our maxim, as a law, must be the limiting condition of our actions, and whereupon we found the value, we set on this mode of acting, which value must be so great, that there can be no higher interest, and how it happens, that thereby only man believes to feel his personal worth, in comparison of which, that of any agreeable situation whatever is to be held of no consequence at all.

It is true we find, that we can take an interest in a personal quality, which carries with it no interest whatever of the state, if that makes us but capable to participate this, in case reason should effectuate the distribution of it, that is, that the mere worthiness of being happy, even without the motive, to partake of this felicity, can interest of itself: but this judgment is in fact but the effect of the foreseen importance of moral laws, (when we separate ourselves by the idea of liberty from all empirical interest,) but, that we ought to separate ourselves from this, that is, to contemplate ourselves as free in acting, and nevertheless hold ourselves subjected to certain laws, in order to find a value in our person merely, which can make good to us every loss of what gives a value to our state, and how this is possible, consequently *wherefore the moral law binds*, we cannot yet perspect in such a manner.

A sort of circle occurs here, it must be freely acknowledged, which, it would seem, there is no getting out of. We suppose ourselves in

in the order of efficient causes as free, for the purpose of cogitating ourselves in the order of ends under moral laws, and we cogitate ourselves afterwards as subjected to these laws, because we have attributed to ourselves the liberty of the will, for liberty and proper legislation of the will are both autonomy, consequently alternate conceptions, of which however the one cannot on that account be used to explain the other and to give a ground of it, but at most, in order, in a logical view, to reduce seemingly different representations of the very same object to a single conception (like different fractions of equal contents to the smallest expression).

An expedient however remains for us still, namely, to investigate, Whether, when we conceive ourselves as efficient causes *à priori*, by liberty, we do not occupy another station, than when we represent ourselves according to our actions as effects, which we see before us.

There is an observation, to which no great subtilty of thought is requisite, but which the most common understanding may be supposed to make, though, in its own way, by an obscure distinction of judgment, which it names feeling, to wit, That all representations, which occur to us without our arbitrament, (like those of the senses,) enable us to cognise the objects in no other manner, than as they affect us, whereby, what they may be in themselves, remains unknown to us, consequently that, as to this species of representations, we can thereby attain, even with the

 greatest

greatest attention and clearness, of which the understanding is capable, merely the cognition of the *phenomena*, but never of the *things in themselves*. As soon as this distinction is made, (perhaps by the distinction observed between the representations, which are given us from elsewhere, and by which we are passive, and those, which we beget ourselves only, and whereby we evince our activity,) it follows of course, that besides the phænomena something else, which is not phænomenon, must still be granted and supposed, namely, the things in themselves, though we naturally concede, that, as they never can be known to us, but only as they affect us, we can neither get nearer to them, nor ever know how they are in themselves. This must furnish a distinction, though rude, between a *sensible* world and an *intelligible one*, the former of which, according to the difference of the sensitive faculty in many contemplators of the world, may be very different, while the latter, which forms its basis, always remains the same. Even man, according to the knowledge, which he has of himself by internal sensation, dares not presume to cognise himself, as he is in himself. For as he doth not create himself, and receives his conception, not *à priori*, but empirically, it is natural, that he can get information of himself by the internal sense and consequently but by the phænomenon of his nature, and the manner in which his consciousness is affected, but he must of necessity, besides this quality of his own subject composed of mere phænomena,

mena, assume something else lying as a foundation, namely, his *I*, as its nature may be in itself, and therefore to count himself, with respect to the mere perception and receptibility of sensations, to the *sensible world*, but in regard of what may be pure activity in him, (of that, which attains consciousness not at all by affection of the senses; but immediately,) to the *intelligible world*, which he however knows no farther.

Such a conclusion must the man of reflection infer of all things that may occur to him; it is perhaps to be met with in even the most common understanding, which, as you know, is very much inclined always to expect relatively to objects of sense something invisible, active of itself, but marrs it again, by immediately (if I may use the word in this acceptation) sensualising this invisible, that is, wishing to render it an object of intuition, and is thereby not in the smallest degree wiser.

Man actually finds in himself a faculty, by which he distinguishes himself from all other things, ay, from himself, so far as he is affected by objects, and this faculty is REASON. This, as pure self-activity, is elevated above the UNDERSTANDING even, which, though it is a self-activity likewise, and does not contain, like sense, representations merely, which arise but when one is affected by things (consequently passive), cannot produce any other conceptions from its activity, than what serve *to bring the sensible representations under rules* merely and thereby to unite them in one consciousness, without which use of the sensitive

faculty it could cogitate nothing at all, whereas reason under the name of ideas discovers a spontaneity so pure, that it thereby goes far beyond what the sensual faculty can furnish it, and shows its most important business in distinguishing the sensible, and the intelligible, world one from another, and thereby pointing out to the understanding its limits.

Wherefore a rational being must contemplate himself, AS AN INTELLIGENCE, (therefore not on the side of his inferiour powers,) not as pertaining to the sensible world, but to the intelligible; consequently he has two stations from which he can consider himself, and cognise laws of the use of his powers, and by consequence all his actions, *first*, so far as he belongs to the sensible world, under laws of nature (heteronomy), *secondly*, as belonging to the intelligible world, under laws, which are founded, independently on nature, not empirically, but in reason merely.

As a rational being consequently appertaining to the intelligible world, man can never conceive the causality of his own will, but under the idea of liberty; for independence on the determinate causes of the sensible world (such as reason must always attribute to itself) is liberty. With the idea of liberty is now inseparably combined the conception of *autonomy*, but with this the universal principle of morality, which in idea forms the basis of all the actions of *rational* beings, in the same manner as the law of nature of all phenomena.

We have now removed the suspicion, which we caused above, that a secret circle was involved

volved in our inference from liberty to the autonomy and from this to the moral law, that we laid the idea of liberty as a foundation but for the sake of the law, in order to infer this afterwards from liberty, consequently could give no ground at all for the moral law, but only beg the question, which good-minded souls would willingly grant us, but which we could never set forth as an evincible position. For we at present perceive, that, when we think ourselves free, we transpose ourselves as members to the intelligible world, and cognise the autonomy of the will, together with its consequence, morality; but if we think ourselves obliged, we consider ourselves as belonging at once to the sensible world and to the intelligible.

How is a categorical Imperative possible?

The rational being reckons himself as intelligence to the intelligible world, and, merely as an efficient cause pertaining to this, does he name his causality a WILL. On the other side he is conscious to himself of his being a part of the sensible world too, in which his actions are met with as mere phenomena of that causality, but whose possibility cannot be perspected from this causality, which we do not know, but instead of which those actions, as determined by other phenomena, namely, appetitions and inclinations, must be considered as belonging to the sensible world. As a mere member of the intelligible world all my actions would therefore be perfectly conformable to the principle of the autonomy

tonomy of the pure will; as a mere part of the sensible world they must be taken to be totally conformable to the natural law of appetitions and inclinations, consequently to the heteronomy of the will. (The former would rest upon the chief principle of morality, the latter upon felicity). As *the intelligible world*, however, *comprehends the ground of the sensible, consequently its laws also*, therefore in regard of my will (which appertains to the intelligible world entirely) is immediately legislative, and of course must be conceived as such, so I cognise myself as an intelligence, though on the other hand as a being belonging to the sensible world, yet subjected to the law of the former, that is, reason, which comprises its law in the idea of liberty, and therefore to the autonomy of the will, consequently I must consider the laws of the intelligible world as imperatives for me and the actions conformable to this principle as duties.

And thus are categorical imperatives possible, by the idea of liberty making me a member of an intelligible world, whereby, were I such only, all my actions *would* always be conformable to the autonomy of the will, but as I intuit, that is, immediately apprehend, myself at the same time as a member of the sensible world, *ought* to be conformable thereto, which *categorical* ought (or shall) represents a synthetic position *à priori*, by superadding to my will affected by sensible appetites the idea of the very same pure will practical of itself but belonging to the intelligible world, which will comprises the chief condition

of

of the former according to reason; nearly in the same manner, as are superadded to the intuitions of the sensible world conceptions of the understanding, which of themselves signify nothing but legal forms in the general, and thereby render possible synthetical positions *à priori*, upon which rests all cognition of nature.

The practical use of common human reason confirms the rightness of this deduction. There is nobody, even the greatest villain, if he is but a little accustomed to exercise reason, who does not wish, when one gives him examples of rectitude of intentions, of resolution and constancy in the observance of good maxims, of participation and of universal benevolence, (and besides, combined with great sacrifices of interest and conveniences,) that he too were equally well-minded. But on account of his inclinations and incitements he cannot well bring it about in himself; he however wishes, at the same time, to be free from such inclinations, which are burdensome to him. He therefore proves by this, that he, with a will devested of incentives of the sensitive faculty, transposes himself in thought to a quite different order of things, than that of his appetites in the field of the sensitive faculty, because he can expect from that wish no pleasure of the appetites, consequently no satisfactory state for any one of his actual or even imaginable inclinations, (for the idea, which drew the wish from him, would thereby lose its preferableness,) but only a greater intrinsic value of his person. He believes however to be this better person, when he transposes

himself to the station of a member of the intelligible world, to which the idea of liberty, that is, independence on *determining* causes of the sensible world, involuntarily necessitates him, and wherein he is conscious to himself of a good will, which for his bad will, as a member of the aspectable world, according to his own avowal, constitutes the law, whose authority he knows, while he transgresses it. The moral *ought*, then, is proper necessary volition as a member of an intelligible world, and is thought by him as *ought* but so far, as he contemplates himself at the same time as a member of the sensible world.

Of the utmost Boundary of all practical Philosophy.

Men conceive themselves as to the will as free. Hence all the judgments on actions as such, as *ought* to have been *performed*, though they *are not performed*. However this liberty is no conception of experience, and cannot be so, because it always remains, though experience shows the opposite of those postulations, which are represented on the presupposition of it as necessary. It is on the other hand just as necessary, that all that happens, shall be infallibly determined according to laws natural, and this necessity of nature is likewise no conception of experience, because it carries with itself the conception of necessity, consequently of a cognition *à priori*. But this conception of a nature is confirmed by experience, and must inevitably be presupposed,

supposed, if experience, that is, coherent cognition of objects of sense according to universal laws, shall be possible. Hence liberty is but a conception of reason, that is, an IDEA, whose objective reality is in itself doubtful, but nature, a CONCEPTION OF UNDERSTANDING, which proves and must of necessity prove its reality by examples of experience.

Though a dialectic of reason springs from this, as in regard of the will the liberty attributed to it seems to be inconsistent with the necessity of nature, and, in this separation of ways, reason in the *speculative view* finds the way of the necessity of nature more beaten and more useful, than that of liberty; so in the *practical view* the path of liberty is the only one, upon which it is possible to make use of our reason in our actions; therefore it is as impossible for the most subtile philosophy, as for the most common human reason, to set aside liberty by reasoning. The common reason of man must then presuppose, That no real contradiction is met with between liberty and necessity of nature in the same human actions, for it can just as little renounce the conception of nature, as that of liberty,

This seeming contradiction, however, must be convincingly removed, though it should never be comprehended, how liberty is possible. For, if the thought of liberty contradicts itself, or even nature, which is equally necessary, it must absolutely be renounced for the necessity of nature.

But it is impossible to avoid this contradiction, if the subject, who thinks himself free,

conceived himself *in the same sense*, or *in the very same relation*, when he names himself free, as when he supposes himself with a view to the same action subjected to the law of nature. For which reason it is an indispensable problem of speculative philosophy, At least to show, that its illusion on account of the contradiction rests upon this, to wit, that we cogitate man in another sense and relation, when we name him free, than when we hold him, as a part of nature, subjected to these its laws, and that both *can* not only subsist together, but must be thought *as necessarily united* in the same subject, because a ground could not otherwise be given, why we should incumber reason with an idea, which, though it should *without contradiction* admit to be united with another sufficiently ascertained, involves us in an affair, whereby reason in its theoretical use is very much confined. But this duty is incumbent on the speculative philosophy merely, in order that it may clear the way for the practical. Thus the philosopher is not left to choose, whether he will remove the seeming contradiction, or leave it untouched; for in the latter case the theory is in this *bonum vacans*, in possession of which the fatalist may put himself with reason and turn out all moral from its putative property occupied without a title.

However it cannot yet be said, that the bounds of practical philosophy begin here. For that ending of the dispute belongs not at all to it, but it requires nothing of speculative reason, but to terminate this disagreement, wherein

it implicates itself in theoretical questions, in order that practical reason may have quiet and security against external attacks, which might dispute with it the ground, upon which it is to build,

But the just claim, even of the common reason of mankind, to the liberty of the will, is founded upon the consciousness and the granted presupposition of the independence of reason on causes determined subjectively merely, which collectively taken constitute what belongs to sensation merely, by consequence under the universal denomination of sensitiveness or sensitive faculty.* Man, who considers himself in such a manner as intelligence, thereby puts himself into another order of things and into a relation to determining grounds of a quite different sort, when he thinks himself an intelligence endowed with a will, consequently with causality, than when he perceives himself as a phenomenon in the sensible world (which he actually is), and subjects his causality, according to external determination, to laws natural. He soon discovers now, that both can, nay must, have place at the same time. For, that a *thing as phenomenon*, (pertaining to the sensible world,) is subjected to certain laws, of which the very same, *as a thing* or a being *in itself*, is independent, involves not the smallest contradiction; but that he must represent and think himself in this twofold manner, rests, as to

* The proper word here is SENSUALITAS, but which unfortunately has so different a meaning in our language, that I dare not venture to introduce it in this sense.

the first, upon the consciousness of himself as a subject affected by senses, as to the second, upon the consciousness of himself as an intelligence, that is, as independent in the use of reason on sensible impressions, (consequently as belonging to the intelligible world). Hence it is that man assumes to himself a will, which allows nothing, that belongs to his appetites and inclinations, to be put to its account, and on the contrary thinks actions, which can be performed but by slighting all appetites and sensible stimulations, as possible by itself, nay, even as necessary. Its causality lies in him as an intelligence and in the laws of the effects and actions according to principles of an intelligible world, of which he knows nothing further, than that therein reason only, and indeed pure reason independent on the sentitive faculty, gives the law, as also as he is there but as an intelligence the proper self (as man, on the other hand, but the phenomenon of himself), those laws concern him immediately and categorically, so that that, to which egg on inclinations and incentives (consequently the whole nature of the sensible world) cannot derogate in the least from the laws of his will, as an intelligence, insomuch that he neither ascribes the former to his proper self, that is, his will, nor answers for them, but he by all means answers for the indulgence, which he may give them, when he allows them, to the detriment of the rational laws of the will, influence on his maxims.

Practical reason, by *thinking* itself in an intelligible world, overleaps not at all its boundaries, but it would by all means go beyond them, should it either *see* or *feel* itself therein. The former is but a negative thought, which with regard to the sensible world, gives laws to reason, in the determination of the will; and but in this one point positive, namely, that that liberty, as negative determination, is at the same time combined with a (positive) faculty and even with a causality of reason, which we term a will, so to act, that the principle of the actions shall be conformable to the essential quality of a cause of reason, that is, the condition of the universal validity of the maxim, as a law. Did practical reason however fetch an *object of the will*, that is, a motive cause from the intelligible world, it would then go beyond its boundaries, and arrogate to itself to know something, of which it has no knowledge. The conception of an intelligible world is therefore but a *station*, which reason finds itself obliged to take beyond the phenomena, *in order to cogitate itself as practical*, which, were the influence of the sensitive faculty determining for man, would not be possible, but which is necessary, unless the consciousness of himself, as an intelligence, consequently as a cause rational and active through reason, that is, a free efficient cause, shall be denied him. This thought indeed occasions the idea of another order and legislation, than that of the mechanism of nature, which affects the sensible world, and renders necessary the conception of an intelligible

gible world, (that is, the whole rational nature, as a thing in itself), but without the least pretension to think farther conformably to this, than according to its *formal* condition merely, that is, the universality of the maxims of the will, as laws, consequently the autonomy of the will, which only can consist with its liberty; whereas all laws that are determined to an object, yield heteronomy, which can be met with but in laws of nature and also affect but the sensible world.

But reason, should it undertake to *explain* to itself *how* pure reason can be practical, which is identical with the problem, to explain, *how liberty is possible*, would then overleap all its boundaries.

For we can explain nothing, but what we can reduce to laws, whose object can be given in any one possible experience. But liberty is a mere idea, whose objective reality can in nowise be shown according to laws natural, consequently not in any possible experience whatever, which therefore, because an example of it can never be produced according to any one analogy, never can be comprehended, or even but perspected. It is valid but as a necessary presupposition of reason in a being, who believes to be conscious to himself of a will, that is, a faculty different from the mere appetitive faculty, (namely, to determine himself to action as an intelligence, consequently according to laws of reason, independent on instincts), But where determination according to laws of nature ceases, there ceases likewise all *explanation*, and nothing remains,

remains, but *defence*, that is, answering or refuting the objections of those, who pretend to have looked farther into the nature of things, and therefore boldly declare liberty impossible. One needs but point out to them, that the opiniative contradiction discovered therein by them lies nowhere, but in this, to wit, that, as they, in order to render valid the law of nature, in regard to human actions, must necessarily contemplate man as a phenomenon, and now, when it is required of them, that they shall cogitate him as an intelligence, of course as a thing in itself, they always continue to contemplate him as a phenomenon still, in which case the separation of his causality (that is, his will) from all natural laws of the sensible world would indeed be a contradiction in one subject, but which ceases, if they would but bethink themselves, and admit, as reasonable, that the things in themselves (though hidden) must form the basis of the phenomena; of the laws of the effect of which things it cannot be required, that they should be the same with those, under which rank their phenomena.

The subjective impossibility *of explaining* the liberty of the will, is identical with the impossibility of discovering and rendering comprehensible an *interest*,* which man may

* Interest is that, whereby reason becomes practical, that is, a cause determining the will. Hence it is said but of a rational being, that he takes an interest in something, reasonless creatures feel but sensible impulses. Reason then takes an immediate interest in the action only, when the universal validity of its maxim is a sufficient determinative of the will. Such an interest only is pure. When it can

take in moral laws; and yet he actually takes an interest therein, for which we name the foundation in us the moral feeling, that has been falsely given out by some as the standard of our moral judgment, but which must rather be considered as the *subjective* effect that the law has on the will, whereto reason only gives the objective grounds.

In order to will that, to which reason only prescribes the *ought* or *shall* to the sensitively affected rational being, belongs indeed a faculty of reason, *to infuse* a *feeling of pleasure* or of complacency in the discharging of duty, consequently a causality of it, to determine the sensitiveness conformably to its principles. But it is totally impossible, to perspect, that is, to render conceivable *à priori*, how a mere thought, which comprises nothing sensible even, shall produce a feeling of pleasure or displeasure: for that is a peculiar sort of causality, of which, as of all causality, we can determine nothing at all *à priori*, but must therefore consult experience only. As this however can furnish no relation of the cause to the effect, as between two objects of experience, but here pure reason by mere ideas (which yield no object whatever for experierce,) must be the cause of an effect, which it is true

determine the will but by means of another object of appetition, or under the presupposition of a peculiar feeling of the subject, reason takes but a mediate interest in the action, and, as reason of itself only can discover neither an object of the will, nor a peculiar feeling upon which it bottoms without experience, so the latter interest would be but empirical and not a pure interest of reason. The logical interest of reason (to promote its introspections) is never immediate, but presupposes designs of its use.

lies

lies in experience, so the explication, how and why the *universality of the maxim as a law*, consequently morality, interests us, is for us men totally impossible. So much only is certain, That it has not validity for us, because it *interests*, (for that is heteronomy and dependence of practical reason on the sensitive faculty, to wit, on a feeling forming the basis, whereby it could never be morally legislative,) but that it interests, because it is valid for us as men, as it arose from our will as an intelligence, consequently from our proper self; *but what belongs to the mere phenomenon, is of necessity subordinated by reason to the quality of the thing in itself* (or noumenon.)

The question then, How a categorical imperative is possible, may be so far answered, as the sole presupposition can be laid down, on which only it is possible, namely, the idea of liberty, as also that the necessity of this presupposition can be perspected, which is sufficient to the *practical use* of reason, that is, the conviction of the *validity of this imperative*, consequently of the moral law, but no human reason can ever perspect how this presupposition itself is possible. But of the presupposition of the liberty of the will of an intelligence the autonomy of the will, as the formal condition, on which only it can be determined, is a necessary consequence. To presuppose this liberty of the will, is not only (without falling into a contradiction with the principle of the necessity of nature in the connection of the phenomena of the sensible world) perfectly *possible*, (as speculative philosophy

can shew,) but to bottom all one's arbitrable actions, as condition, upon it practically, that is, in idea, is without farther condition *necessary* for a rational being, who is conscious to himself of his causality by reason, consequently of a will (which is distinct from appetites). But to explain, *How* pure reason, without other springs, which may be taken from any thing else, is of itself practical, that is, how the mere *principle of the universal validity of all its maxims as laws* (which indeed would be the form of a pure practical reason,) without all matter (object) of the will, in which one might previously take any one interest, can furnish a spring for itself, and occasion an interest, which would be named purely *moral*, or in other words, *How pure reason can be practical*, all human reason is totally unable, and all trouble and labour are lost in the attempt. It is the same as if I should endeavour to find out, how liberty itself as causality of a will is possible. For there I quit the philosophical ground of exposition, and have no other. It is true I might now wander in the intelligible world, in the world of intelligences, which still remains to me; but, though I have an *idea* of it, which has its good ground, I have not the smallest *knowledge* of it, and can never attain this by all the efforts of my natural faculty of reason. It signifies but a something, which remains, when I have excluded from the determinatives of my will all that appertains to the sensible world, merely in order to limit the principle of the motive causes to the field of sensitiveness, by

by bounding it, and by showing, that it doth not comprehend in itself all in all, but that without it there is still more: this more, however, I know not farther. Of pure reason, which conceives this ideal, there remains for me, after the separation of all matter, that is, cognition of objects, nothing but the form, namely the practical law of the universal validity of the maxims, and, according to this, to think reason in reference to a pure intelligible world as the possible efficient cause, that is, as determining the will; the spring here must be totally wanting; the spring then would need to be this idea of an intelligible world itself, or that, in which reason would take an interest originally; but to render which comprehensible, is directly the problem that we cannot solve.

Here is now the utmost boundary of all moral investigation; to determine which, however, is of the greatest importance, in order that reason may not search, on the one side, in the sensible world, in a manner pernicious to morals, after the chief motive cause and a conceivable but empirical interest, but on the other side, in order that it may not feebly flap its wings, without being able to stir, in the space of transcendent* conceptions, which is empty for it, and lose itself among fancies. However the idea of a pure intelligible world, as a whole of all intelligences, to which we ourselves belong as rational beings,

* See the translator's preface (page XXVIII) to THE PRINCIPLES OF CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

(though on the other hand members of the sensible world at the same time), always remains a useful and licit idea for the behoof of a rational belief, though all science ends at the bounds of this idea, in order, by the grand ideal of an universal kingdom of ENDS IN THEMSELVES, (rational beings,) to which we can but then belong, when we carefully conduct ourselves according to maxims of liberty, as if they were laws of nature, to induce us to *take a great interest in the moral law.*

To conclude, The speculative use of reason, *in regard to nature*, leads of absolute necessity to some one chief cause *of the world* or other; the practical use of reason, *with a view to liberty*, leads to absolute necessity likewise, but only *to the laws of the actions* of a rational being, as such. Now it is an essential *principle* of all use of our reason, to push its cognition to the consciousness of its necessity, (for without this it would not be cognition of reason). But it is just as essential a *limitation* of the very same reason, that it can perspect the *necessity*, neither of that, which exists, or which happens, nor of that which ought to happen, unless a condition, on which it either exists, happens, or ought to happen, be laid as a foundation. In this manner however is, by the constant inquiry concerning the condition, the contentment of reason but longer delayed. Hence it seeks restlessly the unconditional necessary, and finds itself obliged to suppose it, without any means whatever of rendering it comprehensible to itself; happy enough, if it can discover but the conception,

ception, which accords with this presupposition. It is therefore no censure of our deduction of the chief principle of morality, but a reproach, with which human reason in general must be charged, that it cannot render comprehensible an unconditional practical law (such as the categorical imperative must be) according to its absolute necessity; for, human reason cannot be blamed, because it does not chuse to do this by a condition, namely, by means of any one interest laid as a foundation, since it would then be no moral, that is, chief, law of liberty. And thus we do not comprehend, it is true, the practical unconditional necessity of the moral imperative, but we comprehend its INCOMPREHENSIBILITY, and this is all that can be equitably required of a philosophy, which does not pursue its researches beyond the confines of human reason.

THE

FALSE SUBTILTY

OF THE

FOUR SYLLOGISTIC FIGURES EVINCED

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1.

Universal Conception of the Nature of Ratiocinations.

To compare something as a mark with a thing is named *to judge*. The thing itself is the subject, the mark the predicate. The comparison is expressed by the copula *is* or *are* which, when it is used absolutely, denotes the predicate to be a mark of the subject's, but which, if it is accompanied with the negative particle, makes the predicate known as a mark opposed to the subject. The judgment in the first case is affirmative, in the second negative. It is easily understood, that, when the predicate is denominated a mark, it is not thereby said to be a mark of the subject's; for this is but in affirmative judgments, but that it, though it in a negative judgment contradicts its subject, is considered as a mark of any one thing whatever. Thus a *spirit* is the thing, which I think; *composed* a mark of some one thing or another; the judgment,

A spirit is not composed, represents this mark as colliding with the thing itself.

That, which is a mark of the mark of a thing, is named a *mediate* mark of it. Thus *necessary* is an immediate mark of *God*, but *immutable* a mark of the necessary's and a mediate mark of *God*. It is evident, That the immediate between the remote and the thing itself supplies the place of an intermedial mark (*nota intermedia*), because the remote mark is compared with the thing itself but by that immediate. A mark may however be compared negatively with a thing by an intermediate mark, by cognising, that something clashes with the immediate mark of a thing. *Contingent* collides as a mark with the *necessary*; but necessary is a mark of God, and one cognises by means of an intermedial mark, that, to be necessary, is inconsistent with God.

Here is now my real exposition of a ratiocination or a syllogism of reason: *Every judgment by a mediate mark is a ratiocination*, or in other words, it is the comparison of a mark with a thing by means of an intermediate mark. This intermediate mark in a ratiocination is denominated also the *middle principal conception* (*terminus medius*); as it is sufficiently known what the other principal conceptions or terms are, I need not dwell on them.

In order to cognise distinctly the reference of the mark to the thing in the judgment, *the human soul is a spirit*, I make use of the mark, *rational*, so that by means of it I consider, *to be*

be a spirit, as a mediate mark of the human soul's. Three judgments must necessarily occur here, to wit:

1. to be a spirit is a mark of the rational's,
2. rational is a mark of the human soul's,
3. to be a spirit, is a mark of the human soul's,

for, the comparison of a remote mark with the thing itself is not possible but by these three acts.

In the form of judgments they would run thus: All that is rational is a spirit, the soul of man is rational, therefore the soul of man is a spirit. This is a positive ratiocination. As to the negative one, it is equally obvious, that since I do not always cognise clearly enough the collision of a predicate and subject, I must, when I can, use the expedient, to facilitate my introspection by an intermedial mark. Let us suppose, that the negative judgment were proposed to me: The duration of God is not commensurable by any time, and, as I do not find that this predicate, immediately compared with the subject, gives me a sufficiently distinct idea of the collision, I make use of a mark, which I can represent to myself immediately in this subject, and compare the predicate therewith, and by that means with the thing itself. *To be commensurable by time* collides with all *immutable*, but *immutable* is a mark of God, consequently etc. This formally expressed would run thus: Nothing immutable is commensurable by time, the duration of God is immutable, therefore etc.

2. *Of*

2.

Of the chief Rules of all Ratiocinations.

From what has been said it may be cognised, that the first and universal rule of all positive ratiocinations is, *A mark of a mark is a mark of the thing's itself (nota notæ est etiam nota rei ipsius)*, of all negatives: *What contradicts the mark of a thing*, contradicts the thing itself (*repugnans notæ repugnat rei ipsi*). Neither of these rules is susceptible of any farther proof. For a proof is possible but by one or more ratiocinations, for which reason to endeavour to prove the chief formule of all syllogisms of reason, would be to infer in a circle. But it is evident, that these rules comprise the universal and last ground of every rational mode of syllogism, because those, which have hitherto been held by all logicians the first rules of all ratiocinations, must borrow the only ground of their truth from ours. The *dictum de omni*, the chief ground of all positive ratiocinations is, That, which is universally affirmed of a conception, is likewise affirmed of every one that is contained under it. The argument of this is clear. That conception, under which others are contained, is always separated as a mark from these; what now belongs to this conception, that is a mark of a mark, consequently a mark of the thing's itself, from which it is separated, that is, it belongs to the lower ones, which are contained under it. Every body, who is in some measure instructed in logical knowledge, perspects, That this *dictum* is true on account of this ground merely,

merely, and that it therefore ranks under our first rule. The *dictum de nullo* stands in a similar relation towards our second rule. What is universally negated of a conception, is likewise negated of all those, which are contained under it. For that conception, under which these others are contained, is but a mark separated from them. But what repugns this mark, repugns too the things themselves; consequently that, which repugns the higher conceptions, must clash with the lower, which rank under them.

3.

Of pure and of mixed Ratiocinations.

Every one knows, that there are immediate syllogisms, where from one judgment the truth of another is immediately cognised without a middle conception. For which reason such syllogisms are not ratiocinations; for instance, from the position, Every one matter is unalterable, follows directly, What is not alterable, is not matter. Logicians count different species of such immediate consequences, among which no doubt those by the logical conversion, as also by the contraposition are the most eminent.

If a ratiocination happens but by three positions, if it is but possible according to the rules, which are above-propounded of every ratiocination, I term it a pure syllogism of reason (*ratiocinium purum*), when more than three judgments are conjoined with one another, it is a mingled syllogism of reason (*ratiocinium hybridum*). Suppose, that between the

the three head-positions an immediate conclusion must be still thrown in, and thus a position more is superadded, than a pure ratiocination allows, it is a *ratiocinium hybridum*, for example, figure to yourself, that one should infer and conclude in this manner:

Nothing, that is perishable, is simple,
Consequently nothing that is simple is perishable,
The soul of man is simple,
Therefore the soul of man is not perishable,

thus he would have, it is true, no properly compound ratiocination, because this must consist of several ratiocinations, but the present one, besides that, which is required to a ratiocination, contains an immediate conclusion by the contraposition and comprehends four propositions.

But were three judgments only actually expressed, the drawing of the conclusion from these three judgments would be possible but by virtue of an allowed logical conversion, contraposition, or another logical alteration of one of these prejudices, the ratiocination were a *ratiocinium hybridum* nevertheless; for it is not taken into consideration here what is said, but what is indispensably necessary to be thought, if a correct consequence shall exist. Let us suppose, in the ratiocination:

Nothing perishable is simple;
The soul of man is simple,

therefore the soul of man is not perishable, is but in so far a just conclusion, as I can say by a very right conversion of the major, Nothing perishable is simple, by consequence nothing

nothing simple is perishable, thus the ratiocination remains always a mixed syllogism, because its syllogistic power rests upon the secret superadding of this immediate consequence, which one must have in thought at least.

4.

In the first Figure, commonly so named, pure Ratiocinations only are possible, in the three Other Figures mixed Ones merely.

When a ratiocination is formed immediately according to one of our two chief rules above-mentioned, it is always in the first figure. The first rule is, A mark B of a mark C of a thing A is a mark of the thing A itself. Hence arise three propositions, *videlicet*,

C has for a mark B What is rational (C) is a spirit (B)
A has for a mark C The human soul (A) is rational (C)
Ergo A has for a mark B Ergo the human soul (A) is a spirit (B).

It is very easy to apply more similar ones and of others also to the rule of negative syllogisms, in order to convince one's self, that, when they are conformable to these, they always are in the first figure; but I endeavour here to avoid a tiresome prolixity. It is easily perceived, that these rules of ratiocinations do not require that, besides these judgments, any one immediate consequence from either of them must be interjected, if the argument shall be

be cogent, therefore the ratiocination in the first figure is of the pure sort.

In the second Figure none but mixed Ratiocinations are possible.

The rule of the second figure is this, When a mark is repugnant to the mark of a thing, it is repugnant to the thing itself. This position is but true, because that, which a mark repugns, repugns too this mark, but what repugns a mark, repugns the thing itself; therefore that, which a mark of a thing repugns, collides with the thing itself. Here it is now evident, that, merely because I can absolutely convert the major as a negative position, the drawing of the conclusion by means of the minor is possible. Consequently this conversion must be secretly thought, else my positions do not conclude. But the position acquired by the conversion is an interjected immediate consequence of the former, and the ratiocination has four judgments, and is a *ratiocinium hybridum*, for instance, when I say,

No spirit is divisible.
All matter is divisible,
Ergo no matter is a spirit;

I conclude right, and the syllogistic power lies therein, only, because from the first position, *no spirit is divisible*, flows by an immediate consequence, *ergo nothing divisible is a spirit*, and after this every thing follows rightly the universal rule of all ratiocinations. But as only by virtue of this immediate consequence

to

to be drawn from it a syllogistical capacity is in the argument, so this pertains thereto and it has four judgments,

No spirit is divisible
And therefore nothing divisible is a spirit.
All matter is divisible
Consequently no matter is a spirit.

In the third Figure none but mixed Ratiocinations are possible

The rule of the third figure is the following: What is suitable to or inconsistent with a thing, is either suitable to or inconsistent with some things, which are contained under another mark of this thing. This position itself is possible but because I can convert the judgment, in which is said, that another mark is suitable to this thing (*per conversionem logicam*), whereby it becomes conformable to the rule of all ratiocinations. *Exempli gratia*, it is said,

All men are sinners,
All men are rational,
Therefore some rational beings are sinners.

This concludes, only because I can infer from the minor by a conversion *per accidens: therefore some rational beings are men*, and then the conceptions are compared with the rule of all ratiocinations, but only by means of an interjected immediate conclusion, and one has a *ratiocinium hybridum:*

All men are sinners;
All men are rational,
therefore some rational beings are men,
consequently some rational beings are sinners.

 The

The same may be very easily shown in the negative mode of this figure, but which for the sake of brevity I omit.

In the fourth Figure none but mixed Ratiocinations are possible.

The mode of inference in this figure is so unnatural, and is founded upon so many possible intermedial syllogisms, which must be conceived as interjected, that the rule, which I could propound for it universally, would be very obscure and unintelligible. For which reason I shall say, but on what conditions a syllogistic power lies therein. In the negative species of these syllogisms of reason a right inference is possible, because I may alter the places of the principal conceptions by either logical conversion or contraposition and thus after every major imagine its immediate consequence, so that these consequences acquire the reference, which they must have in a ratiocination according to the universal rule in general. But I shall shew of the positive ones, that they are not at all possible in the fourth figure. The negative ratiocination according to this figure is represented, as it must be thought, as follows:

No dunce is learned,
therefore *no learned man is* a dunce.
Some learned men are pious,
therefore *some pious men are learned*
ergo some pious men are not dunces.

Let

Let it be a syllogism of the second sort.

Every spirit is simple,
all that is simple is incorruptible,
therefore some incorruptible is a spirit.

It is evident, that the concluding judgment, as it stands here, cannot by any means be inferred from the premises. This is quickly perceived, when the middle term is compared with it. I cannot say, some incorruptible is a spirit, because it is simple, it is not directly a spirit. Again, the premisses cannot be so disposed by all possible logical alterations, that the conclusion or but another position, from which it flows as an immediate consequence, could be deduced, if, according to the rule establsihed in all figures, the *termini* shall have their places so, that the greater *terminus* shall occur in the major, and the smaller in the minor.* And though, when I totally alter the places of the principal conceptions, so that that becomes the smaller, which was before the greater and *vice versa*, a conclusion from which the given conclusion flows may be inferred, a total transposition of the premises is then necessary and the so named ratiocination according to the fourth figure comprises the materials, but not the form, according to

* This rule is founded in the synthetical order according to which the remote and then the proxime mark is compared with the subject. If this were however considered arbitrably merely, it becomes indispensably necessary, when four figures must be had. For as soon as it is the same, whether I bring the predicate of the conclusion into the major or into the minor, the first figure is not at all different from the fourth. A fault of this sort may be found in *Crusius' Logic* page 600 in the note.

which must be concluded and is no ratiocination at all according to the logical order, in which only the division of the four figures is possible, which in the negative mode of conclusion in the same figure is of a quite different nature. It must be thus:

Every spirit is simple,
all that is simple is incorruptible,
therefore every spirit is incorruptible,
consequently some incorruptible is a spirit.

This concludes quite right, but such a ratiocination is not different from that in the first figure by another place of the middle term, but only by the place of the premisses being altered * and in the conclusion the places of the principal conceptions. But therein consists not at all the alteration of the figure. A fault of this sort is to be found in the place above-cited of *Crusius' Logic*, where, by this liberty of altering the place of the premises, one believes to infer naturally in the fourth figure. It is a pity, that a man of great talents should give himself the trouble to endeavour to correct a useless thing: Nothing useful can be done, but by destroying it entirely.

* For when that proposition is the major, in which the predicate of the conclusion occurs, the second proposition of the proper conclusion, which here flows immediately from the premises, is the major and the first the minor. Then however every thing is inferred according to the first figure, only so that the given up conclusion is drawn by a logical conversion from that, which follows next from the said judgments.

5. The

5.

The logical Division of the four syllogistic Figures is a false Subtilty.

It cannot be denied that one may infer and conclude rightly in all these four figures. But it is unquestionable that all of them, except the first, determine the consequence but by a roundabout way and intermingled intermedial conclusions, and that the very same conclusion would follow perfectly pure and unmingled from the same middle conception in the first figure. It may be thought, on that account, that the other three figures are very useless, but not false. However, when one reflects on the view, with which they were invented, and are still propounded, one will judge otherwise. Were the object, to entangle a multitude of conclusions, mingled with the principal judgments, in such a manner with these, that, some being expressed and others understood, it would require great art, to judge of their agreement with the rules of syllogising, one would not just invent more figures, but could nevertheless devise more enigmatical conclusions, which might occasion brains-beating enough. But it is not the end of logic, to implicate, but to resolve, not to propound obscurely, but evidently. Hence these four modes of syllogism ought to be simple, unmingled, and without hidden collateral conclusions, else they are not allowed the liberty, to appear in a logical propounding as forms of the most distinct representation of a ratiocination. It is certain that hitherto all

logicians have considered them as simple ratiocinations without a necessary interjection of other judgments, otherwise this burghership had never been granted them. The other three species of illation as rules of ratiocinations in general are then right, but as such as comprise a simple and a pure conclusion, false. This falsity, which constitutes a right to involve introspections, instead of which, the proper ends of logic are to reduce every thing to the most simple mode of cognition, is the greater, the more particular rules (of which every figure has some proper ones) are necessary, in order, in this side leap, not to trip one's self. In fact, if much acuteness was ever bestowed on a totally useless thing, and much seeming learning lavished, it is the case here. The *moods*, so named, which are possible in every figure, intimated by strange words which, together with much secret art, contain letters that facilitate the transforming into those, will, when once the venerable rust of antiquity shall teach a more instructed posterity, to admire and to regret in these rests the dilligent but fruitless labours of their predecessors, comprise a valuable curiosity of the cast of the human mind. It is easy to discover the first occasion of this subtilty. He, who first wrote a syllogism in three lines below one another, considered it as a chess-board, and tried what would be the consequence of the transposition of the places of the middle term, was as much surprised when he perceived that a rational sense was produced, as one would be who discovers an anagram. It was just as childish to be

be over-joyed with the one as with the other, especially as it was forgotten that nothing new was introduced in point of perspicuity, but only an augmentation of indistinctness and confusion. But it is the lot of human understanding, either to be inquisitive and fall on trifles, or to catch at objects too vast, and build castles in the air. Of the great crowd of thinkers one chuses the number 666, the other, either the origin of animals and plants, or the mysteries of Providence. The errour into which both fall is, according to the difference of their understandings, of a very different taste.

In our days things worthy of being known augment very much. Our capacity will soon be too weak, and our life too short, to comprehend but the most useful part of them. We are presented with an abundance of riches, to make room for which we must throw away a great deal of useless lumber. It had been better never to have been occupied about it.

I would flatter myself too much, if I believed, that the labour of a few hours would be able to overthrow the colossus, whose head is hidden in the clouds of antiquity; and whose feet are of argil. However, as I cannot adjust every thing in the logical propounding conformably to my own insight, but must do much to please the reigning taste, I shall not insist any longer on this subject, but shall employ the time, which I thereby gain, in the actual enlarging of useful knowledge.

There is still another utility of the syllogistic, namely, by means of it, to get the better of the unwary in a learned conversation. But, as this belongs to the athletic of the learned an art, which may otherwise be very useful, but does not contribute much to the advantage of truth, I shall pass it by in silence.

6.

Conclusion.

We are now instructed, that the chief rules of all pure syllogisms of reason lead immediately to that order of conceptions, which is named the first figure, that all other transpositions of the middle term, yield a right consequence but because they lead to such propositions by easy immediate inferences, which are connected in the simple order of the first figure, that it is impossible to infer in a simple and unmixed manner in more than one figure, because nothing but the first figure, which lies hidden in a ratiocination by concealed consequences, comprises the illative power, and the altering of the places of the conceptions occasions but a greater or a smaller roundabout, which one has to go, in order to perspect the consequence, and that the division of the figures in general, in so far as they shall contain pure conclusions mixed with no intermedial judgments, is false and impossible. It may be so easily gathered from our exposition, how our universal fundamental rules of all pure syllogisms of reason comprehend

prehend at the same time the particular rules of the first figure, as also how from the given conclusion and the middle principal conception every one ratiocination from one of the other figures may, without the useless diffusiveness of the formules of reduction, be directly altered into the first and simple mode of illation, so that either the conclusion itself, or a position, from which it follows by an immediate consequence, is inferred, that I shall not dwell on it.

I cannot however quit this subject without adding a few observations, which may be elsewhere of material use.

In the first place I say, that a *distinct* or perspicuous conception * is not possible but by a *judgment*, but a *complete* conception not otherwise than by a *ratiocination*. To a distinct conception is required, that I cognise clearly something as a criterion of a thing, but this is a judgment. That I may have a distinct conception of a body, I represent clearly to myself the impenetrability as a mark of it. This representation, however, is nothing but the thought, *a body is impenetrable*. It is to be observed in this, that this judgment is not the distinct conception itself, but the act, by which it becomes actual; for the representation, which arises from the thing itself after this act, is distinct. It is easily shown, that a complete conception is possible but by a ratio-

* The genealogical tree of this family may be seen in the translator's preface to The Principles of Critical Philosophy, page xxvi—xxvii.

ratiocination, one needs but peruse the first paragraph of this treatise. For which reason a distinct conception may be denominated such a one, as is clear by a judgment, but a complete conception, what is distinct by a ratiocination.

When the completeness is in the highest degree, the ratiocination is a simple one, when it is of the second or third, it is possible but by a series of chain-syllogisms, which the understanding contracts in the mode of a sorites. Hence is evident an essential fault of logic, as it is commonly treated, to wit, that distinct and complete conceptions are handled sooner, than judgments and ratiocinations, though those are possible but by these.

Secondly, as obvious as it is, that to the complete conception no other fundamental power of the soul is requisite, than to the distinct, (as the very same capability, which cognises something immediately as a mark in a thing, is likewise used to represent another mark in this mark, and thus to cogitate the thing by a remote mark;) it is just as obvious, that understanding and reason, *id est*, the faculty of cognising distinctly, and that of framing ratiocinations, are not different *fundamental capabilities.* Both consist in the faculty of judging; but one infers and concludes, when one judges mediately.

Thirdly, and lastly, it is likewise to be collected from this, that the chief power of cognition absolutely rests but upon the faculty to judge. Consequently, if a being can judge, it

it is endowed with the chief capability of cognition. If one has cause to deny it this capability, it is not able to judge. The neglect of such contemplations occasioned a celebrated man of letters to grant distinct conceptions to brutes. An ox, it is said, in his representation of the stall has also a clear representation of its mark, the door, therefore a distinct conception of the stall. It is easy, to avoid the confusion here. The distinctness of a conception does not consist in that, which is a mark of the thing's, being represented clearly, but in its being cognised as a mark of the thing. The door is indeed something belonging to the stall, and may serve for a mark of it, but only he, who forms the judgment, *this door belongs to this stall*, has a distinct conception of the building, and this is surely above the faculty of the brute.

I go still farther, and maintain, That it is totally different to *distinguish* things one from another, and to cognise the *difference* of things. The latter is possible but by judging, and cannot be done by any irrational animal. The following division may be of great use. *To distinguish logically* is, to cognise that A is not B, and is always a negative judgment; to *distinguish physically* is, to be instigated to different actions by different representations. A dog distinguishes roast beef from bread, because he is differently affected by the roast beef (for different things occasion different sensations) and the sensation of the former is a ground of another appetite in him, than that

that of the latter,* according to the natural connection of his instincts with his representations. Hence occasion may be given to reflect better on the essential distinction between rational and irrational animals. Were one able to perspect what sort of a secret power that is, whereby judging becomes possible, one would resolve the difficulty. My present opinion is, that this power or faculty is nothing but the faculty of the internal sense, *id est*, to make one's own representations the object of one's thoughts. This faculty is not to be deduced from another, it is a fundamental faculty in the proper signification, and in my apprehension can belong to rational beings merely. Upon this however rests the whole higher power of cognition. I shall conclude with a representation, which cannot fail to be agreeable to those, who can take pleasure in contemplating the unity in human cognitions. All affirmative judgments rank under a common formule, the position of agreement: *Cuilibet subjecto competit prædicatum ipsi oppositum.* All affirmative ratiocinations are contained under the rule: *Nota notæ est nota rei ipsius*, all negative ones under this: *Oppositum notæ opponitur rei ipsi.* All judgments that rank immediately under the propositions of agreement or of

* It is of the greatest importance indeed, to pay attention to this in the investigation of animal nature. We perceive in brutes external actions merely, whose difference points out different determinations of their appetites. Whether the same action of their cognoscitive power happens in their interiour, as they are conscious to themselves of the agreement or of the disagreement of that, which is in one sensation, with that which is to be found in another, and therefore to judge, is by no means a consequent therefrom.

contradiction,

contradiction, that is, in which neither the identity nor the repugnancy is perspected by an intermediate mark (consequently not by means of the anatomizing of conceptions,) but immediately, are inevincible judgments, those, which can be mediately cognised, are evincible. Human cognition teems with such inevincible judgments. Some of these previously occur to every definition, as soon as one, in order to attain it, represents to one's self that, which one cognises in a thing as proxime or immediately, as a mark of it. Those philosophers err, who proceed as if there were no inevincible fundamental truths at all besides that. Those, who, without a sufficient guaranty, are too liberal in giving this precedency to several of their own positions, err just as much.

ON

THE POPULAR JUDGMENT:

THAT MAY BE RIGHT IN THEORY, BUT DOES NOT HOLD GOOD IN THE PRAXIS.

INTRODUCTION.

The aggregate of even practical rules is denominated THEORY, when these rules, as principles, are thought in a certain universality, and thereby is abstracted from a multitude of conditions, which necessarily have influence on their exercise. Conversely, not every handicraft, but only that attaining of an end, is named PRAXIS, which is thought as the observance of certain principles of procedure represented in the general.

It is evident, that between the theory and the praxis a medium of connection and of transition from the one to the other is still required, let the theory be ever so complete; for, to the conception of understanding, which comprises the rule, must be superadded an act of judgement, whereby the practitioner discriminates, whether something be the case of the rule or not; and, as rules, by which the judgement could take its measures in the subsumption, cannot always be given (because that would go to the infinite), there may be theorists, who never in their lives can become practitioners, because they want judgement; for instance, physicians, or lawyers, who may have prosecuted their studies successfully, but who, when they are to give advice, do not know how to proceed. — But where this gift of nature is even to be met with, there may yet be a want of premises; that is, the theory

theory may be incomplete and the complement of it obtained perhaps but by experiments and experiences to be made still, from which the physician, the farmer, or the financier, on quitting his school, ought to abstract rules for himself, and render his theory complete. The theory however was not to be blamed, if it did not yet suffice to the praxis, but the fault was, that theory *enough* did *not* exist, which the man ought to have learned from experience; and which is real theory, though he is not able to communicate it, and, as a teacher, to propound it systematically in universal positions, consequently can lay no claim to the title of a theoretical physician, farmer, etc. — Nobody therefore can pretend to be practically versed in a science and at the same time despise the theory, without exposing himself to be held an ignorant in his own province: believing, by groping in experiments and experiences, without collecting for himself certain principles (which constitute that, properly named theory), and without having reflected on his business as a whole (which, when one proceeds in this methodically, is termed a system), to make more progress, than the theory would permit.

It is however more supportable, that an ignorant should give out theory as unnecessary, and which may be dispensed with in his opiniative praxis, than that a sciolist should admit of it and of its use in the schools (in order to exercise the understanding only), but maintain at the same time, that the praxis is quite of another nature; that, when one quits the

the school and goes into the world, one perceives void ideals and philosophical reveries to be followed; in a word, that which is right in theory, is of no validity for the praxis. (It is often expressed thus: this or that proposition is valid, it is true, *in thesi*, but not *in hypothesi*). Were empirical machinists, to pronounce in this manner on universal mechanics, or bombardiers, on the mathematical doctrine of the throwing of bombs, that the theory in these sciences is indeed nicely excogitated, but is not at all valid in the praxis, because in the execution experience gives quite other results, they would be but laughed at, (for, if to the former were superadded the theory of friction, to the latter the resistance of the air, consequently, but more theory in general, they would harmonize perfectly with experience). But the case is quite different with a theory, which concerns objects of intuition, than with that, in which objects are represented but by conceptions (with objects of mathematics, and of philosophy): the latter of which perhaps may easily be *thought* and without censure (on the part of reason), but perhaps not at all *given*, but may be void ideas merely, of which no use whatsoever would be made in the praxis, or a use, even disadvantageous to it. Therefore that popular judgment may in such cases be perfectly correct.

But in a theory, which bottoms upon the CONCEPTION OF DUTY, the apprehension on account of the void idealness of this conception ceases entirely. For it would not be duty to proceed on a certain effect of our will, if

this were not possible in experience too (whether it be thought as accomplished or continually approaching to the accomplishment); and this sort of theory only is the subject of the present treatise. For, it is not seldom pretended of it, to the scandal of philosophy, that, what may be right in it, is however not valid for the praxis: and indeed in an imperious disdainful tone, full of presumption, willing by experience to reform reason in that even, in which it places its greatest honour; and with an arrogated wisdom and mole's eyes, which are fixed on experience, imagining to be able to see farther and better, than with eyes, which have fallen to the share of a being, made to stand erect and to behold the heavens.

This maxim, become very common in our times, rich in sentences, but poor in facts, when it concerns any thing moral (duty of law or of ethics), occasions the greatest mischief. For here we have to do with the canon of reason (in the practical field), where the value of the praxis rests entirely upon its suitableness to the theory upon which it is built, and all is lost, when the empirical and by consequence fortuitous conditions of the execution of the law are made conditions of the law itself, and thus a praxis, which is calculated on a probable issue according to a *precedent* experience, becomes entitled to master the theory subsisting of itself.

This treatise is divided according to the three different stations, from which the man of honour, accustomed to pronounce so boldly

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on theories and on systems, is wont to judge his object; consequently in a threefold quality: 1. as a private man but a MAN OF BUSINESS, 2. as a STATESMAN, 3. as a MAN OF THE WORLD, (or a citizen of the world in general). These three personages are unanimous in falling upon the SCHOOLMAN, (who elaborates theory for them all and for their greatest good) in order, as they believe themselves better qualified, to send him to his school (*illa se jactet in aula!*), as a pedant who, spoiled for the praxis, but stands in the way of their experienced wisdom.

We shall therefore represent the relation in which the theory stands to the praxis in three sections: *first*, in MORAL in general (with a view to the good of every *man*), *secondly*, in POLITICS (in reference to the good of *states*), *thirdly*, in a COSMOPOLITICAL consideration (with a view to the good of the *human species* in general, so far as it is engaged in advancing to that good in the series of generations of all future times). — But the titles of the sections will be expressed, for reasons which unfold themselves in the treatise itself, by the relation of the theory to the praxis in MORAL, in THE LAW OF STATE, and in the LAW OF NATIONS.

ON

THE POPULAR JUDGMENT:

THAT MAY BE RIGHT IN THEORY, BUT DOES NOT HOLD GOOD IN THE PRAXIS.

SECTION I.

OF THE RELATION, WHICH THE THEORY BEARS TO THE PRAXIS IN MORAL IN GENERAL.

(In answer to a few Objections started by Professor Garve.)*

Before I come to the proper point of dispute, concerning what may be valid in the use of the same conception for the theory merely, or for the praxis; I must compare my theory, as I have represented it elsewhere, with the representation which Mr. Garve gives of it, in order previously to see, whether we understand one another.

A. By way of introduction I explained moral as a science, which teaches, not how we shall become happy, but how we shall

* *Essays on different Subjects moral and literary, by Prof. Garve Vol. I.* p. 111——116. I name the disputing of my positions *objections* of this worthy man's to that, in which he (I hope) wishes to agree with me; not attacks, which as positive assertions would provoke to a defence, for which it is neither the place here, nor have I the inclination.

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become worthy of felicity.* At the same time I did not neglect to observe, that it thereby was not required of man, that, when the observance of duty was concerned, he should *renounce* his natural end, felicity; for he cannot do that, no more than any finite rational being in general; but he must, when the commandment of duty is in question, totally *abstract* from the consideration of felicity; he must by no means make it the *condition* of the observance of the law prescribed to him by reason; nay, as much as it is possible for him, even to endeavour to become conscious to himself, that no *springs* derived from that source shall imperceptibly mix themselves with the determination of duty: which is effectuated, by representing duty combined rather with sacrifices, which its observance (virtue) costs, than with the advantages, it yields us: in order to represent to ourselves the commandment of duty in its whole consequence or importance, requiring unconditional obedience, enough for itself and standing in need of no other influence whatever.

a. Mr. Garve expresses this my position thus: 'that I maintained, that observance of

* The worthiness of being happy is that quality of a person resting upon the proper will of the subject, in conformity to which a universally legislative reason (for nature as well as for the free will) would harmonise with all the ends of this person. It is therefore totally different from the address in procuring happiness to one's self. For he is not worthy of this even, and of the talent, which nature has lent him for that purpose, when he has a will that does not accord with what only is suitable to an universal legislation, and cannot be comprehended therein (that is, which is repugnant to morality).

the moral law is, entirely without consideration of felicity, the *only scope* of man, that it must be considered as the sole end of the Creator.' (According to my theory, neither the morality of man of itself, nor felicity of itself only, but the highest good possible in the world, which consists of the union and harmony of both, is the only end of the Creator).

B. I observed farther, that this conception of duty has no occasion to bottom upon any particular end, but rather *brings about* another end for the will of man, namely, to contribute to the utmost to the *highest good* possible in the world (universal felicity conjoined with the purest morality, and that felicity conformable to this morality in the universe): which, as it is indeed in our power on one side, but not on both sides taken together, extorts from reason in a *practical view* the belief in a moral Sovereign of the world and in a future life. Not, as if the universal conception of duty should receive *support and stability* but on the presupposition of both, that is, a sure ground and the requisite strength of a *spring*, but that it may receive an *object* but in that ideal of pure reason.* For duty

* The need or necessity of supposing a *highest good* possible by our cooperation in the world, as the scope or final end of all things, is not a need for want of moral springs, but in external relations, in which only, conformably to these springs, an *object* can be produced, as end in itself (as moral *scope*). For no *will* can be without all end; though, when legal necessitation of actions merely is concerned, it must be abstracted from and the law only constitutes the determinative of the will. But every end is not moral (for example, that of proper felicity is not), but this must be disinterested; and the need of a scope given by pure reason comprehending the whole of all ends under one prin-

in itself is nothing, but *limitation* of the will to the condition of an universal legislation possible by an assumed maxim, let the object, or the end of the will be what it pleases (consequently even felicity); but from which and from every end that one may have, it is hereby totally abstracted. In the question concerning the *principle* of moral, the doctrine of the *chief good*, as ultimate end of a will determined by it and suitable to its laws, may then (as episodisal) be passed over in silence; as it will appear in the sequel, that, where the proper point of dispute is concerned, no regard whatever is paid to it, but merely to the universal moral.

ciple (a world as the highest good possible by our cooperation), is a need of the disinterested will's *extending* itself beyond the observation of the formal laws to the production of an object (the chief good). — This is a determination of will of a peculiar sort, namely, by the idea of the whole of all ends, where this is laid as a foundation, to wit, that, *when* we stand in certain moral relations to things in the world, we must every-where obey the moral law; and more than that the duty still survenes, to cause with all our might, that such a relation (a world suitable to the moral chief ends) may exist. In this man cogitates himself according to the analogy with the Deity, which, though subjective, stands in need of no external thing; however it cannot be thought, that he should shut himself up within himself, but is destined to produce the chief good without himself, even by the consciousness of his all-sufficiency: which necessity (which in men is duty) in the supreme Being cannot be represented *by us* but as a moral need. With man therefore the spring that lies in the idea of the highest good possible in the world by his cooperation, is not the proper felicity thereby intended, but only this idea as end in itself, consequently its observance as duty. For it contains not a prospect of happiness absolutely, but a proportion between it and the worthiness of the subject, whatever it be. But a determination of will, which limits itself and its design, to belong to such a whole, to this condition, is *not interested*.

b. Mr. Garve reduces these positions to the following expressions: 'that the virtuous neither can, nor dares lose sight of that point of view (proper felicity), — because otherwise he would totally lose the transition to the invisible world, that to the conviction of the existence of God and of immortality; which however, according to this theory, is absolutely necessary, to give *the system support and stability;*' and concludes in order to comprehend in a small space the sum of the assertions ascribed to me: 'The virtuous in consequence of those principles aspires incessantly to be worthy of felicity, but, *in so far*, as he is really virtuous, never to be happy.' (The expression *in so far* occasions here an ambiguity, which must first be removed. It may mean: *in the act*, in which he as virtuous subjects himself to his duty; and in that case this position harmonizes completely with my theory. Or: when he is but virtuous in general, and even where duty is not concerned and impugned, the virtuous shall pay no regard at all to felicity; and that contradicts my assertions entirely).

These objections, therefore, are nothing but misunderstandings (for I do not chuse to hold them misinterpretations); whose possibility would seem very strange, did not the human propensity, to follow the train of thought to which it is once accustomed in even the judgment of other's thoughts, and thus to transfer that to this, sufficiently explain such a phenomenon.

A dogmatical assertion of the opposite follows this polemical treatment of the above moral principle. Mr. Garve concludes analytically thus: 'In the order of *conceptions* must precede the perception and distinguishing of states, whereby the *preference* is given to the one over the other, to the choice of one of them, and thus to the previous determination of a certain end. But a state, which a being, endued with the consciousness of himself and of his state, when this state is present and perceived by him, *prefers* to other modes of being, is a *good* state; and a series of such good states is the most general conception, which the word *felicity* expresses.' — Again: 'A law presupposes motives, but motives presuppose a previously perceived difference of a worse state from a better. This difference perceived is the element of the conception of felicity etc.' Again: '*From felicity*, in the most general sense of the word, *spring the motives to every pursuit;* therefore to the observance of the moral law. I must first know in general, that something is good, before I can inquire, whether the observance of the moral duties belongs to the rubric of the *good;* man must have a *spring*, that puts him in motion, *before* an *aim* can be set up to him,* to which this motion shall be directed.'

* That is exactly what I insist on. The spring, which man can previously have, before an aim (end) is set up to him, can evidently be nothing, but the law itself, by the reverence, which it (undetermined, what ends one may have and may attain by their observance) inspires. For the law, in regard of the formal of the arbitrament, is indeed the only one, that remains, when we have abstracted from the matter of the arbitrament (the aim, as Mr. G. names it.)

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This argument is nothing more than a play with the ambiguity of the word *the good:* as this is either in itself and unconditionally good, in contradiction to that bad in itself; or, never but good in a conditional manner, compared with the better or with the worse, as the state of the choice of the former can be but a comparatively better state, but in itself may be bad. — The maxim of an unconditional observance of a categorically commanding law of the free arbitrament (that is, duty) having no regard at all to ends as a foundation, is essentially, that is, *according to the species*, different from the maxim, To observe that end (which is named felicity in general) pointed out to us by nature itself, as a motive to a certain mode of action. For the first is good in itself, but the second by no means; it may in the event of the collision with duty, be very bad. Whereas, when a certain end is founded upon, consequently no law commands unconditionally (but only on the condition of this end), thus two opposite actions may be both good in a conditional manner, only, one better than the other (which latter would therefore be named comparatively bad); for, they are not different from one another *according to the sort*, but merely *according to the degree*. And of this nature are all actions, whose motive is not the unconditional law of reason (duty), but an end arbitrably laid by us as a foundation: for this belongs to the sum of all ends, whose attainment is denominated felicity; and one action may contribute more, another less, to my felicity, consequently

sequently be better or worse than the other.— But the *preferring* of the one state of the determination of the will to the other is an act of liberty merely, (*res meræ facultatis*, as the jurists say); in which, it is not at all taken into consideration whether this (determination of the will) be good or bad in itself, therefore it is, in respect of both, equipollent.

A state of being in connection with a certain *given end*, which I prefer to every other *of the same sort*, is a comparatively better state, in the field of felicity (which can be acknowledged as *good by reason* but in a conditional manner, so far as one is worthy of it). But that state, in which, in case of the collision of any of my ends with the moral law of duty, I am conscious to myself, to prefer this, is not only a better state, but that state only good in itself: a good from a quite other field, where we have no regard at all to ends, which may present themselves to us (consequently to their sum, felicity), and where, not the matter of the arbitrament (an object upon which it bottoms) but the mere form of the universal legality of its maxim, constitutes its determinative.— Therefore it cannot by any means be said, that I can reckon every state, which I *prefer* to every other mode of being, to felicity. For I must first be certain that I do not act contrary to my duty; as I am but then allowed to look out for felicity, and to see how much of it I can unite with that my morally (not physically) good state.*

* Felicity comprises all (but nothing more, than) that, with which nature can supply us; but virtue that, which

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The will must certainly have *motives;* but these are not certain designed objects referred to the *physical feeling*, as ends, but nothing but the unconditional *law* itself; for which reason the receptibility of the will, to find itself under that law, as an unconditional necessitation is termed the MORAL FEELING; which is therefore not the cause, but the effect of the determination of the will, of which we would not have the smallest perception in us, if that necessitation in us did not precede. Hence the old song, That this feeling, consequently a pleasure, which we make our end, constitutes the first cause of the determination of the will, of course felicity (to which that pleasure belongs as element) the ground of all objective necessity of acting, therefore of all obligation, pertains to the reasoning *toyings.* When, in alleging a cause to a certain effect, one cannot cease inquiring, thus at last one makes the effect the cause of itself.

At present I come to the point, which properly occupies us here, namely, to try by examples and to prove the interest of the theory and of the praxis opiniatively jarring in philosophy. Mr. G. in his above-mentioned Essay

nobody but man himself can give himself, or can take. Did one on the contrary say, that by deviation from virtue man may incur at least reproaches and pure moral self-censure, therefore discontentment, consequently may make himself unhappy; that may perhaps be granted. But the virtuous only, or he who is on the way to become so, is capable of the pure moral discontentment (not from the consequences of the action pernicious to him, but from its illegality itself). Therefore this discontentment is not the cause, but only the effect of his being virtuous; and the motive for being virtuous could not be taken from this misfortune (if one chooses so to name the pain occasioned by a misdeed).

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gives the best testimony of this. First, says he (speaking of the distinction, which I find between a doctrine, how we shall become *happy* and that, how we shall become *worthy* of felicity): 'I for my part acknowledge, that I perfectly comprehend this partition of ideas in my *head*, but that, I do not find this partition of the wishes and aspirations in my *heart*; that it is even incomprehensible to me, how any one person can be conscious to himself of having purely separated his desire for felicity itself, and therefore discharged his duty quite disinterestedly.'

I first reply to the latter, namely, I willingly grant, that no man can with certainty be conscious to himself of *having discharged* his duty quite disinterestedly: for that belongs to internal experience, and to this consciousness of the state of his mind would belong a throughly clear representation of all the collateral representations and considerations associating themselves with the conception of duty, by imagination, assuetude, and inclination, which cannot be required in any case; the nonexistence of something cannot be an object of experience (consequently an advantage thought in secret cannot). But man is conscious to himself with the greatest distinctness, that he *ought to discharge* his duty quite disinterestedly, and *must* totally separate his desire for felicity from the conception of duty, in order to have it quite pure; or, did he believe not to be conscious of this, it can be required of him that he be so, as far as it is in his power; because just in this purity

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is to be met with the real value of morality, and he must therefore be able to be so. Perhaps no man may have ever quite disinterestedly discharged (without a mixture of other springs) his duty, acknowledged and even honoured by him: perhaps no one, notwithstanding the greatest efforts, will ever reach so far. But, as much as he can perceive in himself by the most careful self-examination, to be conscious to himself not only of no such cooperating motives, but rather of self-denial with regard to many things opposing the idea of duty, consequently of the maxim, to aspire to that purity: that he is able to do; and that is enough for the observance of his duty. Whereas, to adopt as a maxim the favouring of the influence of such motives, under the pretext, that human nature does not allow such a purity (which however he cannot maintain with certitude), is the death of all morality.

As to the laconic confession of Mr. G. to wit, not to find in his *heart* that partition (more properly separation); I make no hesitation to contradict him directly in his self-accusation, and to protect his heart against his head. He, honest man, always found it actually in his heart (in the determination of his will); but they would only not accord, for the behoof of speculation and for the comprehending of what is incomprehensible (inexplicable), namely, the possibility of categorical imperatives, (such as those of duty are), in his head with the common principles of psychological explications (which collectively bottom upon the mechanism of the necessity of nature.*

* Professor Garve, in his observations on *Cicero on Duties*

But when Mr. G. at last says: 'Such fine distinctions become *obscure* in *reflecting* on particular objects; but *they are lost entirely*, when *acting* is in question, when they are to be applied to appetites and views. The simpler, and quicker the step is, by which we pass from the considerations of the motives to real action, and the more *divested of clear representations;* the less is it possible to cognise precisely and certainly the determinate weight, which every motive has added, to direct the step so and not otherwise' — I must be allowed to contradict him flatly, and with an audible voice.

The conception of duty in its whole purity is not only beyond all comparison simpler, more perspicuous, more conceivable to every body for practical use, and more natural, than any motive taken from felicity, or mingled with it and having regard to it (which always requires great art and reflection); but, in the judgment of even the most common human reason, when it is but brought to this, and with separation from, nay, even in opposi-

p. 69. ed. 1783, makes this remarkable confession, which is at the same time worthy of his ingenuity: 'Liberty, according to my most intimate conviction, will always remain inextricable and will never be explained.' A proof of actuality cannot absolutely be met with, either in an immediate, or mediate experience; and one cannot assume it without all proof. As a proof of it cannot be given from theoretical grounds merely, (for these must be sought in experience), therefore from practical positions of reason merely, but not from technically practical ones (for these would require grounds of experience), consequently but from morally practical positions: it is surprising that P. G. had not recourse to the conception of liberty, in order to save the possibility, at least, of such imperatives.

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tion to these, to the will of man far more *energetical*, penetrating, and promises more success, than all the motives borrowed from the latter interested principle. — Let us, for example, put the case: that a certain person has in his hands another's property which was intrusted to him (*depositum*), whose proprietor is dead, and that his heirs neither know, nor can ever hear of that property. Let this case be propounded even to a child, of eight or nine years old; and at the same time, that the detainer of this deposite is (without his fault) exactly at this instant totally ruined in his circumstances, and sees around him a wife and a numerous family of helpless children, melancholy and dejected through want, from which distressing situation he would be immediately relieved, should he appropriate that deposite to himself; let him at the same time be humane and beneficent, but that heir opulent and uncharitable, and in the highest degree luxurious and prodigal, so that this addition to his fortune would be like throwing a drop of water into the ocean. And were it now asked, Whether the detainer, under these circumstances, can be allowed to apply this deposite to his own use? The answer would certainly be: no! and, instead of all grounds, nothing, but that *it is wrong*, that is, repugnant to duty. Nothing is clearer than this; and indeed not that the detainer promotes his own *felicity* by giving up the deposite. For, if he expected the fixing of his resolution from the view to felicity, he might reason thus: if I

return this deposite to its proper owner, without its being demanded, I shall in all probability be rewarded for my honesty; or, should I not be rewarded, I shall acquire a good reputation, which may be highly advantageous to me. But all this is very uncertain. On the other hand many doubts occur: if I should keep the deposite, in order to relieve my distresses at once, I would, should I make a speedy use of it, incur suspicion, and every body would inquire how I came to better my fortune so suddenly; but were I to proceed in this slowly, the misery would increase to so high a degree, that it would not be possible afterwards to remedy it. — The will therefore according to the maxim of felicity hesitates between its springs, what it shall conclude; for it looks to the consequence and that is very uncertain; it requires a good understanding to disentangle one's self from the crowd of arguments and counter-arguments and not to deceive one's self in the summing up. Whereas when one questions one's self, What is duty here? one is at no loss at all what answer to give, but is immediately certain what ought to be done. Nay, if the conception of duty has any weight with us, we even feel an aversion to enter but on the calculation of advantages, which might arise to us from the transgression of our duty, as if we still had the choice here.

It therefore contradicts, even proper experience, that these distinctions (which, as shown above, are not so fine, as Mr. G. fancies, but are written in the most legible characters

racters in the soul of man) *are*, as he expresses himself, *totally lost, when acting is in question.* It does not indeed contradict that experience, which exhibits the *history* of the maxims drawn from the one or from the other principle: for there it evinces, unfortunately, that they for the most part flow from the latter (self-interest); but the experience, which can be but internal, that no idea elevates the human mind more, and animates it to ecstasy even, than that of a pure moral sentiment revering duty above all, struggling with the innumerable evils of life and even with its seducing allurements, and yet overcoming them (as it is supposed with reason, that man is able to do it). That man is conscious to himself, that he can do this, because he ought to do it, opens in him a depth of godlike predispositions, which makes him feel, in a manner, a solemn shudder and reflect on the grandeur and sublimity of his real destination. And were he frequently made attentive and accustomed, to disburden virtue totally of all the riches and spoil of the advantages, which it can make from the observance of duty, and to represent it to himself in its whole purity; were it a principle in the private as well as in the public instruction to make constant use of it (a method of inculcating duties, which has almost always been neglected); the morality of men would soon be on a better footing. That the experience of history has not yet had the good consequence, which moralists wished to evince, is the fault of the false presupposition, That the spring derived from the idea of

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duty in itself is far too fine for the common conception, whereas the coarser spring taken from certain advantages to be expected in this world, nay, even in a future, from the observance of the law (without attending to it as spring), would act more forcibly on the mind; and that to give the aspiring to felicity the preference to that, which reason makes the highest condition, namely, the worthiness of being happy, has hitherto been made the principle of education and of the propounding from the pulpit. For *precepts*, how one may make himself happy, or at least avoid his disadvantage, are no *commandments*. They bind nobody absolutely; and he, after he has been warned, may chuse what he pleases, when he is content with suffering, whatever may happen to him. He has then no reason to consider the evils, which may arise to him from the neglect of the advice given him, as punishments: for these reach, only the free but the wrongful will; but nature and inclination cannot give laws to liberty. Quite differently circumstanced is the idea of duty, whose transgression, without having regard to the disadvantages arising to men therefrom, acts immediately on the mind, and renders them in their own eyes culpable and punishable.

Here is now a clear proof, that in moral all that is right in theory, must be valid for the praxis too. — In the quality of a man, as a being subjected to certain duties by his own reason, every one is a *man of business*; and, as he, as a man, never grows too tall for

for the school of wisdom, he cannot, as opiniatively better versed by experience in what a man is and what can be required of him, with arrogant contempt send back to the school the adherers to the theory. For all this experience does not help him to avoid the precept of theory, but only to teach, how it, when it is adopted as a principle, may be better and more generally put in execution; but which pragmatical address is not the subject of the present discussion.

SECTION II.

OF THE RELATION WHICH THE THEORY BEARS TO THE PRAXIS IN THE LAW OF STATE.

(*Against Hobbes*).

Among all contracts, by which a number of men combine themselves in a society (*pactum sociale*), the contract of the foundation of a *civil constitution* among them (*pactum unionis civilis*) is of so peculiar a nature, that, though it has indeed, with regard to the *execution*, much in common with every other (which is equally directed to any one arbitrable end to be promoted in common), it is in the principle of its establishment (*constitutionis civilis*) essentially different from all others. The conjunction of many to any one (common) end (which all *have*) is to be met with in all contracts of society; but the conjunction of what is end in itself (which every one *ought to have*), consequently that in every external relation of men in general, who cannot avoid falling into a reciprocal influence on one another, is an unconditional and the first duty: such a conjunction is to be met with but in a society, so far as it finds itself in the civil state, that is, constitutes a commonwealth. This end now, which, in such an external

relation, is duty in itself and even the chief formal condition (*conditio sine qua non*) of every other external duty, is the RIGHT of men UNDER PUBLIC COACTIVE LAWS, by which what belongs to every one can be determined and secured from the encroachment of every other person.

But the conception of an external right in general proceeds entirely from the conception of LIBERTY in the external relations of men towards one another; and has nothing at all to do with the end which all men naturally have (the view to felicity), and the prescribing of the means to attain it: so that this, therefore, must absolutely not be mixed with the laws of that right, as their determinative. RIGHT is the limitation of the liberty of every one to the condition of its agreement with the liberty of every body, so far as this is possible according to an universal law; and PUBLIC LAW is the complex of EXTERNAL LAWS, which renders such a thorough agreement possible.

As every limitation of liberty by the arbitrament of another is named COACTION; it follows, that the civil constitution is a relation of *free* men, who (without prejudice to their liberty in the whole of their conjunction with others) rank under coactive laws: because reason itself will have it so, and indeed pure legislative reason *à priori*, which has no regard to any empirical end (all such ends are comprehended under the universal name of felicity); as in respect to which, and wherein every one chuses to place it, men think very differently, insomuch that their will can be brought

brought under no common principle, consequently under no external law harmonizing with the liberty of every one.

The civil state, then, considered as a juridical state merely, is founded in the following principles *à priori*:

1. The LIBERTY of every member of the society, as a MAN.

2. His EQUALITY with every other, as a SUBJECT.

3. The SELF-SUFFICIENCY of every member of a commonwealth, as a CITIZEN.

These principles are not so much laws, which the state already founded gives, but according to which only a foundation of a state is possible, conformably to pure rational principles of the external rights of men in general. Therefore:

1. The *liberty* as a man, whose principle for the constitution of a commonwealth I express in the formule: Nobody can compel me to be happy in his way (as he conceives the wellbeing of other men), but every one may seek his felicity in the way he chuses himself, if he does not derogate from the liberty of others, to aspire to a similar end, which liberty can consist with the liberty of every one according to a possible universal law, (that is, not to derogate from this right of others). — A government, founded upon the principle of benevolence towards the people as that of a *father* towards his children, that is, a *paternal government* (*imperium paternale*), where the subjects, as minors or infants, who cannot distinguish what is really useful or hurt-

hurtful to them, are obliged to conduct themselves in a passive manner merely, in order, to expect, how they *ought* to be happy, barely from the judgment of the head of the state, and, that he shall be pleased to will this, from his goodness merely, is the greatest DESPOTISM imaginable (a constitution, which destroys all liberty of the subjects, who have then no rights whatever). Not a paternal, but a *patriotic* government (*imperium, non paternale, sed patrioticum*) is that only, which can he conceived for men, who are capable of rights, and at the same time in reference to the benevolence of the ruler. That cast of mind is PATRIOTIC, where every one in the state (its head not excepted) considers the commonwealth as the maternal womb, from which, or the country as the paternal land, upon which, he took his origin, and which he must leave behind him as a dear pledge, only in order to protect its rights by laws of the common will, but not to hold himself entitled, to subject it to the use of his own unconditional will and pleasure. — This right of liberty belongs to him, the member of the commonwealth, as a man, so far as he is a being, who is capable of rights in general.

2. The *equality* as a subject, whose formule may run thus: Every one member of the commonwealth has coactive rights against every other, its head only excepted (because he is no member of it, but its creator or preserver); who only has the moral faculty to compel, without being subjected himself to a coactive law. But all, that rank

unde

under laws, are subjects in a state, consequently subjected to the coactive law, like every other fellow-member of the common-wealth; one only (physical or moral person), the head of the state, by whom only all juridical coaction can be exercised, excepted. For, could he too be compelled, he would not be the head of the state, and the series of subordination would go upwards to infinite. Were there however two (persons free from coaction); neither of them would rank under coactive laws, and the one could do the other no wrong: which is impossible.

But this thorough equality of men in a state, as its subjects, consists perfectly well with the greatest inequality of the multitude, and the degrees of their property whether it be in bodily or mental superiority over others, or in the goods of fortune without them and in rights in general (of which there may be many) respectively to others; so that the welfare of the one depends much on the will of the other (the poor on the rich), that the one must obey (as the child the parents, or the wife the husband) and the other command him, that the one serves (as a daylabourer) the other pays, and so on. But as *to right* (which, as the sentence of the universal will, can be but one, and which concerns the form of right, but not the matter or the object, in which I have a right) they are, as subjects, all equal to one another; because no one can compel any other, but by the public law (and its executor, the head of the state), by this (law), however, every other person resists him in

in the same measure, but nobody can lose this moral faculty to compel (consequently to have a right against others) but by his own crime, and cannot relinquish it of himself, that is, he cannot cause by a contract, therefore by a juridical action, that he shall have no rights, but merely duties: because he would thereby deprive himself of the right to make a contract, consequently annual this himself.

From this idea of the equality of men in the commonwealth as subjects arises the formule: Every member of the commonwealth must be able to attain every step of rank in it (that can belong to a subject), to which his talents, his industry, and his fortune may lead him; and his fellow-subjects must not hinder him by a *hereditary* prerogative (as persons privileged for a certain class), or keep him and his posterity perpetually under.

For, as all right consists in the limitation merely of the liberty of every other to the condition, that it can subsist with mine according to an universal law, and the public law (in a commonwealth) is the state of an actual legislation merely conformable to this principle and conjoined with potency, by means of which all those belonging to a nation, as subjects, find themselves in a juridical state in general, namely, the equality of action and reaction of an arbitrament limiting one another agreeably to the universal law of liberty (which is denominated the civil state); so the *innate right* of every one in this state, (that is, previously to every juridical fact of his) in regard of the moral faculty to compel every

every other, is, in order that he may always remain within the bounds of the unison of the use of his liberty with mine, thoroughly EQUAL. Now as birth is no *fact* of his, who is born, consequently no inequality of the juridical state and no subjection to laws of coaction, but merely to those which are common to him as a subject of the only chief legislative potency with all others, are thereby occasioned to him; so there can be no inborn prerogative of one member of the commonwealth, as a fellow-subject, before another; and nobody can transmit by inheritance to his posterity the prerogative of the *rank*, which he bears in the commonwealth, consequently, no one, as if qualified by birth for the rank of master, can hinder posterity by force to attain by proper merit the higher steps of the subordination (of *superior* and *inferiour*, of whom however neither is *imperans*, and the other *subjectus*). He may transmit by inheritance all the rest that is thing (that doth not concern personality) and can be acquired as property and also alienated by him, and thus in a series of posterity produce a considerable inequality in circumstances among the members of a commonwealth (of lessors and lessees, of proprietors of estates, farmers, husbandmen, and so on); only not to prevent these, when their talents, their industry and their fortune put it in their power, from raising themselves to such situations. For else he might compel, with being able to be compelled in his turn by the reaction of others, and thus rise above the degree of a subject. — Likewise no man, who

who lives in a juridical state of a commonwealth, can fall from this equality, but by a crime of his own, but never either by paction or by the power of war (*occupatio bellica*); for he cannot cease by any juridical fact (neither by his own, nor by that of another) to be owner of himself, and be classed with the cattle, which are used at pleasure for all services, and continued therein without their consent as long as one pleases, though with the restriction not to lame or to kill them (which is sometimes sanctioned by religion, as among the Indians). He may be supposed happy in every state, when he is but conscious to himself, that it depends but on himself (on his abilities, or earnest will) or on circumstances, with which he can charge nobody else, but not on the irresistible will of others, that he does not ascend to the same step with others who, as his fellow-subjects, have in this, as to right, no advantage at all over him.*

3. The

* If one chuses to affix a determinate conception to the word *gracious* (*gnädig*) (different from good, kind, beneficent, protecting and such like), it can be attributed but to him, against whom *no coactive right* has place. Therefore only the head of the *administration of the state*, who occasions and distributes all the good possible according to public laws, (for the *sovereign*, who gives them, is, as it were, invisible; he is the personified law itself, not agent) can be titled *gracious sir or master*,† as the only one, against whom no coactive law has place. Thus in an aristocracy even, as formerly in Venice, the *senate* was the only *gnädiger herr*; the nobles, who constituted it, were collectively subjects

† This is the literal translation of *gnädiger herr*, in our language *my lord* comes perhaps nearer to its sense, but seems to me not to express sufficiently all the abjectness of this German mode of salutation.

3. The *self-sufficiency* (*sibisufficientia*) of a member of the commonwealth as a *citizen*, that is, a fellow-legislator. In point of legislation all, who are free and equal *under* public laws already extant, are to be esteemed equal, yet not, as to the right, to *give* these laws. Those, who are not capable of this right, are however, as members of the commonwealth, subjected to the observance of these laws, and thereby as to the protection participant of them; only not as *citizens*, but as *fellows receiving protection.* — All right depends on laws. But a public law, which determines for every body what shall be juridically permitted or prohibited, is the act of a public will, from which all right proceeds, and which itself must not therefore be able to do any body wrong. But for this no other will is possible, than that of the whole nation (where all decree with regard to all, consequently every one with regard to himself): for one's self alone can do wrong to nobody. But if

subjects, even the Doge not excepted (for the *great council* only was the sovereign), and, as to the exercise of right, on an equality with all others, namely, that a coactive right belonged to the subject against every one of them. Princes (that is, persons to whom belong a hereditary right to governments) are however, in this view and on account of that claim named (by courtesy) *gnädige herren*; but they are but fellow-subjects, against whom a coactive right must belong to the lowest of their servants even, by means of the head of the state. There can be no more than one *gnädiger herr* in the state. But concerning the *gnädige* (more properly illustrious) *ladies*, it may be considered that their *quality* together with their *sex* (of course but relatively to the *male* sex) gives them a claim to this title, and that by means of the refinement of manners (named gallantry), according to which men believe to honour themselves the more, the more precedency they grant the fair sex.

if there is another, the mere will of one different from him cannot conclude of any thing with regard to him, which may not be wrong; therefore his law would require still another law to limite his legislation, consequently no particular will can be legislative for a commonwealth. (In order to make up this conception, the conception of external liberty, equality, and *unity* of the will of *all* properly coalesce, of the latter of which, as voting is requisite, when the two former are taken together, self-sufficiency is the condition). This fundamental law, which can spring but from the universal (united) will of the nation, is distinguished by the appellation of ORIGINAL CONTRACT.

He, who has the right to vote in this legislation, is named a CITIZEN (*citoyen*, that is, a *citizen of state*, not a burgher, *bourgeois*). The quality thereto requisite, besides the *natural* one (to be neither a child, nor a woman), is this only, to wit, He must be *his own master* (*sui juris*), consequently must have some one *property* or other (to which every art, handicraft, liberal art, or science may be numbered) which maintains him; that is, he, in those cases, where he must acquire from others in order to live, must acquire but by *alienation* of that which is *his* *, not by the consent, which he

* He, who makes an *opus*, may transfer it to another by *alienation*, as if it were his property. The *praestatio operae* however is no alienation. The house-servant, the shop-man, the daylabourer, and even the hair-dresser are *operarii* merely, not *artifices* (in the large signification of the word), and not members of state, consequently not qualified to be citizens. He, to whom I give my firewood to saw and to split, and the

he gives others to make use of his powers, therefore he must *serve* nobody but the commonwealth in the proper sense of the word. Here artists and great (or small) landed proprietors are all equal, namely, each entitled to but one suffrage. For, as to the latter, without even starting the question, How it could have happened in justice, that any one got possession of more land, than he could make use of with his own *hands* (for the acquisition by the occupancy of war is no first acquisition); and how it happened, that many men, who else might have all acquired a constant state of possession, are thereby brought to serve those merely, in order to live? it would be repugnant to the foregoing principle of equality, if a law should invest them with the prerogative of quality, that their offspring shall either remain always great land-proprietors, (the feudal system), without being able to sell their estates, or to divide them among their issue, and thus redound to the use and profit of several of the nation, or, even in these divisions, that nobody but those belonging to a certain class of men arbitrarily esta-

the taylor, to whom I give my cloth, to make a coat of, seem to be in quite similar relations towards me, yet the former is different from the latter, as the hairdresser from the wigmaker (to whom I may have likewise given the hair for it), and as the daylabourer from the artist or the handicraftsman, who makes a work, which belongs to him till he is paid. The latter, as exercising a trade, traffics his property with the other (*opus*), the former the use of his powers which he gives to another (*operam*). — It is somewhat difficult, I own, to determine the requisite, to be able to lay claim to the station of a man, who is his own master.

blished shall be able to acquire any part of them. The great possessor of land annihilates as many smaller proprietors with their voices, as could occupy his place; therefore does not vote in their name, and has by consequence but one voice. — As it must be left to depend on the ability, on the diligence and on the fortune merely of every member of the commonwealth, that each may acquire a part of it and all the whole, but this distinction cannot be taken into the account in the universal legislation; so must according to the heads of those, who are in the state of possession, not according to the size of the possessions, be judged the number of those capable of voting for the legislature.

But *all*, who have this right of suffrage, must agree to this law of public justice; for otherwise a dispute of right would happen between those who do not agree to it and the former, which would require still a higher principle of right, in order to be ended. As the former cannot be expected from a whole nation, consequently but a majority of voices and that not of the voters immediately (in a great nation), but only of these delegated for that purpose, as representatives of the nation, is that only which can be foreseen as attainable; so the principle, to be contented with this majority, as adopted by universal agreement, therefore by contract, must be the chief ground of the establishment of a civil constitution.

Con-

Consequence.

Here is now an ORIGINAL CONTRACT, upon which only a civil, therefore thoroughly juridical, constitution among men can be founded and a commonwealth established. — But this contract (named *contractus originarius*, or *pactum sociale*), as a coalition of every particular and private will of a nation to a common and public will (for the behoof of a juridical legislation merely), is by no means necessary to be presupposed as a *fact*, (nay, it is as such not at all possible); as if it must be first proved by history, that a nation, into whose rights and obligations we as descendants are entered, *once* actually performed such an act, and must have left us, either orally or scriptorily, a certain account or an instrument of it, in order to consider ourselves bound to a civil constitution already subsisting. But it is a *mere* conception of reason, *id est*, an *idea*, which has however its indubitable (practical) reality, *videlicet*, to oblige every legislator to give his laws in such a manner, that they *might* have sprung from the united will of a whole nation, and to consider every citizen, so far as he is disposed to be a citizen, as if he had voted with him for such a will. For that is the touchstone of the rightfulness of every public law. If this is of such a nature as a whole nation *could not possibly* give its concurrence thereto (as for instance that a certain class of *subjects* should have hereditarily the preference of the *condition of masters*), it is not just; but if it is *possible only* that a

 nation

nation could agree to it, is is duty to hold the law just: let us suppose also, that the nation were in such a state of its cast of mind, that, were it consulted on that head, it would in all probability refuse its consent.*

But this limitation is obviously valid but for the judgment of the lawgiver, not of the subjects. If then a nation under a certain actual legislation should judge with great likelihood to sustain the loss of its felicity; What is it to do? Shall it not make opposition? The only answer can be, There is nothing for it to do, but to obey. For the felicity which is to be expected from the foundation or the administration of the commonwealth for the subject is not under review here; but first merely right, that shall thereby be secured to every body: which is the highest principle, from which must arise all maxims that concern a commonwealth, and that principle is limited by no other. With regard to the former (felicity) no universally valid principle at all can be given for laws. For, as well the circumstances of time, as also the very inconsistent and thereby ever mutable fancy, wherein one

* If, for example, a contribution for war proportional to all the subjects were exacted, these cannot say, though it is heavy, that it is unjust, because the war, in their opinion, is unnecessary: for they are not entitled to judge of that: but, as it always remains *possible*, that it is inevitable and the contribution indispensable, it must in the judgment of the subject be valid as rightful. But when certain landed men in such a war are burdened with taxes, but others of the same class exempted from them; it is evident, that a whole nation cannot acquiesce in such a law, and it is entitled to make representations at least against it, because it cannot hold just these unequal distributions of the burdens.

one places his felicity, (but wherein he ought to place it, nobody can prescribe to him) renders all stable principles impossible, and of itself only unfit for the principle of legislation. The position: *Salus publica suprema civitatis lex est*, remains in its undiminished value and consequence; but the public prosperity, which is *first* to be taken into consideration, is directly that legal constitution, which secures to every one his liberty by laws: whereby he is not deprived of the freedom to seek his felicity in every way he thinks the best, if he does but not derogate from that universal legal liberty, consequently from the rights of other fellow-subjects.

When the chief potency ordains laws, which are immediately directed towards felicity (the opulence of the citizens, the population and such like); this doth not take place as the end of the establishment of a civil constitution, but merely as the mean, to *secure* the *juridical state* chiefly against external enemies of the nation. Of this the head of the state solely has the authority to judge, whether such belong to that flourishing state of the commonwealth, which is requisite, in order to secure its strength and stability, as well internally, as against external enemies; not however to make the nation happy, as it were, against its will, but only to cause that it shall exist as a commonwealth.* In this judgment,

 whether

* To that belong certain prohibitions of importation, in order that the means of acquisition may be promoted for the advantage of the subject and not for that of foreigners and

whether that measure be taken *prudently* or not, the legislator may indeed err, but not in that, where he questions himself, Whether the law harmonize or not with the principle of right; for there he has at hand that idea of the original contract as an infallible standard *à priori*, (and needs not, as with the principle of felicity, wait for experience, which must first inform him of the fitness of his means). For when it is not inconsistent with the idea, that a whole nation could assent to it, let it be ever so burdensome to them; it is conformable to right. But if a public law, agreeably to this, consequently in regard to right is IRREPREHENSIBLE; the faculty to compel is also combined with it, and, on the other side, the prohibition, to oppose by no means actively the will of the legislator: that is, the potency in the state, which gives effect to the law, is IRRESISTIBLE, and there exists no commonwealth subsisting juridically without such a power, which beats down and crushes all internal resistance, because this would take place conformably to a maxim, which, rendered universal, would annul every civil constitution and destroy the state, in which only men can be in the possession of rights in general.

Hence follows: that all opposition to the chief legislative, all incitation in order to render active the discontentment of the subjects,

and for the encouragement of the industry of others, because the state, without opulence of the people, would not possess force enough to resist foreign enemies, or to maintain itself as a commonwealth.

jects, all insurrection or revolt, which breakes out into rebellion, is the greatest and most punishable crime in a commonwealth; because it undermines its very foundation. And this prohibition is *inconditional*, so that that potency or its agent, the head of the state, may have violated the original contract even, and thereby forfeited, according to the conception of the subject, the right to be legislator, by its authorizing the government to proceed tyrannically; yet no resistance, as counterpower, is allowed the subject. The reason of which is, That in a civil constitution already subsisting the nation has no longer a judgment amounting to a right, to determine, How it shall be administered. For let us take for granted, That the nation has such a right, in opposition to the judgment of the actual head of the state; Who shall decide, on whose side the right is? Neither of them can do it, as judge in his own cause. Therefore there must be a head still above the head, to decide between this head and the nation; which is inconsistent. — A right of necessity, (*jus in casu neccssitatis*), which, as an opiniative *right*, to do *wrong* in the greatest (physical) necessity, is besides a nonentity,* cannot intervene

 here

* There is no *casus necessitatis*, but in the case, where duties, namely, *unconditional* and (perhaps great, but yet) *conditional duty*, clash with one another; for instance, when the averting of a misfortune from the state by the treason of a man, who stands in a relation to another, like father and son, is concerned. This averting of the evil from the former is unconditional duty, but that of the misfortune of the latter conditional duty only (namely, so far as he is not

here and lift up the bar which limits the arbitrary potency of the nation. For the head of the state may as well opine to justify his severe procedure towards the subjects by their contumacy or refractoriness, as these their uproar and sedition against him by complaints of their unbecoming sufferings; and Who shall decide here now? Only he, who finds himself in possession of the chief care of the public law, and that is directly the head of the state, can decide; and therefore nobody in the commonwealth can have a right to dispute this possession with him.

However I find respectable men, who maintain this moral faculty of the subject's to counterpower over his superiors under certain circumstances, among whom I shall quote here but *Achenwall*, who is moderate, precise, and very cautious in his doctrines of the rights of nature.* He says, 'When the danger, which threatens

not guilty of a crime against the state). The notice, which the latter would give to the magistrate of the attempt of the former, would perhaps be with the greatest averseness, but urged by necessity (to wit, the moral). — But when it is said of one, who, in a shipwreck, in order to save his own life, pushed another from his plank, that he acquired a right thereto by necessity (the physical); it is quite false. For, to preserve my life, is but conditional duty (when it can be done without a crime); but it is unconditional duty, not to take the life of another person, who does me no injury, nay, who does not even *put* me in danger of losing mine. The teachers of the universal civil law proceed, however, very consequentially in the juridical moral faculty, which they allow to this help in need. For the magistrate can conjoin no *punishment* with the prohibition, because this punishment must be *death*. But it would be an absurd law, to threaten one with death, if he did not in dangerous circumstances give himself up willingly to death.

* Jus Naturæ, Editio 5ta, Pars posterior, §§. 203—206.

threatens the commonwealth from the longer tolerance of the injustice of the head of the state, is greater than is to be apprehended from taking up arms against him; then the nation may resist him, depart from its paction of subjection for the behoof of this right, and dethrone him as a tyrant.' And he concludes, 'The nation returns in this manner (relatively to its former supreme lord) to the state of nature.'

I willingly believe, that neither Achenwall, nor any one of the men of probity, who have reasoned sophistically with him on this subject would ever have given his advice or assent, in any one case happening, to such an enterprise; it is beyond a doubt, that, if those rebellions, by which Switzerland, the United Netherlands, and even Great Britain acquired their present constitutions, praised as so happy, had miscarried, the reader of their histories would have seen in the execution of their authors, at present so celebrated, nothing but merited punishment of great state-criminals. For the issue commonly mixes itself with our judgments of the grounds of right, though that is uncertain, but these are certain. It is however clear, that, as to the latter, — when it is granted, that by such a rebellion no wrong is done to the prince (who has violated, for example, a *joyeuse entree*, as an actually existing contract with the nation), — the nation does wrong in the highest degree to seek its right in this manner; because it (adopted as a maxim) renders every juridical constitution unsecure, and introduces a totally

totally lawless state (*status naturalis*), where all right ceases, at least to have effect.—With regard to this propension of so many well-meaning authors to speak in behalf of the people (to their own ruin), I have to observe, that the cause of it is, partly the common illusion, when the principle of right is the subject of consideration, to found their judgments upon the principle of felicity; and partly where no instrument of an actual contract proposed to the commonwealth, accepted by its head, and sanctioned by both is to be met with, as they always supposed the idea of an original contract, which constantly forms the basis in reason, to be something, which must *actually* take place, and so were of opinion to preserve to the people the faculty to depart therefrom at pleasure in case of a gross violation, but judged by themselves to be so.*

The evil, which the principle of felicity (that is properly not capable of any determinate principle) occasions, as well in the law of state, as in moral, notwithstanding the good

* Let the actual contract of the people with the supreme lord be ever so much violated; they cannot directly *as a commonwealth*, act in opposition, but only by complotting. The constitution hitherto subsisting is torn by the people; and the organization of a new commonwealth must take place. There now intervenes a state of anarchy with all its horrors, which are thereby possible at least; and the injustice which happens here, is that, which one party among the people does to another; as is obvious from the example cited, where the factious subjects of that state endeavoured at last to obtrude on one another a constitution which would have been much more oppressive, than that which they forsook; that is to say, they would have been eat up by nobles and clergy; whereas, they might expect more equality in the distribution of the burdens of state under an all-governing head.

good intentions of the teachers of it, is evident. The sovereign is determined to make the people happy according to his conceptions, and becomes a despot; the people will not suffer themselves to be deprived of the universal claim of mankind to proper felicity, and become rebels. Had it been first inquired. What is right (where the principles stand firm *à priori*, and no empiric can botch therein); the credit of the idea of the social contract would have remained indisputable: but not as a fact (as *Danton* would have it, without which he declares all rights and all property to be found in the actually existing civil constitution to be totally null), but only as a rational principle of the judgment of every public juridical constitution in general. And it would be perspected, that, before the universal will exists, the nation possesses no coactive right at all against its rulers, because it can compel juridically by these only; but if that exists, in the same manner no coaction to be exercised by it against these can have place, because it then would be itself the chief ruler; consequently a right of coaction (opposition in either words or deeds) never belongs to the nation against the head of the state.

We see this theory sufficiently confirmed in the praxis. In the constitution of England, of which the British nation boast so much, as if it were a pattern for all the world,* we find

* Though there may, perhaps, be scope for Parliament (when the circumstances of the times shall allow) to exercise their political wisdom in reforming and supplying defects

find that it is perfectly silent with regard to the moral faculty, which, in case the monarch should infringe the contract of 1688, belongs to the nation; consequently reserves for itself in secret a rebellion against him, should he violate it, because no law exists on this head. For, it is a palpable contradiction, that the constitution in this case shall comprise a law, which justifies the overthrowing of the subsisting constitution, from which all particular laws proceed, (suppose the contract were even violated); because it must then comprehend a *publicly constituted** counterpotency, therefore a second head of the state, to protect the rights of the nation against the first, but then a third also, to decide between both, on whose side the right is. — The leaders of that nation (or, if you chuse, the guardians), apprehensive of such an accusation, if their attempt should

fects, and Where is the human institution without such? '*Ubi homines, ibi vitia.*' And though the translator has, unquestionably, the greatest deference for the Author's profound penetration and superior judgement, he cannot but think, that Britons have at least as good reason to glory in the happy frame of their *Constitution*, as either the Prussians in their *Autocrasy*, or the French in the *Sovereignty of the people*, that marvellously ridiculous stalkinghorse, by which *Jacobins* and *Illumines* deceive and outrage the unenlightened (unfortunately not the least numerous) part of the devoted French nation.

'Crimes and enormities are the legitimate offspring of a government founded in rebellion, perjury, rapine and murder.'

* No right in the state can be concealed by a secret reservation, as it were, maliciously; and still less the right, which the nation assumes to itself as one belonging to the constitution; because all its laws must be thought as sprung from a public will. Therefore if the constitution allowed a rising of the people, it must declare publicly the right thereto, and in what mode use is to be made of it.

should fail, have rather *feigned* a voluntary abdication of the government by the monarch, who was frightened away by them, than assumed to themselves the right to depose him, by which they would have put the constitution in a manifest contradiction with itself.

As I am confident not to have incurred by these my assertions the reproach of having flattered monarchs too much by this inviolableness; so I trust nobody will accuse me of maintaining too much in favour of the people, when I say, that they also have their rights against the head of the state, which are not possible to be lost, though these can be no coactive rights.

Hobbes is of the opposite opinion. According to him *de Cive*, cap. 7, §. 14, the head of the state is bound in nothing to the nation by contract, and can do no wrong to the citizen (let him dispose of him as he pleases).— This position would be perfectly right, if by wrong were understood that læsion, which grants the injured party a *coactive right* against him, who does him wrong; but, so in the general, the position is frightful.

The subject, who is not refractory, must suppose, that his supreme lord does not will to do him wrong. Consequently, as every man has rights, which he cannot possibly lose, which he cannot even relinquish, if he had a mind, and of which he is entitled to judge; but the wrong, that in his opinion is done to him, happens according to that supposition but from error or ignorance of certain consequences from laws of the chief potency: so the

the faculty must belong to the citizen of state, and that with the permission of the supreme lord himself, to make publicly known his opinion of dispositions of the latter, which seem to him to be a wrong towards the commonwealth. For, to suppose, that the head of the state cannot even err, or be ignorant of a matter, would represent him as endowed with heavenly inspirations and elevated above humanity. Therefore, the only palladium of the rights of the nation is THE LIBERTY OF THE PEN, kept within the limits of the highest reverence and love for the constitution, under which one lives, by the liberal way of thinking of the subjects, which that instils even, (and the pens restrict one another of themselves, in order that they may not lose their liberty). For to deny the nation this liberty, is not only as much, as to deprive it of all claim to right in regard to the chief ruler, (according to Hobbes), but to take away from the latter, whose will, merely by representing the universal will of the nation, gives orders to the subjects as citizens, all knowledge of that, which, if he knew it, he himself would alter, and to put him in contradiction with himself. But to insinuate apprehension to the head of the state, that, by thinking for one's self, and, if I may use the expression, by thinking aloud, disturbance or commotion may be stirred up in the state, is as much as to excite diffidence in his own potency, or hatred against his people.

But the universal principle, according to which a nation have to judge of their rights

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negatively, that is, merely to judge, what may be considered as *not enacted* by the chief legislative with its best will, is contained in the position: THE LEGISLATOR, WITH REGARD TO THE NATION, CANNOT DECREE THAT, WHICH THE NATION CANNOT DECREE WITH REGARD TO THEMSELVES.

When, *exempli gratia*, the question is, Whether a law, which enjoins a certain ecclesiastical constitution once established to be perpetual, can be considered as arising from the proper will of the legislator (his design)? let it first be enquired, Whether a nation *can* ordain it a law for itself, that certain positions and forms of faith of external religion once received shall remain for ever; and whether it can hinder its posterity from making farther progress in introspections into religion, or from altering some old errours? It is obvious, that an original contract of the nation, which constituted this a law, would in itself be void: because it jars with the destination and end of humanity; consequently a law made accordingly is not to be considered as the proper will of the monarch, against which therefore representations may be made.— But in all cases, if any thing were even so enacted by the chief legislature, universal and public judgments may, it is true, be given on it, but verbal or active resistance never can be made against it.

In every commonwealth there must be an OBEDIENCE, under the mechanism of the constitution of state according to coactive laws (which refer to the whole), but at the same

 time

time a SPIRIT OF LIBERTY, as every one, in that which concerns the universal duty of man, requires, in order not to fall into a contradiction with himself, to be convinced by reason, that this coaction is rightful. The former, without the latter, is the immediate cause of all SECRET SOCIETIES. For it is a natural propension of humanity to communicate their thoughts to one another, especially on what concerns mankind in general; and these societies would cease, were this liberty favoured. — And by what else can come to the government the knowledge, which promotes its own essential design, than by allowing the spirit of liberty, so worthy of reverence, in both its origin and its effects, to manifest itself.

Nowhere does a praxis passing by all pure principles of reason decide with more presumption on theory, than in the question concerning the requisites to a good constitution of state. The reason is, that a legal constitution of a long continuance has accustomed the nation by degrees, to judge their felicity as well as their rights according to the state in which every thing has been hitherto in its quiet course; but not conversely to estimate the latter according to conceptions, with which reason would furnish them: but rather always to prefer that passive state to the dangerous situation, to seek a better (where that, which Hypocrates gives to encourage the physicians, is applicable, *videlicet*, *judicium anceps*, *experimentum periculosum*). As now all constitutions of a long enough duration, whatever

ever imperfections they may have, yield, notwithstanding their difference, the very same result, namely, To be contented with that constitution, under which one lives: so no theory at all, when the WELFARE OF THE NATION is considered, is in fact valid, but every thing rests upon a praxis obedient to experience.

But if there is any such thing in reason, as may be expressed by the term LAW OF STATE; and if this conception has a binding power for men, who are in a state of antagonism of their liberty towards one another, consequently objective (practical) reality, without needing to look to either the welfare or the misery which may arise to them therefrom (of which the knowledge rests upon experience merely): it is founded upon principles *à priori* (for, experience cannot teach what is right; and there is a THEORY of the law of state, without a consonancy with which no praxis whatever is valid.

Against this now nothing can be advanced, but, that, though men have in their heads the idea of the rights belonging to them, they, on account of their hardheartedness, are incapable and unworthy of being treated conformably to it, and therefore a chief power proceeding according to rules of prudence merely must keep them in order. But this leap of desperation (*salto mortale*) is of such a nature, that, when once not right, but only power, is in agitation, the nation may try theirs too, and thus render every legal constitution very unsecure. If there is not something (such as

the right of man), which extorts immediate reverence through reason, every influence on the arbitrament of men is incapable to curb their liberty: But when, together with benevolence, right speaks aloud, human nature shows itself not so degenerated, as not to listen to its voice with veneration. (*Tum pietate gravem meritisque si forte virum quem Conspexere, silent arrectisque auribus adstant.* Virgil).

SECTION III.

OF THE RELATION WHICH THE THEORY BEARS TO THE PRAXIS IN THE LAW OF NATIONS, CONTEMPLATED IN AN UNIVERSAL PHILANTHROPIC, THAT IS, COSMOPOLITICAL, VIEW.*

(*Against Moses Mendelssohn*).

Is the human species to be beloved on the whole; or is it an object, which one must contemplate with indignation, to which one indeed wishes (in order not to become a misanthrope) every sort of good, but never expects this from it, consequently must rather turn away from it? The answering of this question depends on the answer, which may be given to the following, to wit, Are there in human nature predispositions, from which one may infer, that the species will always proceed to the better; and that the bad of the present and of the past times will lose itself in the good of the future? For thus we may love the species, at least in its constant approximation

* It is not so immediately obvious, how a universal philantropical presupposition leads to a cosmopolitical constitution, but this to the founding of a *law of nations*, as a state, in which only the predispositions of humanity, that render our species lovely, may be sufficiently developed; — The conclusion of this section will present this connection to view.

mation tō the good, otherwise we must either hate or despise it; the affectation of universal philanthropy (which would then be at most a love of benevolence only, but not of complacency), may say to the contrary what it pleases. For that, which is and remains bad, chiefly that in the premeditated reciprocal violation of the most sacred rights of mankind, one cannot, notwithstanding the greatest exertion to force one's self to love, avoid to hate: not directly in order to do men mischief, but to have as little to do with them as possible.

Moses Mendelssohn was of the latter opinion (Jerusalem, sect. 2. p. 44—47), which he opposed to his friend Lessing's hypothesis of a divine education of the human species. It is all a fancy with him: 'that the whole, the humanity here below, shall in process of time advance always and perfectionate itself. — We see, continues he, the human species on the whole take small soarings; and it never advanced a step forwards, without falling back immediately afterwards with redoubled celerity to its former state.' (That is exactly the stone of Sisyphus; and one supposes in this manner, like the Indian, the earth to be a place of expiation for old sins, at present not possible to be remembered). — Again, 'Man goes farther, but humanity continually wavers between firm limits; but maintains, contemplated on the whole, in every period, nearly the same degree of morality, the same measure of religion and of irreligion, of virtue and of vice, of happiness (?) and of misery.' — These assertions he introduces, by saying,

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'Do you wish to divine, what the views of Providence are with humanity? Invent no hypotheses' (he a little before named this theory); 'look but to that, which actually happens, and, could you cast an eye to the history of all times, to that, which has always happened. This is matter of fact; this must have belonged to the design, must have been approved, or at least received in the plan of wisdom.'

I am of another opinion. — If it is an aspect worthy of a Deity, to see a virtuous man struggling with adversities and temptations to bad, and yet stand out against them; it is an aspect highly unworthy, I will not say of a Deity, but even of the most common but well-meaning man, to see the human species make progress from period to period in virtue, and soon afterwards fall back just as deep into vice and misery. To behold this tragedy for a while may perhaps be affecting and edifying; but at last the curtain must drop. For at length it becomes a farce; and the actors do not tire of it, because they are fools, yet the spectator, who has enough in one act or another, becomes tired of it, when he can gather thence with reason, that the never-ending piece is perpetually the same. The punishment following at last may indeed, when it is a play merely, make amends for the disagreeable feelings by the end. But to allow vices without number (though with virtues intervening) to be actually heaped up upon one another, in order that there may one day be a great punishment, is, according to our

our conceptions at least, even contrary to the morality of a wise Author and Governour of the world.

I may therefore suppose, that, as the human species is constantly advancing in regard to culture, as its end of nature, it is engaged in a progression to the better in regard to the moral end of its existence also, and that this is, it is true, sometimes *interrupted*, but never *discontinued*. It is not necessary for me to prove this presupposition; its opposers must prove. For I rest upon my innate duty, so to act on posterity, in every member of the series of generations, — wherein I (as a man in general) am, and with the requisite moral quality in me, yet not so good, as I ought to be, consequently as I could be, — that they shall always grow better (of which the possibility must also be supposed), and that thus this duty may be rightfully transmitted by inheritance from the one member of the generations to the other.

Let ever so many doubts, furnished by arguments collected from history, be made against my hopes, doubts, which, were they proving, might induce me to desist from a labour in appearance fruitless; I cannot, however, so long as this cannot be made quite certain, exchange duty (as the *liquidum*) for the rule of prudence not to labour with a view to what is impracticable (as the *illiquidum*, because it is hypothesis merely); and, how uncertain soever I may always be and remain, whether the better is to be hoped for the human species, this cannot derogate from the maxim,

maxim, consequently not from its necessary presupposition in a practical view, that it is feasable.

This hope for better times, without which an earnest desire to do any thing conducible to the universal weal, had never warmed the human heart, has at all times had influence on the labours of the well-thinking; and the good Mendelssohn must have reckoned on this likewise, when he exerted himself with so much zeal for the enlightening and for the welfare of the nation, to which he belonged. For to effectuate them of himself only, if others after him did not proceed farther on the same path, he could not reasonably hope. Notwithstanding the sad spectacle not so much of the evils, which afflict the human species from causes natural, as rather of those, which men do to one another; the mind becomes serene by the prospect, that, in future, things may grow better; and indeed with disinterested benevolence, when we shall have been long ago sunk into the grave, and shall not enjoy the fruit of the tree which we ourselves have planted. Empirical arguments against the success of this resolution formed on hope, avail nothing here. For, that that, which hitherto has not succeeded, will on that account never succeed, does not justify desisting from a pragmatical or even a technical purpose (as, for example, that of travelling in the air in aerostatical balloons); but still less a moral one, which, when its effecting is but not demonstratively impossible, is duty. Besides many proofs may be given, that the

human speciés, on the whole, is actually in our age, in comparison with all the preceding ones, considerably advanced in the moral self-reformation, (impediments of a short duration can prove nothing to the contrary): and that the clamour of its continually increasing degeneracy proceeds directly from this, to wit, that, when it stands on a higher step of morality, it sees still farther before it, and its judgment on that, which one is, in comparison with what one ought to be, consequently our self-censure, becomes always the stronger, the more steps of morality we have already ascended in the whole course of the world, with which we are become acquainted.

If we enquire, by what means this everlasting progression to the better may be maintained and accelerated, we immediately perceive, that this consequence going to infinity does not depend so much on what we do (for instance the education which we give youth), and according to what method we proceed in order to effect it; as on that, which human *nature* does in us and with us, in order to *force* us into a track, which we would not easily keep of ourselves. For from it, or rather (because the highest wisdom is requisite to the accomplishment of this end) from *Providence* only, can we expect a consequence, which refers to the whole and from that to the parts, whereas men with their *projects* set out but from the parts, nay, remain but with them, and can extend, it is true, their ideas, but not their influence to the whole, as such, which is too vast for them: especially

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as they, in opposition to one another in their projects, will hardly unite of their own free determination. As violence on all sides, and the necessity arising therefrom, must finally bring a nation to the resolution, to submit themselves to the coaction, which reason itself prescribes to them as a mean, namely, to subject themselves to public law, and to enter into the state of a civil constitution; so must necessity likewise from the incessant warring, by which states endeavour to lessen and to subjugate one another, bring them at last, even against their will, either to enter into the state of a *cosmopolitical* constitution; or, if such a state of universal peace is, on the other hand, still more dangerous to liberty (as has frequently been the case with overgrown states), by bringing to pass the most horrible despotism, this necessity must compel them to put themselves into a state, which indeed is not a cosmopolitical commonwealth under one head, but a juridical state of *confederation* nevertheless according to a *law of nations* concerted in common.

For as the advancing culture of states, with the propensity increasing at the same time to aggrandize one's self at the expence of others either by cunning or by force, must multiply wars, aud occasion still greater expences by armies (with constant pay) more and more augmented, maintained on a permanent footing aud in discipline, and furnished with instruments of war always becoming more numerous; mean-while the prices of all the necessaries of life increase continually, without leaving

leaving any hope, that a proportionally advancing accession of the metals representing them will accrue;[e] besides no peace lasts so long, that the savings during it would be adequate to the expences of the next war, to which the invention of a national debt is an ingenious expedient, it is true, but annihilating itself at last:[f] so impotency must finally effectuate what good will ought to have done, but did not: That every state become so organized in its interiour, that not the head of the state, to whom the war is in fact attended with no charges (because he carries it on at the expence of another, to wit, the nation) but the nation, who actually defray the charges of it, shall have the deciding voice, Whether there shall be war or not (for which indeed the realising of that idea of the original compact must be necessarily presupposed). For I make no doubt but these, from a mere appetite for aggrandizement, or on account of an opiniative verbal offence merely, would avoid the danger of exposing themselves to indigence and misery, which the head of the state never suffers.

And thus posterity (upon which no burdens are laid by its progenitors), may always advance to the better, even in a moral sense, without a love to them, but only the self-love of every age, being the cause of it: as every commonwealth, unable to offer violence to another, must adhere to right only, and may hope with reason, that other states, formed in the same manner, will assist it in this.

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This is however but opinion and merely hypothesis: uncertain, like all judgments, which would give to an intended effect, that is not totally in our power, its only suitable cause natural; and, even as such (hypothesis), it does not contain, in a state already subsisting, a principle for the subjects to obtain it by force (as above-mentioned), but only for heads of states free from coaction. Though it does not just lie in the nature of man, according to the common order, to forego arbitrably any thing of his power, in pressing circumstances it is not impossible; so it cannot be considered as an expression unsuitable to the moral wishes and hopes of men (with the consciousness of their inability), to look for the circumstances thereto requisite from *Providence*, who will procure a success to the end of *humanity* in its whole species for the attainment of its final destination by the free use of its powers, so far as they extend, to which success the ends of men, considered separately, act in direct opposition. For even the counter-action of the inclinations (from which arises the bad) among one another, furnishes reason with a free play, to subdue them altogether; and, instead of the bad, which destroys itself, to make the good govern, which, when it once exists, maintains itself henceforward of itself.

Human nature appears nowhere less amiable, than in the relation of whole nations to one another. Neither the self-sufficiency, nor the property, of the one state is a moment secure against the other. The will to subjugate one

another, or to lessen what belongs to another, always exists; and the arming for defence, which often renders peace yet more burdensome, and more destructive to the internal welfare, than even war itself, must never cease. Against this no other mean, is possible, than a law of nations founded upon public laws accompanied with potency, to which every state must subject itself (according to the analogy with a civil law or a law of state for single men). — For a constant universal peace, by the *balance of the powers of Europe* so named, is, like Swift's house, (which was built by an architect so exactly according to all the laws of equilibrium, that, a sparrow happening to perch upon it, it immediately fell to the ground) a mere fancy. — But it may be said that states will never subject themselves to such coactive laws; and the proposal of an universal state of nations, to whose power all single states shall submit themselves of their own accord, in order to obey its laws, however melodiously it may sound in the theory of a St. Pierre, or of a Rousseau, is of no validity in the praxis: as it has always been derided by great statesmen, but still more by heads of states, as a pedantic childish idea of the schools.

Whereas, for my part, I confide in the theory, which sets out from the principle of right, as the relation between men and states *ought to be*, and which recommends to the terrestrial gods the maxim, at all times to proceed so in their differences, that such an universal state of nations may be thereby introduced,

troduced, and therefore to suppose it possible (*in praxi*), and that it *can be;* but I confide at the same time (*in subsidium*) in the nature of things, which compels to go, where one does not go willingly (*fata volentem ducunt, nolentem trahunt*). In this is then taken into the account human nature which, as reverence for right and duty is always alive in it, I neither can nor will hold so immersed in the bad, that the morally practical reason after many unsuccessful essays shall not at last gain a complete victory over it, and also represent it (human nature) as amiable. We therefore maintain, that, in a cosmopolitical view, what is valid in theory from grounds of reason, is valid in the praxis likewise.

OF

THE INJUSTICE

OF

COUNTERFEITING BOOKS.

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Those, who consider the publication of a book as the use of the property in a copy (whether the possessor came by it as a manuscript from the author, or as a transcript of it from an actual editor), and then, however, by the reservation of certain rights, whether of the author's, or of the editor's, who is put in possession by him, have a mind to limit the use still to this, namely, that it is not permitted to counterfeit it, can thereby never attain the end. For the author's property in his thoughts or sentiments (though it were not granted that such a property has place according to external laws) remains to him notwithstanding the counterfeit; and, as an *express consent* of the vendees of a book to such a limitation of their property cannot have place,*

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* Would an editor attempt to bind every body, who purchased his work, to the condition, to be accused of embezzling the property of another intrusted to him, if either intentionally, or by his inconsiderateness, the copy, which he purchased, were used for the purpose of counterfeiting? Nobody would consent to this; because he would thereby expose himself to every sort of trouble about the inquiry and the defence. The work would therefore remain upon the editors hands.

how much less would a merely *presumed* one suffice to their obligation?

I believe, however, to have reason to consider the publication not as the trading with goods *in one's own name*, but as *the transacting of business in the name of another*, to wit, the author, and in this manner to be able to represent easily and distinctly the wrongfulness of counterfeiting books. My argument, which proves *the editor's right*, is contained in a ratiocination; after which follows a second, wherein *the counterfeiter's pretension* shall be refuted.

I.

Deduction of the Editor's Right against the Counterfeiter.

Whoever transacts another's business in his name and yet against his will, is obliged to give up to him, or to his attorney, all the profits that may arise therefrom, and to repair all the loss, which is thereby occasioned to either the one or the other.

Now *the counterfeiter is he*, who transacts another's business (the author's) and so on.

Therefore he is obliged to give up to the author, or to his attorney (the editor) etc.

Proof of the Major.

As the agent, who intrudes himself, acts in the name of another in a manner not permitted, he has no claim to the profit, which arises

arises from this business; but he, in whose name he carries on the business, or another attorney, to whose charge the former has committed it, possesses the right, to appropriate this profit to himself, as the fruit of his property. Besides, as this agent injures the possessor's right by intermeddling *nullo jure* with other's affairs, he must of necessity pay all damages sustained. This lies beyond a doubt in the elementary conceptions of the law of nature.

Proof of the Minor.

The first point of the minor is, *That the editor transacts the business of another by the publication.* — Here every thing depends on the conception of a book, or of a writing in general, as a labour of the author's, and on the conception of the editor in general (whether he be attorney or not). Whether a book be a commodity, which the author, either mediately or by means of another, can traffic with the public, therefore, alienate either with or without reservation of certain rights; or whether it is not rather a mere *use of his powers* (*opera*), which he can *concede*, it is true, to others, but never *alienate*? Again, Whether the editor transacts his business in his own name, or another's business in the name of another?

In a book as a writing the author *speaks* to his *reader;* and he, who printed it, speaks by his copies not for himself, but entirely in the

the name of the author. The editor exhibits him as speaking publicly, and mediates but the delivery of this speech to the public. Let the copy of this speech, whether it be in the handwriting or in print, belong to whom it will; yet to use this for one's self, or to traffic with it, is a business, which every owner of it may conduct in his own name and at pleasure. But *to let* any one *speak* publicly, to publish his speech as such, is as much as to say, to speak in his name, and, in a manner, to say to the public, A writer lets you know, teaches you etc, this or that literally by me. I answer for nothing, not even for the liberty, which he takes, to speak publicly through me; I am but the mediator of its coming to you; that is no doubt a business, which one can execute in the name of another only, but never in one's own (as editor). The editor furnishes in his own name *the mute instrument of the delivering of a speech of the author's to the public;** but he can *publish* the said speech by *printing*, consequently show himself as the person, *by whom the author addresses* the public, but in the name of the author.

The second point of the minor is, That the *counterfeiter* undertakes the (author's) business, not only without any permission from

* A book is the instrument of the delivering of a speech to the public, not merely of the thoughts, as pictures, a symbolical representation of an idea, or of an event. What is the most essential is, that it is no *thing*, which is thereby delivered; but an *opera*, namely, a speech, and that literal. In naming it a mute instrument, I distinguish it from what delivers the speech by a sound, as, for instance, a speaking trumpet, nay, even the mouth of others.

the proprietor, but even contrary to his will. For as he is a counterfeiter, only because he invades the province of another, who is authorized by the author himself to publish the work; the question is, Whether the author can confer the same faculty on another, and consent thereto. It is however clear, that, as then each of them, the first editor and the person afterwards usurping the publication of the work (the counterfeiter), would manage the author's business with the same public, the labour of the one must render that of the other useless and be ruinous to both; therefore a contract of the author's with an editor with the reservation, to allow to another still the publication of his work, is impossible; consequently the author was not entitled to give the permission to any other (as counterfeiter), and the latter should not have even presumed this; by consequence the counterfeiting of books is a business totally contrary *to the will* of the proprietor, and yet undertaken in his name.

From this ground it follows, that not the author, but the editor authorized by him, is lesed. For as the former has entirely given up his right to the managing of his business with the public to the editor and, without reservation, to dispose of it otherwise; so the latter is the only proprietor of the transaction of this business, and the counterfeiter encroaches on the editor, but not on the author.

But as this right of transacting a business, which, if nothing particular has been agreed on concerning it, may be done just as well

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by another, is not to be considered of itself as *inalienable* (*jus personalissimum*); the editor, as he is invested with full power, has the faculty of making over his right of publication to another; and as the author must consent to this, he, who undertakes the business from the second hand, is not counterfeiter, but rightfully authorized editor, that is, one, to whom the editor, who was put in possession by the author, has transferred his plenipotence.

II.

Refutation of the Counterfeiter's pretended Right against the Editor.

The question remains still to be answered, Whether, as the editor abalienates the work of his author to the public, the consent of the former (and of course of the latter, who gave him authority) to every use of it at pleasure, consequently to reprinting it, does not follow from the property in the copy, however disagreeable it may be to him? For gain perhaps enticed him to undertake with this risk the business of editor, without excluding the purchaser from it by an express contract, because this might have been hurtful to his business. — That the property of the copy does not furnish this right I prove by the following ratiocination:

A personal positive right against another can never be derived from the property of a thing only.

But

But the right of publishing a work is a personal positive right.

Therefore it never can be derived from the property of a thing (the copy) only.

Proof of the Major.

With the property of a thing is indeed conjoined the negative right, to resist any one, who would hinder me from the use of it at pleasure; but *a positive right against a person*, to demand of him to perform something or to serve me in any thing, cannot arise from the mere property of a thing. It is true this latter might by a particular agreement be added to the contract, whereby I acquire a property from any body; for example, that, when I purchase a commodity, the vender shall send it to a certain place free from expences. But then the right against the person, to do something for me, does not proceed from the mere property of my purchased thing, but from a particular contract.

Proof of the Minor.

One has a right in the thing, which he can dispose of at pleasure *in his own name*. But what he can perform but *in the name of another*, he transacts this business so, that the other is thereby bound, as if it were transacted by himself. (*Quod quis facit per alium, ipse fecisse putandus est*). Therefore my right to the transacting of a business in the name of another is a personal positive right, namely,

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to necessitate the author of the business to guaranty something, to wit, to answer for every thing, which he has done by me, or to which he obliges himself through me. The publishing of the work now is a speech to the public (by printing) in the name of the author, consequently a business in the name of another. Therefore the right to it is a right of the editor's against a person: not merely to defend himself in the use of his property at pleasure against him; but to necessitate him to acknowledge and to answer for as his own a certain business, which the editor transacts in his name, — consequently a personal positive right.

The copy, according to which the editor prints, is a *work* of the author's (*opus*), and belongs totally to the editor, after he has purchased it, either in the manuscript, or printed, and can do every thing with it he pleases, and what can be done in his own name; for that is a requisite of the complete right in a thing, *id est*, property. But the use, which he cannot make of it but only *in the name of another*, (*videlicet*, the author), is a *business* (*opera*), that this other transacts by the proprietor of the copy, whereto besides the property a particular contract is requisite.

Now the publication of a book is a business, which can be transacted but in the name of another (to wit, the author, whom the editor presents as speaking to the public through him); therefore the right thereto cannot pertain to the rights, which adhere to the property of a copy, but can become rightful

but

but by a particular contract with the author. Who publishes without such a contract with the author (or, when he has already granted this right to another, as proper editor, without a contract with him) is the *counterfeiter*, who then leses the proper editor, and must make amends to him for all damages.

Universal Observation.

That the editor transacts his business of editor, not merely in his own name, but in the name of another,* (to wit, the author), and without his consent cannot transact it at all, is confirmed from certain obligations which, according to universal acknowledgment, he is laid under. If the author, after he had delivered his manuscript to the editor to be printed, and the latter had bound himself thereto, were dead; the editor has not the liberty to suppress it as his property; but the public has a right, in case of a want of heirs, either to force him to publish the book, or to give up the manuscript to another, who offers to publish it. For it is a business, which the author had a mind to transact with the public, and which he accepted as transactor. It was not necessary that the public should know of this promise of the author's,

* Though the editor is at the same time author, both businesses are different! and he publishes in the character of a trader, what he wrote in the character of a man of letters. But we may set aside this case, and restrict our exposition but to that, where the editor is not at the same time the author; it will afterwards be easy to extend the consequence to the first case likewise,

or

or to accept of it; it acquires this right against the editor (to perform something) by the law only. For he possesses the manuscript but on condition, to use it for the purpose of a business of the author's with the public; but this obligation towards the public remains, though that towards the author has ceased. Here a right of the public to the manuscript is not built upon, but upon a business with the author. Should the editor give out the author's work, after his death, mutilated, falsified or interpolated, or let the necessary number of copies for the demand be wanting; the public would be entitled to force him to more justness, and to augment the number of the copies, but otherwise to provide for this elsewhere. All which could not have place, were the editor's right not deduced from a business that he transacts between the author and the public *in the name of the former.*

To this obligation of the editor's, which will probably be granted, a right founded thereupon must however correspond, namely, the right to all that, without which that obligation could not be fulfilled. This is, That he shall exercise the right of publication exclusively, because the rivalry of others in his business would render the transaction of it practically impossible for him,

A copy of *works of art*, as things, which was rightfully acquired, may be imitated, or otherwise modelled at pleasure, and those imitations publicly sold, without requiring the consent of the author of the original, or of him, whom he used as the workmaster of his

his ideas. A drawing, which any one has delineated, or got engraved by another, or executed in stone, in metal, or in stucco, may be copied, and the copies publicly sold; as every thing, that one can perform with his thing *in his own name*, requires not the consent of another. *Lippert's Dactyliotec* may be imitated by every possessor of it, who understands it, and exposed to sale, and the inventor of it has no right to complain of encroachment on his business. For it is a work (*opus*, not *opera*, *alterius*) which every body, who possesses it, may, without even mentioning the name of the inventer, alienate, of course imitate, and use in public traffic in his own name as his own. But the writing of another is the speech of a person (*opera*), and whoever publishes it can speak to the public but in the name of this other, and say nothing more of himself, than that the author makes the following speech to the public through him (IMPENSIS *Bipliopolæ*.) For it is a contradiction, To make in his own name a speech which, according to his own notice, and conformably to the demand of the public, must be the *speech of another*. The reason why all works of art of others may be imitated for public sale, but books, which have their editor already put in possession, dare not be counterfeited, lies in this, That the former are *works* (*opera*), the latter *acts* (*operæ*), those may be as things existing of themselves, but these can have their existence but in a person. Consequently these belong

to

to the person of the author exclusively;* and he has an inalienable right (*jus personalissimum*) always to speak himself through every other, that is, nobody dares make the same speech to the public but in his (the author's) name. But when one alters (abridges, augments, or retouches) the book of another so, that it would now be even wrong to give it out under the name of the author of the original; the retouching *in the proper name* of the publisher is no counterfeit, and therefore not prohibited. For here another author transacts by his editor another business than the first, and consequently does not intrench on his business with the public; he represents not that author, as speaking through him, but another. The translation into another language cannot be held a counterfeit; for it is not the same speech of the author, though the thoughts may be exactly the same.

Were the idea of a copyright, or of the publication of books in general, bottomed upon here, well-understood, and elaborated (as

* The author and the proprietor of the copy may both say of it with equal right: it is my book! but in a different sense. The former takes the book as a writing, or a speech; the latter as the mute instrument merely of the delivering of the speech to him, or to the public, that is, a copy. This right of the author's however is no right in the thing, namely, the copy (for the proprietor may burn it before his face); but an innate right, in his own person, to wit, to hinder another from reading it to the public without his consent, which consent can by no means be presumed, because he has already given it exclusively to another.

(as I flatter myself it is possible) with the elegance requisite to the Roman juridical learning; the complaint against the counterfeiter might be brought before a court, without first needing to ask on that account for a new law.

ETERNAL PEACE.

A NEW EDITION ENLARGED.

ETERNAL PEACE.

Whether this satirical inscription on the sign of a Dutch inn, on which is painted a cemetery, be levelled at mankind in general, at the heads of states in particular, whose voracious appetite for war is utterly insatiable, or at philosophers only, who willingly indulge in the agreeable reverie of a perpetual peace, may be left undetermined.

But, as the practical politician, with great complaisance towards himself, is wont to look down with disdain on the theoretical, as a schoolsage, whose ideas, being but mere creatures of the mind, and of course totally void of reality, can be productive of no danger whatever to the state, which must be founded upon principles of experience, and who may be allowed to pursue his own method, without the *public* statesman's taking any notice of it, the author of the present sketch

stipulates, expressly, that the practitioner, in case of a dispute with the theorist, must act so far consequentially, as not to imagine to perceive danger to the state in opinions, which he has ventured to communicate freely to the public; — by which *clausula salvatoria* the author hopes to have sufficiently guarded himself against every malicious interpretation.

ETERNAL PEACE.

SECTION I.

THE PRELIMINARY ARTICLES OF PERPETUAL PEACE AMONG STATES.

1. *No treaty of peace, entered into and concluded with the secret reservation of matter for a future war, ought to be valid as a peace.*

For it would then be a mere truce, a suspension of hostilities, but not a *peace*, which signifies the termination of all hostilities, and to add to which the epithet *perpetual* is a suspicious pleonasm. The present causes of a future war, though not yet known perhaps to the contracting parties themselves, are, let them be searched for with ever so much dexterity in the documents of archives, and picked out of them with ever so much acuteness, altogether removed by the conclusion of peace. The reservation (*reservatio mentalis*) of old pretensions to be first excogitated afterwards, of which neither party may at present make mention, because they are both too much exhausted to continue the war, with the bad will, to embrace the first opportunity favourable to this end, belongs to the casuistry of Jesuits,

 and

and is, when the matter is judged as it is in itself, beneath the dignity of a regent, as the compliance with such deductions is beneath that of a minister. —

But when, according to enlightened conceptions of politics, the real honour of the state is made to consist, by whatever means, in the continual augmentation of potency, that judgment is evidently scholastic and pedantic.

2. *No state subsisting of itself (it is all one here whether great or small) ought to be acquired by another state by either inheritance, exchange, purchase, or donation.*

A state is not a patrimony (like the ground upon which it has its seat). It is a society of men, of whom nobody, but itself, has the command and the disposal. But to insert it, which, as a stock itself, has its own roots, like a graft into another state, is to destroy its existance, as a moral person, and to reduce this to a thing, and is therefore inconsistent with the idea of the original contract, without which no right over a nation can be conceived.* Every body knows to what danger the prejudice of this mode of acquisition has in our days exposed Europe, for the other quarters of the world never even surmised that states too could wed one another, partly as a new sort of industry, to render themselves

* An hereditary empire is not a state, which can be inherited by another state, but whose right to govern may be transmitted by inheritance to another physical person. The state acquires then a regent, but not the regent, as such (that is, who possesses another empire) the state.

more

more potent by family alliances without the expence of forces, and partly to extend the territory. — Also the hiring out of the troops of one state to another, against an enemy that is not common to both, belongs to this head; for the subjects are thereby used and misused as things, to be disposed of at pleasure.

3. *Standing armies (miles perpetuus) ought in time to cease totally.*

For they continually menace other states with war, by the readiness to appear always prepared for it; and egg these on to surpass one another in the number of armed men, which has no bounds, and, as by the money bestowed thereon peace becomes still more burdensome at last than a short war, they themselves occasion offensive wars, in order to get rid of this burden; besides, to be hired either to kill, or to be killed, seems to imply a use of men as mere machines and tools in the hands of another (the state), which is incompatible with the rights of the humanity in our own person. The voluntary martial exercises of the citizens performed at stated periods, on purpose to defend themselves and their native country against the invasions and irruptions of a foreign enemy, are of a totally different nature. — The accumulation of riches, being considered by other states as a menace of war, would in the same manner necessitate to preventive attacks (because of the three powers, the *power of an army*, the *power of alliance*, and the *power of money*, the latter might be the instrument of war the

most to be depended on; if the difficulty to discover the size of it did not oppose).

4. *No national debts ought to be contracted relatively to external state-affairs.*

To seek assistance either without or within the state for the behoof of the œconomy of the country (the repairing of roads, new settlements, providing magazines against years of scarcity, and so on), is a resource unsuspected. But, as an engine for the different powers to counteract one another, a system of credit, (the ingenious invention of a commercial nation in the present century) in which debts accumulate to infinite, is a dangerous power of money, namely, a treasure for the purpose of carrying on war, that exceeds the treasures of all other states taken collectively, and can never be exhausted but by the taxes falling short, which must infallibly take place at last, but which system may by the animation of commerce, by means of the reaction of industry and gain, still be long maintened. This facility of waging war, combined with the inclination thereto of those possessing potency, which would seem to be inherent in human nature, is a great obstacle to perpetual peace, to surmount which must be so much the more a preliminary article of this, because the national bankruptcy inevitable at length must involve in the ruin many other states undeservedly, which would be a manifest lesion of the latter. Consequently they are entitled to unite themselves in order to oppose such dangerous measures.

5. *No*

5. *No state ought to intermeddle forcibly with the constitution and government of another state.*

For what right can it have to do so? Perhaps on account of the scandal, which it imputes to the subjects of another state. But that may rather serve it as a warning, by the example of the great evils, which a nation has incurred by its lawlessness and consequent licentiousness; and the bad example, which one free person sets another, is, generally speaking, (as *scandalum acceptum*) no lesion to him. — No room would be left for doubt, should a state through internal dissensions divide itself into two parts; each of which represents a separate state of itself that lays claim to the whole; where to assist one of them would not be laid to the charge of another state as intermeddling with the constitution of the other (for it is then an anarchy). But so long as this intestine war is not decided, this intermeddling of foreign powers would be a violation of the rights of an independent nation, struggling but with its own internal disease, therefore, even a scandal given, and would render insecure the autonomy of all states.

6. *No state, at war with another, ought to allow itself to carry on hostilities of a nature that must render impossible the mutual confidence in the future peace; as are employing assassins* (percussores), *poisoners* (venefici), *breaking capitulation, and the instigation of treason* (perduellio), etc. *in the state with which war is waged.*

These are dishonourable stratagems. For some confidence in the cast of mind of the enemy must still remain, even in war, else no peace could ever be concluded, and the hostilities would break out into a war of extermination (*bellum internecinum*); as war is but the sad mean of necessity to maintain one's right by force in the state of nature, where there is no tribunal that can judge legally; where neither of the parties can be declared an unjust enemy, because that supposes the sentence of a judge, but the *issue* decides (as if it were by an ordeal) on whose side the right is; but no punitive war between states is cogitable, because no relation of a superior to an inferiour exists among them. — Hence follows, that a war of extermination, where the extirpation can reach both parties at once, and together with them every right too, would let everduring peace have place but in the vast sepulchre of the whole human race. Wherefore such a war, and of course the means thereto, must absolutely not be permitted. — It is obvious that the use of the above-named means unavoidably leads to such a war, because those hellish arts, as they are base in themselves, were they practised, would not be long confined to the theatre of war, as for instance, the use of spies (*uti exploratoribus*), where nothing but the dishonourableness of *others* (which cannot be eradicated) is turned to profit, but would be exercised during peace likewise, and thus totally destroy the design of it.

The

The laws above-mentioned are objectively, that is, in the intention of those having power, merely *prohibitory laws*, yet some of them are of the *strict species* (*leges strictæ*) valid without distinction of circumstances, which *directly* insist upon abolishment (as No. 1, 5, 6.), others, however, (as No. 2, 3, 4.) which, not as exceptions to the rule of right, but yet in regard to its *exercise*, through circumstances, are *subjectively* with reference to the moral faculty enlarging (*leges latæ*), and imply permission to *adjourn* the execution, without losing sight of the end, which does not allow of this adjournment (*exempli gratia*, of the *restitution* of the liberty taken away from certain states, according to No. 2.) *ad calendas græcas* (as Augustus was in the habit of promising), consequently the non-restitution, but, in order that it may not be done precipitantly and so contrary to the design itself, only the delay. For the prohibition here concerns but the *mode of acquisition*, which ought not to obtain for the future, but not the *state of possession*, which, though it has not the requisite title of law, was, according to the public opinion of those times (the putative acquisition), held rightful.*

* Hitherto it has not been doubted without reason, whether, besides the commandment (*leges praeceptivae*), and interdiction (*leges prohibitivae*), there can be still laws of permission (*leges permissivae*) of pure reason. For laws in general imply a ground of objective practical necessity, but permission one of practical contingency of certain actions; consequently *a permissive law* would imply a necessitation to an action, to that, to which one cannot be necessitated, which, if the object of the law had the same signification in both references, would be a contradiction. — However the

the presupposed prohibition refers here in the permissive law but to the future mode of acquisition of a right (for instance, by inheritance), but the exemption from this prohibition, *id est*, the permission, to the present state of possession, which latter may, in the transition from the state of nature to the civil state, as a wrongful, yet *honourable possession (possessio putativa)* according to a permissive law of the right of nature, still continue henceforth, though a putative possession, as soon as it is cognised as such, is interdicted in the state of nature, as also is a similar mode of acquisition in the subsequent civil state (after the transition is made), which moral faculty of the continual possession, were such a putative acquisition to be in the civil state, would not have place; for there, directly after the discovery of its wrongfulness, it as a lesion must cease.

My design here was to make the teachers of the law of nature attentive, but by the way, to the conception of a *lex permissiva*, which naturally presents itself to a reason capable of dividing systematically; chiefly, as use is frequently made of it in the civil (or statute-) law, only with the distinction, that the prohibitory law exists there of itself only, but the permission is not as a limiting condition (as it ought to be) included in that law, but thrown in among the exceptions. — It is then said: this or that is interdicted: *let it be now* No. 1, No. 2, No. 3. and so on to infinity, the permissions are superadded to the law but contingently, not according to a principle, but by groping among occurring cases; for otherwise the condition must have been *in the formule of the prohibitory law*, whereby it would have then become a permissive law at the same time. — It is therefore much to be regretted, that the ingenious, though never resolved, problem of the equally wise and acute count of Windischgrætz, which directly urged the latter, was so soon neglected. For the possibility of such a formule (similar to the mathematical) is the only genuine test of a consequential permanent legislation, without which the *jus certum*, so named, will always remain a pious wish. — Otherwise there will be *general* laws merely (which are valid *in the general*), but no *universal* laws (which are *universally* valid), as the conception of a law seems to require.

SECTION II.

THE DEFINITIVE ARTICLES OF PERPETUAL PEACE AMONG STATES.

The state of peace among men, who live beside one another, is no state of nature, (*status naturalis*), which is rather a state of war, that is, though not always open hostilities, an everlasting menace with them. The state of peace must therefore be *established*; for the forbearance from hostilities is not yet security for it, and, unless security be given to one neighbour by another (but which can be done in a *juridical* state only), the former may treat the latter, of whom he has demanded it, as an enemy.*

* It is commonly supposed, that I dare not proceed in a hostile manner against another, but only when he has *injured* me actively, and it is perfectly correct, when we are both in the *civil (legal)* state: For he, having entered into this state, gives me (by means of the magistrate, who has power over us both) the requisite security. — But the person (or the nation) in the mere state of nature deprives me of this security, and, as he is beside me, wrongs me by this very state, not actively (*facto*), yet by the lawlessness of his state (*statu injusto*), whereby I am constantly threatened by him, and I can compel him, either to enter into a common legal state with me, or to leave my neighbourhood. — The postulate then, upon which all the following articles bottom, is: All men, who can have reciprocal influence on one another, must belong to some one civil constitution or other.

All

All juridical constitution now, as to the persons, who rank under it, is:

1. That according to the *civil law* of men, in a nation, (*jus civitatis*),

2. according to the *law of nations* of states in relation to one another (*jus gentium*),

3. that according to the *cosmopolitical law*, so far as men and states, standing in external relation influencing one another, are to be considered as citizens of an universal state of men (*jus cosmopoliticum*). This division is not arbitrable, but necessary relatively to the idea of a perpetual peace. For, were but one of these in the relation of the physical influence to the other, and yet in the state of nature, the state of war would be therewith conjoined, to be delivered from which, is here the very design.

DEFINITIVE ARTICLE THE FIRST.

The civil Constitution ought to be republican in every State.

The *republican* * is that constitution, which is founded, *first*, according to principles of

* *Juridical* (consequently external) *liberty* cannot, as is commonly done, be defined by the moral faculty, To do what one pleases, provided one wrongs nobody. For what is moral faculty *(Befugnis)*? The possibility of an action, so far as one thereby wrongs no one. Therefore the exposition would run thus: Liberty is the possibility of actions, by which one does wrong to nobody. One wrongs nobody (let one do what he pleases), provided one does nobody wrong, consequently it is empty tautology. — But rather my external (juridical) *liberty* is to be expounded thus: It is the moral faculty, to obey no external laws, but to which I could have given my consent. — In like manner external (juridical) *equality* in a state is that relation of the citizens, according to which No one can oblige another to any thing, unless he at the same time subjects himself to the law, to be *able* to be obliged in the same manner by the other reciprocally. (No exposition of the *juridical* dependence is necessary, as it lies in the conception of a constitution of state in general). — The validity of these innate rights, pertaining necessarily to humanity and unalienable, is confirmed and elevated by the principle of the juridical relations of man to superior beings even (if he cogitates such), when he represents himself according to the very same principles as a citizen of a supersensible world. — For, concerning my liberty, I have, even in regard of the Divine laws cognoscible by me through mere reason, no obligation, but only so far as I myself could have given my consent thereto (for by the law of liberty of my own reason do I first form a conception to myself of the Divine will). With respect to the most sublime being of the world (except God), which I may conceive (a great Aeon), there is no reason, as to the principle of equality, why, when I discharge my duty in my station, as that æon does in his, it should be my duty to

of the *liberty* of the members of a society (as men); *secondly*, according to the principles of the dependence of all on but one common legislative (as subjects); and *thirdly*, that according to the law of their *equality* (*as citizens*) — and is the only constitution, which arises from the idea of the original contract, upon which all juridical legislation of a nation must be grounded. This constitution is therefore, as to right, that in itself, which originally forms the basis of every species of civil constitution; and the only question now remaining is, Whether it is the only one likewise, which can lead to a perpetual peace?

The republican constitution, besides the purity of its origin, to have sprung from the pure source of the conception of right, has still

to obey merely, but that he should have the right to command. — The reason, that this principle of *equality* is not suitable (like that of liberty) to the relation to God, is, because this is the only being, with whom the conception of duty ceases. But with regard to the equality of all citizens of state, as subjects, it depends entirely on the answer to the question on the admissibleness of *hereditary nobility*, *videlicet*, Whether the *rank* given by the state (to one subject in preference to another), must precede *merit*, or this precede that. — It is evident, that, when rank is conjoined with birth, it is quite uncertain, whether merit too (address and fidelity of office) will follow; consequently it is just as much, as if it were bestowed on the favoured persons without any merit (to be commanders); which the universal will of the nation would never decree in an original compact (which is however the principle of all right). For a nobleman is not, on that account, directly a *noble* man. As to the *nobility of office* (which might be named the rank of a superior magistracy, and which must be acquired by merit), rank here, like property, does not belong to the person, but is annexed to the post, and thereby the equality is not violated; because, when the person resigns his office, he at the same time devests himself of the rank, and returns to the class of the people.

still the perspective of the desirable consequence, everlasting peace; the reason of which is, When the consent of the citizens is required (as it cannot be otherwise in this constitution), in order to decide, Whether there shall be war, or not, there is nothing more natural, than, as they must bring on themselves all the calamities and desolations of war (such as, to fight themselves; to pay the expences of the war out of their own pockets; to repair with great trouble and difficulty the cruel havock and devastation, which it has made; and finally, to heap up the measure of evil, to take upon themselves a heavy load of debt, which, on account of wars constantly succeeding one another, never can be liquidated, an imbittering of even peace itself), that they would reflect very maturely before they undertook a task so rugged: Whereas in a constitution, where the subject is not a citizen, and which is therefore not republican, war is an affair of the least consequence, and occasions not the smallest hesitation, because the head is not a fellow-citizen of the state but its proprietor, and sustains on account of the war no loss whatever of his table, of his household, of his country residences, of his chace, of his...., but may therefore declare war, as he would determine on a party of pleasure, for the most insignificant reasons, and, for the sake of decorum, leave with the most frigid indifference the justification of it to the *corps diplomatique*, which is always ready and willing to undertake it.

 That

That the republican constitution may not be confounded (as usual) with the democratical, the following must be observed. The forms of a state (*civitas*) may be divided either according to the difference of the persons, who have the supreme power of the state in their hands, or according to the *mode of governing* the nation, whatever it be, by its head; the former is properly denominated the form of the *sovereignty* (*forma imperii*), and but three forms of it are possible, where either *one* only, or *a few* combined among themselves, or *all* those, who constitute the civil society, possess the power of sovereignty (*autocrasy*, *aristocracy*, and *democracy*, the power of a prince, the power of nobles, and the power of the people). The second is the form of the government (*forma regiminis*), and concerns the manner, founded upon the constitution (the act of the universal will, whereby the multitude becomes a nation), how the state makes use of the perfection of its potency — and in this reference is either *republican* or *despotical*. REPUBLICANISM * is the state-principle

* The word *Republicanism* (as well as the honourable name of patriot, citizen, etc.) has of late been to grossly misapplied, that, though it is the only one suitable to the signification here, the translator cannot help feeling a reluctancy to use it. This species of republicanism, (not even cogitable but by a moral politician) will not, however, be liable to be confounded with the Gallic, more aptly denominated *Jacobinism*. A few lines, by one of our most elegant and most able writers, will serve, better than any thing the translator could say, to contrast those two sorts of republicanism. — 'From discontent to sedition; from sedition to insurrection; from insurrection to rebellion; from rebellion to deposition; from deposition to murder; from murder

ciple of the separation of the executive power (the government) from the legislative; DESPOTISM is that (the state-principle), according to which the state arbitrarily executes the laws ordained by itself, by consequence the private will of the regent is administered as the public will. — of these three forms of state that of DEMOCRACY is, in the proper sense of the word, of necessity a *despotism*, because it establishes an executive power, where all decree with respect to and even against one (who therefore does not consent), consequently all, who are not all, decree, which is a contradiction of the universal will both with itself and with liberty.

Every form of government that is not REPRESENTATIVE is properly *formless*, since the legislator can be at the same time the executor of his own will, as little as the universal of the major in a ratiocination can be at the same time the subsumption of the particular under that in the minor, and, though the other two constitutions of state are always so far defective, that they leave room for such a mode of government, it is possible at least, that they may adopt a species of government conformable to the *spirit* of a representative system, as, for example, Frederic II. seemed to evince by saying, that 'He was but the first servant

murder to (Gallic) republicanism. Such is the patriotic ladder by which the real friends to liberty ascend to the summit of political perfection!'

See A LETTER TO THE EARL OF LAUDERDALE, by JOHN GIFFORD Esquire, sold by Longman.

servant of the state,'* whereas the democratical constitution renders it impossible, because in it every one wishes to be master. — It may therefore be said, The fewer the persons, who are in possession of the power of the state (the number of the rulers), and on the contrary the greater the representation, the more does the constitution of state accord with the possibility of republicanism, and may at last by gradual reforms be elevated to the republican constitution. For which reason it is more difficult in an aristocracy, than in a monarchy, but in a democracy impossible, but by violent revolutions, to attain this only perfect juridical constitution. The form of the government,* however,

* The appellations, by which a sovereign has been frequently dignified (to wit, the Lord's anointed, the administrator of the Divine will upon earth, and the representative of God), have been often censured as gross flatteries; but in my opinion, without foundation. — So far from making him haughty, they ought rather to make him humble, if he is endowed with understanding (which must be supposed) and reflects, that he has accepted an office, which is too great for a man, namely, to administer the most sacred thing, which God has upon earth, the *rights of man*, and he must be constantly apprehensive of having acted in some one manner or another derogatorily from this favourite of the Almighty.

* Mallet du Pan, in his usual declamatory way, boasts to have at length acquired, after long experience, a thorough conviction of the truth of the well-known lines of Pope,

'For Forms of Government let fools contest;
Whate'er is best administer'd is best:'

If these mean, That the best administered government is the best administered, he has, according to Swift's expression, cracked a nut and found a maggot; but if that sentence signifies, That it is the best mode of government too, that is, constitution of state, nothing can be, more false; for examples of good governments prove nothing relatively

however, is beyond all comparison of greater importance to the nation, than the form of the state, though a great deal depends on the more or less suitableness of this to that end. But to that, if it is to be conformable to the conception of right, belongs the representative system, in which only a republican mode of government is possible, and without which it is, let the constitution be what it will, despotic and violent. — None of the ancient republics, commonly so named, knew this, for which reason they could not but terminate in that despotism, which obtains under the supreme power of one only, yet the most supportable of any.

latively to the mode of government. — Who ever governed better than *Titus* and *Marcus Aurelius*, and yet the one left as his successor a *Domitian*, and the other a *Commodus*, which in a good constitution could not have happened, as their unfitness for this post was known soon enough, and the sovereign had sufficient potency to exclude them.

DEFINITIVE ARTICLE THE SECOND.

The Law of Nations ought to be founded upon a Confederation of free States.

Nations, as states, may be judged as single men, who injure one another in their state of nature (that is, in their independence on external laws) by their juxtaposition, and each of whom, for the sake of his own safety, may, nay, ought to demand of the other, to enter with him into a constitution, similar to the civil one, where each may be secured in his rights. This were a *league of nations*, but which must not be a state of nations. There would however be a contradiction therein; because every state comprises the relation of a *superior* (a legislative) to an *inferior* (obeying, namely, the nation), but a number of nations in a state would constitute but a nation, which, as we have here to weigh the rights of *nations* with one another, so far as they constitute so many different states, and are not to be incorporated into one state, is inconsistent with the supposition.

As we behold with profound contempt, and consider as rude, unpolished, and a brutal degradation of humanity, the attachment of savages to their lawless liberty, rather to wrangle and fight with one another incessantly, than

than to submit themselves to a legal coaction, to be constituted by themselves, consequently to prefer the insane liberty to the rational; so, one should imagine, that civilised nations (each united in a state by itself) must hasten to forsake a situation so abandoned: Instead of that, however, every *state* rather places its majesty (for the majesty of the people is an absurd expression) in not being subjected to any external legal coaction whatever, and the splendour of its head consists in having at his orders, without needing to expose himself to danger, many thousands, who suffer themselves to be sacrificed * for an affair, which does not concern them, and the difference between the European and the American savages consists chiefly in this, namely, that, as many tribes of the latter have been totally devoured by their enemies, the former know better how to turn their vanquished enemies to account, than to eat them, and rather chuse to augment by them the number of their subjects, consequently, the multitude of instruments of still more extensive wars.

Considering the pravity of human nature, which manifests itself in the free relation of nations (though it veils itself in the civil (legal) state by the coaction of the government), it is astonishing, that the word *right* has not yet been able to be totally banished as pedantic

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* A Bulgarian prince gave for answer to the Greek emperor, who, in order to spare innocent blood, called him to decide the contest between them by single combat, That a blacksmith, who has tongs, will not be so great a fool, as to take the red hot iron out of the fire with his hands.

from the politics of war, and that no state has yet had the effrontery, to declare itself publicly for the latter opinion; for *Hugo Grotius*, *Puffendorf*, *Vattel* and many others (but sorry comforters), though their code, philosophically diplomatically composed, has not the smallest *legal* force, nor can have (because states as such do not rank under a common external coaction), will always be cordially cited for the purpose of *justifying* a hostile attack, without there being an example, that a state, armed with testimonies of so weighty men, has ever been moved by arguments, to desist from its purpose. — This homage, which every state does (at least according to the words) to the conception of right, evinces, that a still greater, though at present slumbering, moral predisposition is to be met with in man, some time or other to overpower the bad principle in him (whose existence he cannot deny), and to hope this of others likewise; else the word *right* would never be pronounced by states, who are determined to wage war with one another, unless it were ironically, as a certain Gallican prince explained it: 'It is the preference, which nature has given the stronger over the weaker, that the latter shall obey him.'

As the manner, in which states prosecute their right, never can be, as in an external tribunal, by process, but only by war, by this however and its favourable issue, *victory*, right is not determined, and by the *contract of peace* an end is put, it is true, to the war for this time, but not to the state of war (al-

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ways to find a plausible pretence for a new one), which cannot be directly interpreted as unjust, because in this state every one is judge in his own case, but of states, according to the law of nations, not even that can be valid, which is of men in a lawless state according to the law of nature, namely, to be obliged to quit this state, (because they, as states, have already internally a juridical constitution, and are grown too big for the coaction of others, to be brought by them according to their conceptions of law under an enlarged legal constitution), mean-while reason, from the throne of the supreme moral legislative power, absolutely condemns war as the course of right, and on the contrary makes an immediate duty of being in a state of peace, but which cannot be established and secured, without a paction of nations among themselves; — thus there must be a confederacy of a peculiar sort, that may be named the *confederacy of peace* (*foedus pacificum*), which would be different from the *treaty of peace* (*pactum pacis*), as this aims at putting an end to *one* war merely, but that to *all* wars for ever. This confederacy refers to no acquisition of any one potency of state, but only to the support and security of the *liberty* of a state, at once relatively to itself and to other leagued nations, without these needing on that account to subject themselves (like men in the state natural) to public laws, and a coaction under them. — The feasibility (the objective reality) of this idea of confederation, which ought to extend gradually to all states, and thus lead to per-

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petual peace, may be exhibited. For if it should so happen, that a potent and enlightened nation can form itself into a republic (which from its very nature must be inclined to perpetual peace), this would form a centre of federal union for other states to join themselves to, and so, conformably to the idea of the law of nations, to secure a state of peace, and by more alliances of this sort to extend themselves by degrees further.

It may be understood, when a nation says, There shall be no war among us; for we will form ourselves into a state, that is, establish for ourselves a chief legislating, governing, and judging power, which shall make up our differences peaceably. — — But when this state says: There shall be no war between me and other states, though I acknowledge no supreme legislative power, which secures my right to me and their's to them, it is not possible to understand, upon what I am to ground the confidence in my right; unless it be the surrogate of the contract of civil society, to wit, the free federalism, which reason must necessarily conjoin with the conception of the law of nations, if there shall remain any thing at all to be thereby thought.

By the conception of the law of nations as a right *to* war, nothing whatever can properly be conceived (because it must be a right, not according to universally valid external laws, which limit the liberty of every individual, but according to unilateral maxims, to determine by force, what is right), it must then be thereby understood, That no injustice

at all happens to men, so minded, when they destroy one another, and find everlasting peace in the wide grave, in which are inhumated together with their authors all the horrors of violence and oppression. — There is no other rational manner for states, in relation one to another, to get out of the lawless situation, in which there is nothing but war, than that they, as well as single men, shall forsake their savage (lawless) liberty, submit themselves to public coactive laws, and thus form a *state of nations* (always increasing, it is true), (*civitas gentium*), which would ultimately embrace all the nations of the earth. But as they, according to their idea of the law of nations by no means will this, consequently, reject *in hypothesi*, what is right *in thesi*; so, in place of the positive idea of a *republic of the world* (unless all shall be lost) only the negative surrogate of a permanent *league*, preventing war, and, gradually extending itself, can stem the wild torrent of inimical inclination abhorring all right, yet with constant danger of its bursting out. (*Furor impius intus fremit horridus ore cruento.* Virgil).*

* On the conclusion of a war, it would not be unbecoming for a nation, if after the day of thanksgiving, a day of fasting and repentance were appointed, to implore heaven, in the name of the state, for forgiveness and mercy for the great sin, of which the human species still continues to be guilty, in not being willing to subject themselves to any legal constitution, in relation to other nations, but, proud of their independence, rather to use the barbarous mean of war (by which, however, what is sought, namely, the rights of each state, is not obtained). — The thanksgivings during war, on account of a victory gained, the hymns which, like true Israelites, are sung to the *Lord of Hosts*, are not less strongly

strongly contrasted with the moral idea of the Father of men; because they, besides the indifference as to the manner, in which nations seek their reciprocal rights (which is sad enough), still add a pleasure, to have either butchered multitudes of men, or at least destroyed their happiness.

DEFINITIVE ARTICLE THE THIRD.

The cosmopolitical Law ought to be limited to Conditions of universal Hospitality.

Neither here, nor in the foregoing articles, is philanthropy the subject in hand, but *right*, and *hospitality* signifies the right of a stranger, not to be treated hostily on account of his arrival upon the territory of another. The other may send him away, when it can be done without occasioning his destruction, but, as long as he (the stranger) behaves himself in a peaceable manner in his country, not treat him as an enemy. It is not a *law of guests*, to which the latter may lay claim (whereto a particular beneficent contract would be requisite, to make him for a certain time a house-companion), but a *right of visiting*, which belongs to all men, to introduce themselves to society, by means of the right to the common possession of the surface of the earth, upon which, as a spherical surface, they cannot disperse themselves to infinite, but must finally bear to live beside one another, no one however has a greater right, than another, originally, to be at any place of the earth. — Uninhabitable parts of this surface, the sea and the sandy deserts separate this communion, yet so,

so, that the *ship*, or the *camel* (the ship of the desert) renders it possible to approach one another across these masterless regions, and to use the right to the *surface*, which belongs in common to the human race, for a possible commerce. The inhospitality of the inhabitants of the coasts (for example those of Barbary), by robbing vessels in neighbouring seas, or making slaves of shipwrecked mariners, or that of the sandy deserts (of the arabian Bedouins), to consider the approaching to the Nomades as a right to plunder them, is repugnant to the law of nature, but which law of hospitality, that is, the moral faculty of foreigners, extends no farther, than to the conditions of the possibility of *trying* a commerce with the ancient inhabitants. — In this manner the inhabitants of distant parts of the world may come into amicable relations with one another, which may at last become publicly legal, and thus bring the human species nearer to a cosmopolitical constitution.

If we compare with this the *inhospitable* conduct of civilized, chiefly commercial states of our quarter of the globe ,we must startle at the violence and injustice they commit in *visiting* foreign countries and nations (which with them is synonymous with *conquering* these). America, the coast of Guinea, the spice-islands, and the cape of good hope etc. were, immediately on their discovery, in the opinion of those European states, countries, which belonged to nobody; for their inhabitants were looked upon as nobody. Under the specious pretext of establishing factories

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they introduced foreign troops into the East Indies (Indostan), but with them oppression of the natives, incitement of the different states to extensive wars, famine, rebellion, rapine, perfidy, and all the host of evils, which assails mankind.

The inhabitants of China* and Japan, who had received the visits of such guests, have wisely

* To distinguish this great empire by the name, which is given to it by its own inhabitants, to wit, *China*, not Sina, or a sound similar to this, see Georgii Alphab. Tibet. pag. 651—654. especially Nota b. below. — It properly bears, according to Prof. Fischer of Petersb., no determinate appellation, by which the inhabitants name it; the most usual one is that of the word *Kin*, to wit, *Gold* (which the inhabitants of Thibet express by Ser), hence the emperor is named the king of *Gold* (the most glorious country of the world), which word in the empire itself may sound like *Chin*, but is pronounced like *Kin* by the Italian missionaries, on account of the guttural letter. — Hence it is obvious, that the country named *Serer* by the Romans is China, but the silk was brought over Great Thibet (perhaps across Little Thibet the Bucharey and Persia, and so on) to Europe, which leads to many contemplations on the antiquity of this surprising state, in comparison with that of Indostan, in the connection with Thibeth, and, by this, with Japan; whereas the name Sina, or Tschina, which the inhabitants are said to give to this country, leads to nothing. — — Perhaps the very ancient, though never properly known, intercourse between Europe and Thibet may be explained from what Hespchius has preserved of this for us, namely, the acclamation Κονξ Ομπαξ of the hierophants in the Eleusinean Mysteries (see Travels of Anacharsis the younger, 5 Part. 447). — For according to Georgii Alph. Tibet. the word *Concioa* signifies God, which has a remarkable similarity with *Konx*. *Pah-cio* (ib. p. 520.), which could be easily pronounced by the Greeks as *pax*, *promulgator legis*, the Godhead diffused throughout nature (named *Cenerefi* also, p. 177). — Bnt *om*, which La Croze translates by *benedictus*, may, applied to the Divinity, signify nothing but the *held Blessed*, p. 507. As P. Fran. Horatius always received from the Lhamas of Thibet, whom he often questioned, what they understood by God (*Concioa*), the answer: *It is the Collection of all Holies.* (id est, holy souls

wisely refused them enterance, though not access, and this indeed the Japanese allow but to one European nation, the Dutch, whom they however exclude, like captives, from every intercourse with the natives. The worst of the affair (or, considered from the station of a moral judge, the best) is, that those states will derive no profit from these outrages, that all those trading companies are just at the point of overthrow; that the sugar-islands, that seat of the most cruel slavery possible to be devised, yield no real revenue, but only mediately, and serve for a purpose not very laudable, namely, a nursery for seamen to supply the navy, and consequently to carry on war in Europe; and the heads of those states, while they commit such glaring injustice, and such acts of violence and cruelty, make much of piety, and wish, in point of orthodoxy, to be held elect.

As the intercourse more or less strict among the nations of the earth is now thoroughly brought to such a pass, that the violation of right in *one* part of the earth is felt in *all* parts;

souls transformed by the regeneration of the Lamas, after many wanderings through all sorts of bodies, finally returned to the Godhead, in *Burchane*, that is, Being worthy of adoration (p 223), thus that mysterious word ΚΟΝΞ ΟΜΠΑΞ must have signified the *holy* (*Konx*) *blessed* (*om*) and *wise* (*Pax*), supreme Being (personified nature) diffused throughout the world, and, used in the Greek *mysteries*, pointed out the *monotheism* for the popes, in contradistinction to the *polytheism* of the people; though P. Horatius (a. a. O.) discovered under this an atheism. — It may however be explained in the above manner, how that mysterious word came to the Greeks across Thibet. and, *vice versa*, thereby renders probable the earlier intercourse between Europe and China across Thibet (perhaps still earlier than between Europe and Indostan).

parts; the idea of a cosmopolitical law is not a phantastical and overstrained mode of representing right, but a necessary complement of the unwritten code, as well of the law of state as of the law of nations, for the public law of man in general, and so for the purpose of everlasting peace, to which we cannot flatter ourselves, but on this condition, to be in the continual approximation.

SUPPLEMENT.

Of the Guaranty of perpetual Peace.

This *guarantee* is nothing less, than the great artist NATURE (*natura dædala rerum*), in whose mechanical course conformity-to-end is evident, by making concord arise out of the very discord of men, even against their will, and therefore, like a necessitation of a cause unknown to us from the laws of its effect, is named FATE, but, on pondering its conformity-to-end in the course of the world, as profound wisdom of a superior cause, directed to the objective scope of the human species, and predetermining this course of the world, PROVIDENCE,* which we do not

* In the mechanism of nature, to which belongs man too (as a sensible being) we discover forming the basis of its existence a form, which we cannot render comprehensible to ourselves, but when we attribute to it the end of an Author of the world, predetermining it, whose predetermination we denominate the (divine) *Providence* in general, and, provided it be placed in the *beginning* of the world, *founding* (*providentia conditrix; semel jussit, semper parent*, Augustin), but in the *course* of nature to obtain this according to universal laws of the conformity-to-end, *ruling Providence* (*providentia gubernatrix*), farther, to peculiar ends, but not to be foreseen by men, but presumed from the consequence only, *guiding* (*providentia directrix*), finally, even with regard to single events, as divine ends, no longer Providence, but *extraordinary direction* (*directio extraordinaria*), but

not properly *cognise* in these artificial dispositions of nature, nor even *conclude* therefrom,

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but to have the intention to cognise which (as it in fact shows to miracles, though the events are not so named), is nothing but mad audaciousness of man; because it is absurd and full of arrogance to conclude from a single event a peculiar principle of the efficient cause (that this event is end, and not merely collateral consequence of the mechanism of nature from another end totally unknown to us), let the language express on this head ever so much piety and humility. The division of providence (*materialiter* contemplated), as it refers to *objects* in the world, into *universal* and *particular*, is false and inconsistent (that it, for instance, takes care to maintain the species of creatures, but commits the individuals to chance); for it is expressly termed universal, that no one thing may be thought excepted. — Perhaps the division of providence here (*formaliter* contemplated) has been meant according to the mode of execution of its design, namely, into *ordinary* (*exempli gratia*, the annual decaying and reviviscency of nature according to the vicissitude of the seasons) and *extraordinary* (for instance, conveying to the coasts of the frozen sea wood, which cannot grow there, by the tide, for the inhabitants of those regions, who could not exist without it), where, though we can easily explain to ourselves the physical mechanical cause of these phenomena (for example, by the banks of rivers overgrown with trees in the temperate climates, into which rivers those trees fall, and are carried away perhaps by the gulf-stream), we must not overlook the teleological, which points to the care of a wisdom ruling over nature. — But as to the conception, usual in the schools, of a divine *assistance*, or co-operation (*concursus*) in an effect in the sensible world, this must be totally dropped. For to have a mind to couple the heterogeneal (*gryphes jungere equis*) and to let him, who is himself the complete cause of the alterations of the world, *integrate* his own predetermining providence during the course of the world, (which must therefore have been defective), for example, to say, that *next to God* the physician has cured the patient, and therefore is present with his aid, is *in the first place* contradictory. For *causa solitaria non juvat*. God is the author of the physician together with all his remedies, and thus the effect must be *entirely* ascribed to God, if we will mount to the highest first cause theoretically incomprehensible to us. Or it may be ascribed to the physician

entirely,

but which (as in all relation of the form of things to ends in general) we can and must but *add by cogitation* in order to form a conception to ourselves of its possibility, according to the analogy with human works of art, but to represent to ourselves the relation and agreement of which with the end, that reason immediately prescribes to us (the moral end), is an idea, which indeed in a *theoretical* view is transcendent, but in the practical (for instance, with regard to the conception of duty, *perpetual peace*, in order to employ that mechanism of nature for this purpose), dogmatical and as to its reality well-founded. — The use of the word *nature*, when, as here, theory merely (but not religion) is in question, is more suitable to the limits of human reason (as it must keep itself, with regard to the relation of effects to their causes, within the pale of possible experience), and more *modest*, than the expression of a *Providence* cognoscible by us, with which one puts on Icarean wings, in order to approach in a temerarious manner the mystery of his inscrutable design.

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entirely, provided we pursue this event as explicable according to the order of nature in the series of the causes of the world. *Secondly* such a cast of mind destroys all determinate principles of the judgment of an *effect*. But in a *morally practical* view (which is totally directed to the supersensible), *exempli gratia*, in the faith, that God will complete the want of our proper justice, were our mindedness but genuine, and that by means incomprehensible to us, but we must not remit in the striving and aspiration to the good, the conception of the divine *concursus* is totally apposite and even necessary: whereby it is self-evident, that nobody must endeavour from this to *explain* a good action (as an event in the world), which is a pretended theoretical cognition of the supersensible, consequently absurd.

Ere we determine this guaranty more precisely, it will be necessary previously to take a view of the state, which nature has prepared for the persons acting upon her vast theatre, and which finally renders necessary their security of peace; — but then first the mode, how she gives this.

Her provisional preparation consists, 1. in that she has taken care that men can subsist in all the regions of the earth; — 2. in that she has forced them every-where by *war*, even into the most inhospitable climes, in order to people them; 3. in that she has necessitated them by the very same mean to enter into relations more or less legal. — That in the cold wastes that border the frozen sea moss should grow, which the *raindeer* scrapes from beneath the snow, to maintain itself, in order to be food for the Ostiac or the Samoiede, and to drag the sled; or that the saline sandy deserts should contain the *camel*, which seems as if created for the purpose of travelling in them, in order that they should not be entirely useless; how admirable! But the end is still more obvious, when, besides the animals covered with fur on the coasts of the frozen sea, we find that seals, seahorses, and whales yield food and firing for the inhabitants. The care of nature, however, excites the greatest admiration by the floating wood, with which (without our knowing well, whence it comes) she supplies those countries destitute of vegetation, without which material the inhabitants could have neither boats nor arms, nor be able to build their huts; where

they have then enough to do with the war against the wild beasts, to induce them to live in peace among themselves. — — But that which has *forced them thither*, has perhaps been nothing but war. The *horse* is the first *instrument of war* among all the animals, which man, during the time of the peopling of the earth, learned to tame and to domesticate (for the elephant belongs to the more modern times of luxury of states already established), as the art of cultivating certain sorts of grass no longer knowable by us, as to their original quality, named *corn*, and also the multiplying and improvement of the different sorts of *fruit* by transplanting and ingrafting (perhaps of but two species in Europe, the crab-apple and wild pear), could have their origin but in the situation of states already established, where a security in landed property had place, — afterwards men formerly in a state of lawless liberty passed from the life of *hunters*,* fishers and herdsmen to that *of cultivators*, and now *salt* and *iron* were discovered,

* Of all the ways of life that of *hunters* is beyond doubt the most contrary to the civilized constitution; because the families, which must separate themselves, soon become *foreign* to one another and therefore dispersed in extensive forests, and soon *inimical*, as each requires a great space for the purpose of acquiring food and clothing. — The *prohibition of blood to Noah*, Gen. I. IX, 4—6. (which, often repeated, was afterwards made a condition, though in another view, by the Jewish Christians, even to the Christians newly arrived from the pagan countries, Acts, xv. 20. xxi. 25—) seems originally to have been nothing, but the prohibition of the *hunter's life*; because in it the case must often occur, to eat raw flesh, therefore the former was forbidden at the same time with the latter.

covered, perhaps the first articles in general demand of a commerce between different nations, whereby they were brought first into a *friendly relation* towards one another, and so, even with more remote nations, into a good intelligence, intercourse, and amicable relation among one another.

As nature has taken care that men *can* live every-where upon the earth, she at the same time has despotically willed that they *shall* live every-where, though contrary to their inclination, and even without this *shall's* presupposing at the same time a conception of duty, which, by means of a moral law, would bind them thereto — but she has chosen war, to attain this her end.— We see nations by the unity of whose language is made known the unity of their descent, as the *Samoiedes* on the coasts of the frozen sea, on the one hand, and a nation speaking a similar language, at the distance of two hundred German miles from them, in the *Altaish* mountains, on the other, between whom have intruded themselves another nation, horsemen and warlike, namely, the Mongols, who have driven that part of their stem far from this part of it into the most inhospitable frozen regions, whither they had certainly not extended themselves of their own accord;* — in like manner the

* It might be inquired, If nature had been willing that these icy coasts should not remain uninhabited, What will become of their inhabitants, if she should not one day carry them any more wood by floatings (as is to be looked for)? For it is to be believed, that, by advancing culture, the inhabitants of the temperate zones will know how to profit more by the wood, which grows on the banks of their rivers,

the *Finlanders* in the most northern parts of Europe, named *Laplanders*, are separated from the *Hungarians* to just as great a distance, but related to them, according to the language, Goths and Sarmatians having forced themselves between them; and what can have driven the *Esquimaux* (perhaps the descendants of European adventurers of old, a race totally different from all Americans) in North America, and the *Pesheras*, in South America, so far as Terra del Fuego, but war, which nature uses as a mean to people all corners of the earth. War itself however requires no peculiar motive, but seems to be grafted upon human nature, and even to prevail as something noble, to which man is animated, without selfish springs, by the instinct of honour: so that *military valour* (of the American savages, as well as of the European, in the times of chivalry) is judged to be of immediately great value not merely *when* war is (as reasonable), but also, that war shall be, and it is often begun, merely to show that valour, consequently an intrinsic *dignity* is placed in war in itself, insomuch that even philosophers themselves make panegyrics on it, as a certain ennoblement of humanity, unmindful of this sentence of their Greek predecessor: 'War is

vers, and will not allow it to fall into these, and so swim to the sea. I would answer: The inhabitants on the banks of the rivers Oby, Jenesy, and Lena will carry it to them by means of trade, and truck it for the productions of the animal kingdom, in which the sea is so rich on the icy coasts; when she (nature) shall have first forced peace among them.

is bad, because it makes more wicked men, than it takes away.' — And so much at present as to what nature does *for her own end* relatively to the human race as a class of animals.

The question now, which concerns what is the most essential of the design of perpetual peace, is, What nature does in this view, with reference to the end, which man's own reason constitutes his duty, consequently to the favouring of his *moral design*, and how she guaranties, that that, which man *ought* to do according to laws of liberty, but does not do, may, without prejudice to this liberty, be secured by a coaction of nature even, that he *will* do it, and that according to all the three relations of the public law, the *law of state*, the *law of nations*, and the *cosmopolitical law*. — When I say of nature, *She wills*, that this or that shall be done, it does not mean, that she imposes a duty on us, to do it (for only the practical reason, free from coaction, can do that), but she does it herself, whether we will or not (*fata volentem ducunt, nolentem trahunt*).

1. Though a nation were not necessitated by intestine dissensions, to put themselves under the coaction of public laws, external war would do it, as, according to the abovementioned disposition of nature, every nation has for its neighbour another nation pressing it, against which it must form itself internally into a *state*, in order, as a *potency*, to be prepared against the other. Now the *republican* constitution is the only one, which is perfectly

fectly suitable to the rights of man, but also, the most difficult to found, and still more to maintain, insomuch that many assert, that it must be a state of *Angels*, as if men with their selfish inclinations were not capable of a constitution of so sublime a form. But nature comes to the assistance of the revered universal will, founded in reason, but unable for the praxis, directly by those selfish inclinations, so, that it depends but on a good organization of state (which is certainly in the power of men), to direct those her powers in such a manner, that the one either stops the destructive effect of the other, or annuls it; so that the consequence is to reason, as if both did not exist at all, and thus man, though not a morally good man, is compelled to be a good citizen. The problem of the establishment of a state, let it be ever so harsh to the ear, even for a nation of devils (if they have but understanding), is solvable and runs thus: To order a multitude of reasonable beings, who collectively desire universal laws for their protection, every one of whom is however inclined in secret to except himself therefrom, and to regulate their constitution so, that, though they in their private sentiments struggle against one another, these impede one another so, that in their public conduct the consequence is just the same, as if they had no such bad sentiments. A problem of this nature must be *solvable*. For it is not the moral amendment of men, but only the mechanism of nature, of which the problem desires to know, how it may be employed relatively to men,

men, in order so to direct the collision of their unpeaceable sentiments in a nation, that they must necessitate one another to put themselves under coactive laws, and thus bring about the state of peace, in which laws have force. This may be seen in the present, still very imperfectly organized states, that they in the external conduct come very near to that, which the idea of right prescribes, though the internal of morality is certainly not the cause of it (as the good constitution of state is not to be expected from the moral conduct, but rather conversely, from the former is first to be looked for the good moral formation of a nation), consequently the mechanism of nature by selfish inclinations, which naturally act in opposition to one another externally, may be used by reason as a mean, to make room for this its end, the juridical precept, and with this also, as much as lies in the state itself, to promote and to secure the internal as well as the external peace. — Nature *wills* irresistibly, that right shall at last obtain the superiority. Whatever is neglected to be done, she does ultimately herself, though not without great inconveniency. —

Vous pliez d'un roseau le fragile soutien;
Courbez trop, il rompra. Qui veut trop, ne veut rien.

BOUTERWECK.

2. The idea of the law of nations presupposes the *separation* of many neighbouring states independent of one another, and, though such a state is in itself a state of war (if a federal union of them does not prevent the breaking

breaking out of hostilities), even this, according to the conception of reason, is better than the melting of them together, by the one potency outgrowing the others and passing to an universal monarchy; because the laws always lose the more of their energy, the more the compass of the government is extended, and a soulless despotism, after it has blasted the buds of the good, falls at last into anarchy. Every state however (or its head) longs after this, and by this mode of putting itself into the situation of permanent peace, to sway, if possible, the universe. But *nature wills* otherwise. — She makes use of two means to withhold nations from intermixing and to separate them, namely, the difference of *language* and of *religion*,* which indeed carrys with itself the propension to mutual hatred, and a pretence for war, but yet, by increasing culture and the gradual approximation of men to a greater agreement in principles, leads to a good understanding in a peace, which is produced and secured, not like that despotism (in the tomb of liberty), by the weakening of all powers, but, in their most vigorous emulation, by their equilibrium.

3. As

* *Difference of religion:* a strange expression! exactly, as if one spoke of different *moralities*. There may indeed be different *species of belief* used historically, not in religion, but in the history of the means to its furtherance, agreed on in the field of learning, and in like manner different *books of religion* (the Zend-avesta, the Vedam, the Koran, and so on), but only one *religion* valid for all men and at all times. Those can therefore comprise nothing but the vehicle of religion, which is casual, and may, according to time and place, be different.

3. As nature wisely separates the nations, who would willingly unite under themselves, either by artifice or by force, the will of every state, and forsooth according to grounds of the law of nations; so she unites on the other side by mutual interest nations, whom the conception of the cosmopolitical law would not have secured from violence and war. It is the *spirit of commerce*, which is incompatible with war, and which sooner or later seizes every nation. Because among all the potencies (means), subordinate to the potency of the state, the *potency of money* is undoubtedly the most to be depended on, thus states feel themselves compelled (though not just by springs of morality), to forward the noble work of peace, and, wherever war threatens to break out, to avert it by mediation, as if they were on that account in a constant alliance: for great unions for the purpose of war can, from the nature of the thing, but very seldom happen, and still seldomer succeed. — — In this manner does nature guaranty perpetual peace, by means of the mechanism in the human inclinations themselves; with a surety, which is not sufficient, it is true, to *presage* (theoretically) its arrival, but which suffices in a practical view, and makes it duty, to promote this (not merely chimerical) end.

SECRET ARTICLE OF PERPETUAL PEACE.

A secret article in negociations of public law, considered objectively, that is, according to its matter, is a contradiction; but subjectively, judged according to the quality of the person, who dictates it, a secret may by all means have place therein, namely, that he finds it prejudial to his dignity, to publish it as his own production.

The only article of this sort is contained in the position: *The maxims of philosophers on the conditions of the possibility of public peace ought to be consulted by the states armed and fitted out for war.*

But it seems to be derogatory to the legislative authority of a state, to which must naturally be attributed the greatest wisdom, to seek information on the principles of its conduct towards other states from *subjects* (the philosophers); it is however very salutary to do it. Therefore the state will *invite* them *tacitly to give that information* (by its making a secret of it), which is as much as to say, that it will *allow* them to *speak* freely and publicly on the universal maxims of the carrying on of war and of the establishment of peace (for that they will do readily enough of themselves

themselves, if they are but not forbidden to do it), and the agreement of states among one another on this point requires no particular concerting of states among themselves with a view to this, but lies in the obligation induced by the universal (morally legislative) reason of man. — It is however not meant by this, That the state must give the principles of the philosopher the preference to the sentences of the jurist (the representative of the potency of the state), but only that they must be *heard*. The latter, who has made a symbol for himself of the *balance* of right, and beside it the *sword* of justice also, commonly uses this, not to keep off from that all foreign influence merely, but when the one side will not incline, to put in the sword, in order to turn the scale: (*væ victis*) to which the jurist, who is not at the same time a philosopher (as to morality), is exposed to the greatest temptation, since it is his office but to apply laws that are extant, but not to examine whether these themselves do not stand in need of amendment, and reckons this (in fact) lower rank of his faculty to the higher, because he is invested with potency (as is likewise the case with the other two faculties). — Philosophy stands under this combined power upon a very low step: For instance, it is said of her, that she is the *handmaid* of theology (and the other two faculties insinuate as much with regard to their professions). — But it is not clearly seen, Whether she carries the taper, or bears the train of her lady.

It

It is to be neither looked nor wished for that kings should philosophise or that philosophers should become kings; because the possession of power unavoidably ruins the free judgment of reason. It is however indispensably necessary to both, for the enlightening of their important affairs, that kings or kingly nations (that is, those governing themselves according to laws of liberty) should not suffer the philosophers to disappear or to be silenced, but should permit them to speak openly, as this class of men is from its very nature incapable of complotting or of forming secret connections and clubs subversive of the order of civil society, consequently not liable to be suspected of the infamy of belonging to the *propagande.*

APPENDIX.

On the Dissonance between Moral and Politics, relative to perpetual Peace.

Moral is in itself a praxis in an objective signification, as an aggregate of unconditionally commanding laws, according to which we *ought* to act, and it is a palpable absurdity, after one has allowed this conception of duty its authority, to say, that it *cannot* be done. For then this conception falls of itself out of morality (*ultra posse nemo obligatur*); consequently there can be no conflict of politics, as practising law, with moral, as such, but theoretical (therefore no conflict of the praxis with the theory): else one must understand by the latter a universal *doctrine of prudence,* that is, a theory of maxims, to choose the fittest means to the ends calculated for one's advantage, that is to say, to deny, that there is a moral in general.

Politics say, *Be artful as a serpent;* moral adds (as a limiting condition) thereto: *and without deceit like a dove.* If they are incompatible in one commandment, there is actually

a conflict between politics and moral; but if they shall be thoroughly united, the conception of the opposite is absurd, and the question, how that conflict is to be put an end to, cannot even be propounded. The position, *Honesty is the best policy*, comprises a theory, which, alas! very frequently contradicts the praxis; yet to the position, likewise theoretical, *Honesty is better than all policy*, no objection whatever can be made, nay, it is the indispensable condition of the latter. The Terminus of moral does not yield to Jupiter (the Terminus of power); for he ranks under Fate, that is, reason is not enlightened enough, to overlook the series of predetermining causes, in order to foretel with certainty, according to the mechanism of nature, either the good or the bad consequent of the actions of men (though to hope for it conformably to our wishes). But reason directs us sufficiently how to keep the path of duty (according to rules of wisdom), and herewith points out the final end or scope.

The practitioner (to whom moral is mere theory) founds the comfortless judgment, which he, notwithstanding his having granted that duty and possibility, expressed by *ought* and *can*, pronounces against our sincere hope, upon this, namely, that he pretends to foresee from the nature of man, that he *will* never *will* what is required to bring to pass that end leading to perpetual peace. — Indeed the willing of *all single* men to live in a legal constitution according to principles of liberty (the distributive unity of the will of *all*), is not

not sufficient to this end, but that *all* together will this state (the *collective* unity of the will), this solution of a difficult problem is still requisite thereto, in order that the civil society may become a whole, and, as to the difference of the particular volition of all, a uniting cause of it must still be superadded, in order to produce a common will, which cannot be done by either of them; so in the *execution* of that idea (in the praxis) there is no other beginning of the juridical state to be counted on, than that by *force*, on whose coaction the public law is afterwards founded; which then (as it is not much to be expected from the moral mindedness of the legislator, that he, after the union of the wild multitude into a nation is once effectuated, will leave it to them only, to bring about a juridical constitution by their common will) leaves room to expect great deviations from that idea (of the theory) in actual experience.

Whoever has once the power in his hands, will not allow the nation to prescribe laws to him. A state, which is in the situation, not to rank under any external laws, will not, with regard to the mode, in which it is to seek its right against other states, render itself dependent on their tribunal, and even one part of the world, when it feels itself superior to another, that offends it in nothing, will not neglect to use the mean to the fortifying of its potency, by bereavement or even by domination of the other; and in this manner all plans of theory, for the law of state, the law of nations, and the cosmopolitical law, run

into impracticable ideals void of reality, whereas a praxis only, founded upon empirical principles of human nature, which does not hold it beneath it, to draw information for its maxims from the mode, in which things happen in the world, can hope to find a sure foundation for its political edifice.

If there is no liberty and a moral law built thereupon, but all that happens or can happen is mere mechanism of nature, politics (as the art of profiting by that mechanism for the government of men) are the whole practical wisdom, and the conception of right is a thought void of reality. But if this conception is found indispensably necessary to be conjoined with politics, nay, to be elevated to the limiting condition even of the latter, the possibility of the union of both must be admitted. I can easily conceive a *moral politician*, that is, one, who takes the principles of politics so, that they can be consistent with moral, but not a *political moralist*, who fabricates such a moral for himself, as may be found advantageous to the statesman.

The moral politician lays down as his principle, That, when defects are found in the constitution of state or in the relation of states, which could not be prevented, it is duty, chiefly for the heads of states, to consider how they may be supplied or reformed as soon as possible, and made suitable to the law of nature, as it is held up to us in the conception of reason for a pattern; should it occasion sacrifices of their self-love even. As tearing a bond of union of state or of a cosmopolitical bond,

bond, before a better constitution is ready to put in the place of it, is contrary to all politics, agreeing herein with morality, it were absurd to require, that every defect must be supplied or reformed directly and with precipitation: but it may be required of him, who has potency, that the maxim of the necessity of such a supplying or reforming shall be intimately present with him, in order to remain in a constant approximation to the end (of the best constitution according to laws of right). A state may *govern* itself in a republican manner, though it, according to the present constitution still possesses despotical *sovereign potency:* till by degrees the nation becomes capable of the influence of the mere idea of the authority of the law (as if it possessed physical power), and is afterwards found qualified for its proper legislation (which is originally founded in right). If even by the vehemence of a *revolution* generated by a bad constitution a more legal one were wrongfully obtained, it must then be held no longer allowed to lead back the nation to the old constitution, though whilst it lasted every one, who interfered with it either violently or insidiously, would be justly subjected to the punishment due to a rebel. With regard to the external relation of states, a state cannot be desired to relinquish its constitution, though despotical (which is however the stronger relatively to external enemies), so long as it runs the risk of being instantly swallowed up by other states; consequently in every resolution the delay of the

execution till a better opportunity must be permitted.*

It may happen, that the moralists, who proceed despotically, failing in the execution, shall commit a number of faults in politics (by measures either taken or recommended precipitantly), and experience must teach them to correct by degrees these faults against nature; instead of which the moralizing politicians, by colouring wrongful principles of state, under the pretext of human nature's not being *capable* of the good, according to the idea, which reason prescribes, *render impossible*, as much as they can, the growing better, and eternalize the violation of right.

Instead of the praxis, of which these political men boast, they deal in *practices*, as they devise ways and means (by humouring the present ruling power, with a view to their own advantage) to give up the nation, and if possible the whole world, to be pillaged; like true jurists (of the profession, not of the *legislative*), when they soar above their own sphere to the region of politics. For as it is not their

* These are permissive laws of reason, to let the state of a public law charged with injustice remain, till the total circumvolving of every thing, either ripened of itself, or brought to maturity by pacific means: because any one *juridical*, though but in a small degree rightful, constitution is better than none at all, which latter state (anarchy) is the fate of a *precipitate* reform. — The wisdom of state, in the present situation of affairs, will therefore make it a duty, to reform suitably to the ideal of public law: but to use revolutions, when nature brings them on of herself, not for the purpose of varnishing a still greater oppression, but as the call of nature, to bring about, by a solid reform, a legal constitution founded in principles of liberty, as the only permanent one.

their business, to reason on legislation itself, but to execute the present commands of the law of the country, every legal constitution extant, and when this is altered by a higher power, the subsequent, must always be the best with them; where every thing then goes on in its proper mechanical order. But when the address, to accommodate themselves to every circumstance (*aptus cuivis*), instils into their minds the fancy of being able to judge of principles of a *constitution of state*, in general, according to conceptions of right (consequently *à priori*, not empirically), and when they vaunt of knowing *men* (which is indeed to be looked for, as they have to do with many), yet without knowing *man*, and what may be learned from him (to which a higher station of anthropological observation is requisite), and furnished with these conceptions, proceed on the law of state and of nations, as reason dictates it, they cannot make this transition, but with the spirit of chicane, as they pursue their usual procedure (of a mechanism according to coactive laws despotically given) even where the conceptions of reason will have a legal coaction founded but according to principles of liberty, by which only a stable constitution is first possible; which problem the pretended practitioner, passing by that idea in silence, believes to be able to solve empirically, from experience, as the constitutions of state hitherto the most durable, but for the most part contrary to right, were framed. — The maxims, which he uses (though tacitly) for this

purpose, turn pretty nearly upon the following sophistical ones.

1. *Fac et excusa.* Embrace the favourable opportunity of arbitrarily taking possession (either of a right of the state over its own, or over another neighbouring, nation); the justification will be much easier and more elegant *after the act*, and the violence more easily dressed in specious colours (especially in the first case, where the chief power in the interiour is directly the legislative magistrate, who must be obeyed, without reasoning too nicely on the subject), than if one should first think on convincing reasons, and then wait for the objections. This effrontery itself gives a certain appearance of internal conviction of the rightfulness of the act, and the god *bonus eventus* is afterwards the best representative of right.

2. *Si fecisti nega.* Whatever thou hast committed thyself, for instance, if thou hast driven thy nation to despair, or to rebellion, deny that it is *thy* fault; but maintain that it is the refractoriness of the subjects, or if thou hast seized on the territory of a neighbouring nation, lay the blame on the nature of man, who, if he is not prevented by another by force, will certainly anticipate him and take possession of his territory.

3. *Divide et impera.* That is, if there are certain privileged chiefs in thy nation, who have chosen thee for their head merely (*primus inter pares*), disunite those from one another, and set them at variance with the nation; then support the latter, and amuse them with idle

hopes

hopes of greater liberty, and every thing will depend on thy unconditional will. Or, if they are foreign states, the stirring up of dissension among them is a pretty certain mean, under the appearance of assisting the weaker, of subjecting the one after the other.

Indeed nobody is now deceived by these political maxims; for they are all universally known; but the case never occurs where they are blushed at, as if the injustice were too glaring. For, as great powers are never ashamed of the judgment of the multitude, but only of that of one another, as to those principles, however, not their becoming public, but only their *miscarrying* can touch them with shame (for with regard to the morality of maxims the consension of the whole is complete), so the *political honour* always remains to them, on which they may count with certainty, namely, that of the *augmentation of their potency*, whatever be the means of acquisition.*

* Though a certain vitiosity or pravity (rooted in human nature) of *men*, who live in the same state, may still be doubted, and, instead of it, the want of a culture not yet advanced far enough (rudeness) may be given with some appearance as the cause of the illegal phenomenon of their cast of mind; it is, in the relation of *states* towards one another, perfectly obvious and incontrovertible. In the interiour of every state it is veiled by the coaction of civil laws, as a great power, to wit, that of the government, potently counteracts the inclination to the mutual violence of the citizens, and thus not only gives a moral varnish (*causae non causae*), if I may use the expression, but also, by preventing the eruption of illegal inclinations, the unfolding of the moral predisposition to the immediate reverence for right becomes actually much easier. — For every one believes that he would keep sacred and faithfully observe the conception

From all these serpentine windings of an immoral doctrine of prudence, to produce the state of peace among men from the warlike state of the state of nature, so much at least is evident, That men can, as little in their private relations, as in their public, escape the conception of duty, and dare not found politics publicly upon knacks of prudence, consequently refuse all obedience to the conception of a public law (which is striking, chiefly in that of the law of nations), but ought to do it in itself all due honour, if they should invent a thousand evasions and palliations, in order to evitate it in the praxis, and to attribute to cunning power the authority, to be the origin and the band of all right. —

In order to put an end to this sophistry (if not to the injustice coloured by it), and to bring the false *representatives* of the mighty ones of the earth to the acknowledgment, that they do not speak in favour of right, but of power, of which they, as if they themselves had

conception of duty, if he could expect but the like from every other; which the government in part secures to him; whereby a great step is then taken *towards* morality (though not yet a moral step), to be attached to this conception of duty on its own account, without looking for a return. — But as every one, notwithstanding the good opinion he entertains of himself, presupposes a bad mindedness in every other, in this manner they judge of one another mutually, That, as to the *fact*, neither of them is good for much (the reason, as it cannot be laid to the charge of the *nature* of man, as a free being, may remain unexamined). However as the reverence for the conception of duty, which man can absolutely not avoid, sanctions in the most solemn manner the theory of the faculty to become suitable to that conception, every one perceives, that he must on his part act conformably to it, whatever others may do.

had a title to give orders in this, assume the tone, it will be expedient to discover the illusion, by which one deceives himself and others, to investigate the chief principle, from which proceeds the design of perpetual peace, and to point out, That all the bad, which hinders it, proceeds from the political moralist's beginning where the moral politician reasonably ends, and, by thus subordinating the principles to the end (that is, by putting the cart before the horse), he (the former) frustrates his own design, to bring politics to a good understanding with morality.

It is first necessary, in order to render practical philosophy consistent with itself, to decide the question, Whether in problems of practical reason the beginning must be made with its *material principle*, the *end* (as object of the arbitrament), or with the *formal*, that is, that (founded in liberty merely in the external relation) according to which it is said, Act so, that thou can will, that thy maxim become an universal law (whatever be the end).

There is no doubt but the latter principle must precede; for it has, as a principle of right, unconditional necessity, instead of which the former is necessitating but on the presupposition of empirical conditions of the designed end, namely its execution, and, if this end (for instance, perpetual peace), were duty also, this even must have been derived from the formal principle of maxims to act externally. — The first principle now, that of the *political moralist* (the problem of the law

law of state, of nations, and of the cosmopolitical law), is a mere *technical problem*, whereas the second, as the principle of the *moral politician*, to whom it is a *moral problem*, is extremely different from the other in the procedure, in order to bring to pass everlasting peace, which is not wished for as a physical good merely, but also as a state proceeding from the agnition of duty.

To the resolution of the first, to wit, the *problem of the prudence of state*, great knowledge of nature is required, in order to employ its mechanism for the said end, and yet all this is uncertain in regard to its result, concerning perpetual peace; let either the one or the other of the three divisions of public law be taken. It is uncertain, whether the nation can be better kept in obedience and at the same time in a flourishing state by severity, or by the baits of vanity, whether by the supreme power of one only, or by the union of several chiefs, perhaps by a nobility of service merely, or by a power of the nation, in the interiour, and that for any length of time.

Of all modes of government (the sole genuine republican mode excepted, but which can enter into the mind of none but a moral politician) examples of the contrary are to be met with in history. — Still more uncertain is a *law of nations* pretended to be erected upon statutes according to ministerial plans, which in fact is but a word void of reality, and rests upon contracts, which in the very act of their conclusion comprise at the same time

the secret reservation of their violation. — Whereas the solution of the second, namely, the *problem of the wisdom of state*, so to say, obtrudes itself naturally, is evident to every one, mars all subtlety, and thereby leads directly to the end; yet with the warning of prudence, not to bring it about precipitantly by force, but, according to the nature of favourable circumstances, to approach towards it incessantly.

Aspire first after the kingdom of pure practical reason and after its *justice*, and your end (the blessing, perpetual peace) will fall out of itself. For moral has the peculiarity in itself, with regard to its principles of public law, (consequently with reference to politics cognoscible *à priori*), that, the less it renders the conduct in order to the designed end dependent on the intended advantage, whether physical or moral, the more does it agree with this in general; because it is directly the universal will *given à priori* (in a nation, or in the relation of different nations among one another), which only determines what is law among men; but this union of the will of all, if one proceeds but consequentially in the execution, may, even according to the mechanism of nature, at the same time be the cause of producing the effect aimed at, and of rendering the conception of right effectual. — Thus it is, for instance, a principle of the moral politics, That a nation ought to unite themselves in a state according to the only conceptions of right, liberty and equality, and this principle is not founded in prudence, but in

in duty. Let political moralists reason sophistically ever so much to the contrary on the natural mechanism of a multitude of men entering into society, which weakens those principles, and would disappoint their design; let them endeavour to prove their assertion to the contrary by examples of badly organized constitutions of ancient and more modern times (for instance, democracies without the system of representation), they merit no attention; especially, as such a pernicious theory occasions the evil itself it foretels, according to which man is thrown into the same class with the other living machines, to whom is wanting but the consciousness, that they are not free, in order to render them in their own judgment the most miserable of all sublunary beings.

The proverbial, and indeed somewhat hectoring, but true position, *Fiat justitia, pereat mundus*, that is to say, Let justice reign, though all the villains in the world should perish, is a vigorous principle of law cutting off all the crooked ways pointed out either by cunning, or by power; only, that it be not mistaken, and understood as a permission to make use of one's right with the greatest strictness (which would be repugnant to ethical duty), but as an obligation on those having potency, neither to refuse nor to lessen the right of any one against another, either out of disfavour or compassion; to which is chiefly requisite an internal constitution of state regulated according to pure principles of right, and also that of its union with other neighbouring or

even

even distant states for the purpose of a legal making up of their differences (analagous to an universal state). — This position means nothing, but that the political maxims must not arise from the welfare and felicity of every state, to be expected from their observance, therefore not from the end, which each of them makes its object (from volition), as the chief (but empirical) principle of the wisdom of state, but from the pure conception of the duty of right (from what is expressed by *ought*, whose principle is given *à priori* by pure reason), let the physical consequences be what they will. Wicked men being made less numerous, will by no means occasion the fall of the world. The moral bad has the property inseparable from its nature, that it in its views (principally in relation to others of the same mind) is contrary to and destructive of itself, and so makes room, though by slow steps, for the (moral) principle of the good.

There is then *objectively* (in theory) no conflict at all between moral and politics. Whereas *subjectively* (in the selfish propension of men, but which, since it is not founded in maxims of reason, must not yet be named praxis), it will and may always remain, because it serves for a whetstone to virtue, whose true courage (according to the principle, *Tu ne cede malis, sed contra audentior ito*) in the present case does not so much consist in our resisting the evils and making the sacrifices here with a firm resolution, as in looking in the face and subduing the cunning of the much more dangerous, false and treacherous, but

yet

yet reasoning, bad principle in ourselves, which constantly deceives us by presenting to us the weakeness of human nature as a justification of every transgression.

In fact the political moralists may say, That the regent and the nation, or nation and nation do *one another* no wrong, when they wage war with one another in either a violent or an insidious manner, though they do wrong in general, by refusing all reverence for the conception of right, which only can establish peace everlasting. For as the one transgresses his duty towards the other, who is just as wrongfully minded towards him, no wrong at all happens to either, when they destroy one another, yet so, that there may always remain enough of this race, not to let this play cease till the remotest times, in order that a late posterity may one day or other take a warning example by them. Providence is hereby justified in the course of the world; for the moral principle in man never extinguishes, reason pragmatically apposite to the execution of the juridical ideas according to that principle, increases constantly by culture always advancing, but with it the culpability of those transgressions too. The creation only seems not to be able to be vindicated by any *theodicee*, that such a race of corrupted men in general should have been on earth (when we suppose, that the human species neither will nor can be better disposed; but this station of judgment is far too high for us, to presume in a theoretical view, to apply our conceptions (of wisdom) to the Supreme Potency,

tency, who is inscrutable for us. — We are inevitably driven to such desperate conclusions, when we do not assume, that the pure principles of right have objective reality, that is, may be put in execution; and the people in the state, and farther states towards one another, must act accordingly; whatever objections empirical politics may make. True politics can therefore take no step, without having previously done homage to moral, and though politics of themselves are a difficult art, there is no art at all in uniting them with moral; for, as soon as they clash, this cuts the knot, which those cannot untie. — The rights of man must be held sacred, let the sacrifice, which the sovereign power may make, be ever so great. One cannot halve here, and devise the medium or adiaphory of a pragmatically conditional right (between right and profit), but all politics must bend the knee to morality, they may hope, however, to attain the degree, though slowly, where they will permanently shine.

Of the Consonance of Politics with Moral according to the transcendental Conception of Public Law.*

When we abstract from all *matter* of public law (either according to the different empirically

* See the distinction made, in this mode of philosophising, between *transcendental* and *transcendent*, in the preface to THE PRINCIPLES OF CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY, by the translator, page XXVIII.

cally given relations of men in the state, or of states among one another), as the teachers of law commonly cogitate it, the *form of publicity*, whose possibility every claim of right comprises, still remains to us, for without that there were no justice (which can be conceived but as capable of being made *publicly known*), consequently no right, which is distributed but by it.

Every claim of right must have this capability of publicity, and, as it may be easily judged, whether in an occurring case it has place, that is, whether it may be united or not with the principles of the actor, it can furnish a criterion, to be met with in reason *à priori*, easily used, to cognise directly in the latter case, as if by an experiment of pure reason, the falsity (contrariety to law) of the said claim (*prætensio juris*).

After such an abstraction from all that is empirical, contained in the conception of the law of state and of nations (such is the pravity of human nature, which renders coaction necessary), the following position may be denominated the *transcendental formule of public law: Relatively to the rights of other men, all actions, whose maxim doth not accord with publicity, are unjust.*

This principle is not to be considered as ethical merely (belonging to the doctrine of virtue), but also as *juridical* (concerning the rights of man). For a maxim, which I dare not *divulge*, without thereby frustrating at the same time my own design, which, in order that it may prosper, must absolutely

be

be *concealed*, and which I cannot *publicly own*, without infallibly exciting the resistance of every one, cannot bring on me this necessary and universal, therefore *à priori* perspectable, opposition of all, but by the injustice, with which it threatens every body. Again, this principle is *negative* merely, that is, it serves but to cognise by its means, what is *not right* with regard to others. It is like an axiom self-evident or indemonstrably certain, and besides easy to be applied, as may be perceived by the following examples of public law;

1. *With regard to the law of state (jus civitatis)*, namely, the internal one, in it occurs the question, which many consider as difficult to be answered, and which the transcendental principle of publicity resolves with the greatest facility, *videlicet*, Is rebellion a rightful mean for a nation to shake off the oppressive power of a tyrant so named (*non titulo sed exercitio talis*)? The rights of the nation are violated, and no wrong is done to him (the tyrant) by the dethroning; this is beyond a doubt. It is however not less wrong in the highest degree in the subjects, to seek their rights in this manner, and they can just as little complain of injustice, should they be defeated in this struggle and afterwards obliged to suffer in consequence thereof the most rigorous punishment.

Much may be said on both sides of the question if one chuses to decide it by a dogmatical deduction of the titles; but the transcendental principle of publicity of public law

may

may save itself the trouble of this prolixity. According to this principle, let the nation, previously to the entering into the civil contract, question itself, Whether it would presume, to make the maxim of the resolution on an occasional revolt publickly known. It is obvious, that, in founding a constitution of state, were it made a condition, to use force in certain occurring cases against the head, the nation must assume to itself a rightful potency over that head. But then he would not be the head, or, if both were made conditions of the establishment of the state, no establishment at all of a state would be possible, which would however be contrary to the design of the nation. The injustice of rebellion is evident, as its maxim, by *avowing it publicly*, would render its own design impossible. It must therefore be necessarily concealed. But this would not be necessary on the side of the head of the state. He may proclaim, that he will inflict the punishment of death on the ringleaders of every rebellion, let these still believe, that he has first transgressed the fundamental law; for when the head is conscious to himself, to possess the *irresistible* supreme power (which must be supposed in every civil constitution, because he, who has not might enough, to protect every one in the nation against others, has not the right to give him orders), he needs not be under any apprehension, to defeat his own design by his maxim's being made known; with which principle it is also perfectly coherent, that, should the nation

tion succeed in the rebellion, that head must retire to the station of a subject, and must never stir up a rebellion with a view to recover his power, but he must not have to fear being called to an account for his former government of the state.

2. *With regard to the law of nations.* — A law of nations can be in question but on the presupposition of some one juridical state or other (that is, that external conjunction, in which man actually acquires a right); because it, as a public law, involves in its conception the publication of an universal will determining to every one what is his due, and this *status juridicus* must arise out of some one contract or other, which needs not just be founded upon coactive laws (like those, from which a state springs), but may be a *continuing free* association, like the above-mentioned of the confederation of different states. For without some one *juridical state*, which connects actively the different (physical or moral) persons, consequently in the state of nature, there can be no other, than merely a private law. — There now happens a difference between politics and moral (this considered as law), where that criterion of the publicity of maxims may likewise be easily applied, yet only so, That the contract binds the states but with the view, to keep themselves in peace among one another and with other states, but by no means in order to make acquisitions. — The following cases of the antinomy between politics and moral present themselves here, with

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which their solution is at the same time combined:

a. When one of these states has promised something to the other, let it be succour, cession of certain lands, or subsidies and such like, the question is, whether, in a case, on which depends the welfare of the state, it can free itself from keeping its word, by pretending to consider itself in a double capacity, first as *sovereign*, who is not responsible to any body in the state; but next as chief *officer of state*, who must be accountable to the state; as then the consequence would be, that he would free himself in the second quality from what he had obliged himself to in the first. But if a state (or its head) should let these its maxims become publicly known, every other would naturally either fly it, or unite with others, in order to resist its usurpations, which evinces, that politics notwithstanding all their sliness, would in this way (of publicity) disappoint their very end, consequently that maxim must be wrong,

b. When a neighbouring power, increased to a tremendous greatness (*potentia tremenda*), occasions apprehension, May it be supposed, that it will, because it *can*, be *disposed* to oppress, and does that give a right to the less powerful states, without any previous offence, to attack (conjointly)? — A state, that *gave out* its maxim affirmatively in this case, would bring the evil to pass but still more certainly and more quickly. For the greater power would be beforehand with the smaller ones, and, as to the union of the latter, that

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is but a weak defence against those, who know how to profit by *divide et impera*. — This maxim of politics, publicly declared, balks of necessity its own design, and is by consequence wrong.

c. When a smaller state interrupts by its situation the connexion, necessary to the support and defence of a greater state, Is the latter not entitled to subdue the former, and to incorporate it with itself? — It is very obvious, that the greater must by no means let such a maxim transpire previously, for either the smaller states would unite themselves betimes, or other potencies would dispute the prey, consequently this maxim renders itself impracticable by its very publicity; a sign, that it is unjust and may be so in a very great degree; for a small object of injustice doth not prevent the injustice proved by it from being very great.

3. *With regard to the cosmopolitical law*, I pass it over here in silence: because, on account of the analogy between it and the law of nations, its maxims are easily formed and estimated.

The principle of the incompatibility of the maxims of the law of nations with publicity, affords us an excellent criterion, it is true, of the *discordancy* of politics with moral (as law). But we require still to be informed of the condition, on which their maxims agree with the law of nations. For it cannot be conversely concluded, that the maxims, which bear publicity, are on that account just; because, whoever has the decided

superiority of power, needs not conceal his maxims. — The condition of the possibility of a law of nations in general is, That a *juridical state* shall first exist. For without this there is no public law, but all law, which may be conceived besides that (in the state of nature), is private law merely. We have seen above, That a federative situation of states, merely with a view to put a stop to war, is the only *juridical* situation, possible to be united with their *liberty*. Therefore the harmony of politics with morality is possible in a federal union only (which is given *à priori* according to principles of law and is necessary), and all politics have the founding of it, in its greatest possible compass, for their proper basis, without which end all their acumen is but insipience and veiled injustice. — These spurious politics have, as well as the best school of Jesuits, their CASUISTRY — *the reservatio mentalis:* in drawing up public contracts, couched in such expressions, which may be occasionally explained to one's own advantage, as one pleases (for instance, the distinction between *status quo de fait* and *de droit*); — the *probabilism:* to impute bad intentions to others, or also to make probabilities of their possible preponderancy the title to the undermining of other peaceable states; — finally the *peccatum philosophicum* (*peccatillum, bagatelle*): To hold the swallowing up of a small state, when a much *greater one* profits by it with a view to the imaginary greater prosperity

rity of mankind, a trifle, or at most a very pardonable fault.*

This is aided by the deceitfulness of politics in regard of moral, to make use of either the one or the other branch of it for their own purpose. — Both, philanthropy and reverence for the *rights* of man, are duty; but that *conditional* only, this on the contrary *unconditional*, absolutely commanding duty, which he, who is disposed to give himself up to the agreeable feeling of beneficence, must be first fully assured not to have transgressed. Politics easily coincide with moral in the first sense (as ethics), in order to deliver up the rights of men to their superiors: But with that in the second sense (as law), to which they must bend the knee, they find it adviseable not to engage in a contract, but rather to refuse all reality, and to interpret all duties as mere benevolence; which artifice of politics shunning the light philosophy would easily baffle by means of the publicity of those its maxims, if politicians would but venture to give assistance to this publicity.

In this view I have to propose another transcendental and positive principle of public law, whose formule is, *All maxims, which,*

* Professor Garve's *Treatise on the Conjunction of Moral with Politics*, 1788, bears testimony to such maxims. This worthy and learned man owns at the beginning of his work, not to be able to give a satisfactory answer to this question. But yet to approve of it, though indeed with the avowal, not to be able to answer fully the objections made to it, seems to be a greater condescension towards those, who are very much inclined to abuse it, than might be adviseable.

in order not to miss their end, stand in need of publicity, agree with law and politics united.

For, if they can obtain their end but by publicity, they must be conformable to the universal end of the public (felicity), to harmonize with which (to make it satisfied with its situation), is the peculiar problem of politics. But if this end shall be attainable *but* by publicity, that is, by the removal of all distrust from its maxims, these must also agree with the law of the public; for in this only is the union of the ends of all possible. — I must defer the farther amplification and exposition of this principle till another occasion; I shall only add, that it may be perceived to be a transcendental formule, from the removing of all empirical conditions (of felicity), as the matter of the law, and from the mere regard to the form of the universal legality.

To conclude, If it is duty, if at the same time there is a well-founded hope, to realize, though but in an approximation advancing to infinite, the state of a public law, EVERLASTING PEACE, which succeeds to the treaties or conclusions of peace hitherto falsely so named (more properly truces), is not a void idea, but a problem which, resolved by degrees, draws constantly nearer to its object, as it is to be hoped that less and less time will be requisite to equal progressions.

THE CONJECTURAL BEGINNING OF THE HISTORY OF MANKIND.

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To intersperse conjectures in the progress of a history, in order to fill up chasms in the accounts, is by all means allowable; because the preceding, as the remote cause, and the following, as the effect, may furnish a pretty sure guidance to the discovery of the middle causes, in order to render the transition comprehensible. But, to let a history arise out of conjectures entirely, seems little better, than to delineate the plan of a romance. It would not bear the name of even a *conjectural history*, but of a mere *fiction*. — Yet that, which cannot be ventured on in the process of the history of human actions, may be attempted by conjecture on its *first beginning*, so far as *nature* makes it. For this must not be feigned, but may be collected from experience; when it is presupposed, that those actions were neither better nor worse in the first beginning, than we meet with them at present: a presupposition, which is conformable to the analogy with nature, and carries with it nothing hazarded. A history of the first unfolding of liberty from its original predisposi-

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tion in the nature of man, is therefore quite different from the history of liberty in its progress, which can be founded but upon narrations.

However, as conjectures must not carry their pretensions to assent too high, but must announce themselves as a permitted exercise of the imagination only accompanied with reason, for the unbending and for the health of the mind, but not as a serious occupation; so they cannot vie with that history, which is written on the very same event as an actual account and believed, whose proof rests upon quite other grounds, than mere philosophy of nature. For which reason, and as I set out here on a mere journey of pleasure, I may hope for the favour, to be allowed to make use of a sacred record as a map thereto, and at the same time to fancy, that the flight, which I take on the wings of imagination, though not without a clew connected with experience by reason, will fall on the very same line, which that record contains historically drawn. The reader will please to turn over its leaves (Gen. Chap. II—VI.) and observe, step by step, whether the way, which philosophy goes according to conceptions, coincide with that which history points out.

If we would not perplex and lose ourselves in a maze of conjectures, the beginning must be made from that, which is not susceptible of a derivation from prior causes of nature by human reason, therefore, with the *existence of man*; in his *full growth*, as he must do without maternal assistance: *in one pair*, in order

order to propagate his species; and but *one pair*, that the flames of war may not be directly kindled, if men were in the neighbourhood and yet foreign to one another, or also that nature be not accused that she has, by the difference of descent, let the fittest preparation for sociableness, as the greatest end of the human destination, be wanting; for the unity of the family, from which all men are descended, is doubtless the best disposition for that purpose. I put this pair in a place secured from the attack of beasts of prey, and abundantly supplied by nature with all the means of food, therefore as if in a *garden*, in a climate always mild and temperate. And besides, I contemplate them, only after they have made considerable progress in the address to use their powers, and of course do not begin from the total rudeness of their nature; for, should I undertake to fill up this chasm, which in all likelihood comprehends a great period, there might easily be too many conjectures for the reader but too few probabilities. The first man then could *stand* and *walk*; he could *speak* (Gen. ch. II. v. 20.),* nay, *talk*, that

* The instinct to communicate his thoughts must have first prompted man, who is yet alone, to the making known of his existence to other living beings, chiefly those that utter a sound, which he can imitate and which may afterwards serve for a name. A similar effect of this instinct may be perceived in children and in thoughtless people, who, by speaking in the throat, crying, whistling, singing, and other noisy entertainment (and frequently devotion of the same nature) disturb the thinking part of mankind. For I can conceive no other motive to this, than that they wish to publish their existence around them.

that is, speak according to coherent conceptions (v. 23), consequently *think*. Mere addresses, all of which he must acquire himself (for were they imprinted by the Creator, they would also be transmitted by inheritance, which is however repugnant to experience); but with which I suppose him to be now provided, in order to take into contemplation the unfolding of what is moral in his actions, which necessarily presupposes that address.

Only instinct, this *voice of God*, to which all animals hearken, must in the beginning guide the novice. This allowed him some things for food, and forbid him others (III. 2. 3.). — But it is not necessary to suppose a peculiar, at present lost instinct for this behoof; it may have been the sense of smelling merely, and its affinity with the organ of taste, the known sympathy of this latter however with the organs of digestion, and thus in a manner the faculty of the presension of the fitness or of the unfitness of food, such as one still perceives. One needs not even suppose this sense acuter in the first pair, than it is at present; for it is sufficiently known what difference may be found in the power of perception between the men occupied about their senses merely, and those conversant about their thoughts at the same time, but thereby diverted from their sensations.

As long as the unexperienced man obeyed this call of nature, he found his account in it. But *reason* soon began to manifest itself, and endeavoured to extend his knowledge of food *beyond the limits of instinct* (III. 6.) by comparison

rison of what he had eaten with that which a sense, different from that to which instinct was bound, perhaps the sense of seeing, represented as similar to what he had already eaten. This trial might have accidentally succeeded well enough, though instinct did not advise it, if it did but not contradict. But, it is a property of reason, that it can, with the assistance of the imagination, counterfeit appetites, not only *without* an instinct directed, but even *contrary*, to them, which in the beginning take the name of *concupiscence*, but whereby a whole swarm of unnecessary, nay, even unnatural inclinations is brooded, under the name of *luxury*. The occasion of becoming disobedient to instinct needed be but a trifle; but the consequence of the first essay, namely, to become conscious to one's self of one's reason as a faculty, that can extend itself beyond the limits, wherein all animals are kept, was of great importance and decisive for the mode of life. Were it but a fruit, whose look, by the likeness to other agreeable fruits which one had tasted before, invites to a trial; if besides the example of an animal were added, to whose nature such a food is suitable, as on the contrary it is hurtful to man, and consequently there is an instinct which opposes it; this might give reason the first occasion to chicane the *voice* of nature (III. 1.), and in spite of its contradiction, to make the first trial of a free choice, which, as the first, in all probability did not fall out agreeably to expectation. How insignificant soever the harm may have been, man's

eyes were now opened (v. 7.). He discovered in himself a faculty, to choose for himself a manner of life, and not to be bound like other animals to a single one. On the instantaneous complacency, which this observed preference might excite in him, anxiety and embarrassment must directly follow; how he, who yet knew nothing according to its hidden qualities and remote effects, should go to work with his new discovered faculty. He stood, as it were, on the brink of an abyss; for, from single objects of his desire, which instinct had hitherto shown him, to him an infinity of them was opened whose choice he did not yet understand at all; and it was now impossible for him to return from this once tried state of liberty to that of thraldom (under the dominion of instinct).

Next to the instinct to nourishment, by which nature supports every individual, the *instinct to sex*, whereby she takes care of the preservation of every species, is the most eximious. Reason once put in action did not delay to prove its influence on this. Man quickly found, that the stimulation to sex, which rests with animals in a merely transitory, for the most part periodical instinct, with him is capable of prolongation and even of augmentation by the phansy, which transacts its business with more moderation, but at the same time more durably and more uniformly, the more the object is *withdrawn from* the senses, and that thereby the disgust, which the satiating of a merely animal appetite carries with it, is avoided. The fig-leaf (v. 7.)

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was the production of a far greater manifestation of reason, than it evinced in the first step of its developement. For thereby to render an inclination more intimate and more lasting, by withdrawing its object from the senses, shews the consciousness of some superiority of reason over instinct; and not merely, like the first step, a faculty to serve it to a smaller or to a greater extent. *Refusing* was the artifice to transport insensibly from the merely animal desire to love, and with this from the feeling of the mere agreeable to the taste for beauty, in the beginning in men only, but then in nature likewise. *Modesty*, an inclination by good manners and decency (concealing what might excite slighting) to inspire others with reverence for us, as the proper groundwork of all true sociableness, gave besides the first hint for the cultivation of man, as a moral creature. — A small beginning, but which constitutes an epoch, by giving a quite new direction to the cast of mind, is more important, than the whole infinite series of the subsequent enlargements of culture.

The third step of reason, after it had taken part in the first immediately felt wants, was the reflected *expectation of the future.* This faculty, not merely to enjoy the present moment of life, but to render present to one's self the coming, frequently very distant, time, is the most decisive criterion of the preference of man, to prepare himself for remote ends conformably to his destination, — but at the same time the not to be dried up source of fear and sadness, which the uncertain futurity occasions,

casions, and which all animals are freed from (v. 13—19). Man, who had to maintain himself and a wife, together with future children, foresaw the constantly increasing painfulness of his labour; the woman foresaw the troubles, to which nature had subjected her sex, and over and above those, which the more powerful man would impose on her. After a life of hardships both foresaw with terror in the back-ground of the picture that, which inevitably happens to all animals, yet without making them uneasy, namely, death; and seemed to rebuke and make a crime of the use of reason, which occasions them all these evils. To live in their posterity, who may perhaps be less unhappy, or even as members of a family alleviate their troubles, was probably the only consolatory prospect, that strengthened their dejected minds (16—20).

The fourth and last step, which reason advanced, totally elevating man above the society with beasts, was, That he (though but obscurely) comprehended, that he is properly the *end of nature*, and nothing that lives upon the earth can be his competitor for this. The first time he said to the sheep, *Nature did not give thee the pelt, thou wearest, for thyself, but for me*, stript him of it and put it on himself (v. 21.); he perceived a prerogative, that he, by virtue of his nature, has above all animals, which he now considered no more as his copartners in the creation, but as the means and instruments left to his will for the accomplishment of his purposes at pleasure. This representation comprehends (though

(though obscurely) the thought of the opposite position, to wit, that he dares not speak thus to any *man*, but must consider him as an equal partaker of the gifts of nature: a remote preparative to the restrictions, which reason afterwards imposes on the will with regard to his fellow-man, and which is far more necessary to the establishment of society, than inclination and love.

And thus man entered into an *equality with all rational beings*, whatever might be their rank, (III. 22.), namely, with regard to the pretension *to be himself an end*, to be esteemed by every other as such, and to be used by no other as a mean barely to other ends. Herein, and not in reason, as it is considered as an instrument merely to the satisfaction of the diverse inclinations, lies the ground of the so unlimited equality of man, even with superior beings, who may otherwise surpass him beyond all comparison in the gifts of nature, but none of whom has on that account a right to dispose of him according to mere pleasure. Hence this step is at the same time combined with his dismission from the maternal lap of nature; an alteration, which is indeed honourable, but at the same time very dangerous, as it turned him out of the harmless and secure state of being nursed as a child, in a manner out of a garden, which furnished him with necessaries without his giving himself any trouble (v. 23.), and thrust him out into the wide world, where so many cares, troubles and unknown evils await him. For the future the hardships and miseries of life

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will often draw from him the wish for a paradise, the creature of his imagination, where he may dream or trifle away his existence in tranquil inactivity and constant peace. But restless reason, irresistibly inciting him to the unfolding of the faculties placed in him, is encamped between him and that fancied seat of joy, and does not allow him to return to the state of rudeness and simplicity, from which it has taken him (v. 24.). It instigates him to take upon himself patiently the trouble, which he hates, to run after the gewgaws he despises, and to forget even death itself, which he cannot think of without horrour, being taken up with all those trifles, whose loss he dreads still more.

Observation.

From this representation of the first history of mankind it follows, That man's leaving paradise, represented to him by reason as the first abode of his species, was nothing but the transition from the rudeness of a merely animal creature to humanity, from the go-cart of instinct to the guidance of reason, in a word, From the guardianship of nature to the state of liberty. Whether man has won or lost by this alteration, cannot be any longer the question, when one considers the destination of his species, that consists in nothing but in the *advancing* towards perfection, however imperfectly might fall out the first endeavours to reach this aim, even following one another in a long series of their members. — However

However this course, which for the species is a *progress* from the bad to the better, is not the same for the individual. Before reason awoke there was neither a commandment, nor a prohibition, consequently no transgression; but when it (reason) entered on its office, and, weak as it is, mingled with the animality and its whole force, evils must arise, and, what is worse, with more cultivated reason, vices, which were totally foreign to the state of ignorance, therefore of innocence. The first step then out of this state was on the moral side a *fall;* on the physical were a multitude of never known evils of life the consequence of this fall, therefore punishment. Thus the history of *nature* begins from the good, for it is the *work of God;* the history of *liberty* from the bad, for it is the *work of man.* To the individual, who in the use of his liberty looks to himself merely, there was in such an alteration a loss; to nature, who directs its end with man towards the species, it was a gain. Hence the individual has cause to ascribe to his own guilt all the evil, which he suffers, and all the bad that he commits, but at the same time as a member of the whole (of a species) to admire and to praise the wisdom and the conformity-to-end of the arrangement. — In this manner may be made to accord with themselves and with reason the assertions of the celebrated J. J. Rousseau, so often misinterpreted, and according to appearance colliding with one another. In his publication *on the influence of the sciences* and in that *on the inequality of men*

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he shows perfectly right the unavoidable collision of culture with the nature of the human species, as a *physical* species, in which every individual ought to attain his destination totally; but in his *Emil*, his *Social Contract*, and other writings, he endeavours to solve the more difficult problem, How culture must go on, in order to unfold the predispositions of humanity, as a *moral* species, suitably to their destination, so that this may no longer collide with that as a species natural. From this collision (as culture, according to true *principles of education* for the *man* and for the *citizen* at the same time, is perhaps not yet properly begun, much less ended) spring all the real evils, which oppress human life, and all the vices that disgrace it;* as the incitements

* In order to produce but a few examples of this collision between the efforts of humanity with a view to its moral destination, on the one side, and the unalterable observance of the laws placed in its nature for the rude and animal state, on the other, take the following.

The epoch of full age or majority, that is, of the instinct, as well as the faculty, to propagate one's species, nature has fixed at about the age of 16 or 17 years: an age, at which the youth in the rude state of nature literally becomes a man; for he then has the faculty to support himself, to propagate his species, and also to maintain it together with his wife. The simplicity of the wants renders this easy for him. Whereas in the cultivated state many means of acquisition belong to the latter, as well in address, as in favourable external circumstances, so that this epoch, in the civil state, is delayed 19 years at least one with another. Nature however has not at the same time altered her period of maturity with the progress of the civil refinement, but follows obstinately her law, which she intended for the maintaining of the human species, as a species of animals. Hence arises now an unavoidable damage to the end of nature by morals, and *vice versa*. For the man of nature is already in a certain age a man, when the civil man (who does

ments to the latter, which one blames on that account, are good in themselves and conform-
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does not yet cease to be a man of nature) is but a youth, nay, even but a child, for one may well name him so, who, on account of his years (in the civil state) cannot support even himself, much less his species, though he has for him the instinct and the faculty, consequently the call of nature, to propagate it. For nature has surely not placed instincts and faculties in living creatures, in order that they should combat and suppress them. Therefore the predisposition to those was not at all designed for the civilized state, but merely for the support of the human species as a species of animals; and the civilised state falls into an inevitable collision with the latter, to which a perfect civil constitution only (the ultimate aim of culture) can put an end, as at present that interval is commonly filled with vices, and their consequence, various human miseries.

Another example as a proof of the truth of the position, That nature has implanted in us two predispositions for two different ends, namely, for humanity as a species of animals, and for the very same as a moral species, is the *Ars longa. vita brevis* of Hippocrates. Sciences and arts might be carried to a far higher pitch by one head that is organized for them, when he has once attained by long exercise and acquired knowledge the proper maturity of judgment, than whole generations of the learned might do successively, if he lived but with the same juvenile power of mind the time, which is granted to all these generations. Now nature has manifestly taken her resolution with regard to man's duration of life from another point of view, than from that of the furtherance of sciences. For, when the man of the most happy understanding is at the point of making the greatest discoveries, which he has reason to hope for from his address and experience, age advances; his faculties grow blunt, and he must leave to a second generation (which begins anew from A B C, and must once more journey over the whole track, that was already explored), to add another step to the progress of culture. The course of the human species to the attaining of its whole destination seems for that reason incessantly interrupted, and to be in constant danger to fall back into the old rudeness; and the Grecian philosopher did not complain entirely without reason, that *it is a pity, that one must die, when one has just begun to perspect, how one ought to live.*

A third example may be the inequality among men, and not that of the gifts of nature or of the goods of fortune, but of the universal rights of them, an inequality, of which Rousseau complains with great justice, but which is not to be

able-to-end as predispositions of nature, but these predispositions, as they were adjusted to the mere state of nature, suffer damage by advancing culture, and in return endamage it, till perfect art becomes nature again, which is the ultimate aim of the moral destination of the human species.

Conclusion of the History.

The beginning of the following period is, That man passes from the period of ease and of peace *to that of labour and of discord*, as the prelude to the union in society. Here we must again take a great leap, and put him at once in the possession of domestic animals, and of plants, which he himself can multiply by sowing and planting for his food (IV. 2.); though the transition from the savage live of a hunter to the former, and from the unsteady digging of roots or the collecting of fruits in the second state, may have been slow enough. Here now must begin the difference between men hitherto living amicably beside one another, whose consequence was the separation and

be separated from culture, as long as it in a manner proceeds without a plan (which is however unavoidable during a long time), and to which nature had certainly not destined man; as she gave him liberty, and reason to restrict this liberty by nothing but its (reason's) own universal and external legality, which is denominated *the civil right or law*. Man ought to extricate himself from the rudeness of his very predispositions of nature, and, raising himself above them, take care nevertheless not to commit a fault against them: an address, which he can expect but late and after many miscarrying essays, during which interval humanity groans under the evils that it brings upon itself from inexperience.

and dispersion upon the earth of those of a different mode of life. The *life of a herdsman* is not only easy, but, as there can be no want of pasture in an extensive uninhabited land, affords the most certain subsistence. Whereas *agriculture*, or planting, is very troublesome, depending on the inconstancy of the weather, consequently insecure, and requires a permanent abode, property of the soil, and sufficient power to defend it; but the herdsman hates this property, which limits his liberty of grazing. As to the former, the husbandman might seem to envy the herdsman as more favoured by heaven (v. 4.); in fact, however, the latter, so long as he remained in his neighbourhood, was very burdensome to him; for the grazing cattle did not spare his fields and plantations. As it was easy for the herdsman, after the damage which he had occasioned, to remove to a great distance with his herd, and to avoid all indemnification, because he leaves nothing behind him, which he does not find just as well every-where else; so it was natural for the husbandman to use force against such encroachments (which the other did not hold unallowed) and, as the occasion to such could never totally cease, in order not to lose the fruits of his long labour, finally carried that force as far as he possibly could, so that those who lead the life of herdsmen were *obliged to go away*. (v. 16.). This separation makes the third epoch.

A soil, on whose cultivation and planting (chiefly with trees) depends the means of supporting life, requires permanent habitations; and

and the defence of them against all outrages stands in need of a number of men to assist one another. Therefore in this way of life men could no longer disperse themselves in families, but were under the necessity of keeping together, and of erecting villages (improperly named *cities*), in order to defend their property against either wild hunters, or hordes of wandering herdsmen. The first necessaries of life, whose provision required a *different mode of life* (v. 20.), could now be exchanged for one another. Thence must arise *culture*, and the beginning of *art*, of pastime, as well as of industry (v. 21. 22.); as also, what is of the greatest moment, some preparation for a civil constitution and public justice, at first indeed but with regard to the greatest violences, whose avenging was no longer left, as in the savage state, to individuals, but to a legislative potency, which contained the whole, that is, a mode of government, over which itself no exercise of power had place (v. 23. 24.). — From this first and rude predisposition could now develope itself by degrees all human art, of which that of *sociableness* and *civil security* is the most salutary, the human species increase itself and, from a centre, like bee-hives, extend everywhere by sending abroad and planting colonies already civilized. With this epoch commenced likewise the *inequality* among men, this abundant source of so much bad, but of all that is good also, and henceforth increased.

So long as the nomades or nations of herdsmen, who acknowledge God only for their master,

master, swarmed around the inhabitants of the city and husbandmen, who have a man (a magistrate) for a master (VI. 4.),* and as sworn enemies to all landed property bore an ill will to these and were in return hated by them; there was continual war between them, at least incessant danger of it, and hence both nations might be glad in the interiour at least of the inestimable good, liberty. — (for still at present nothing but the danger of war moderates despotism; because riches are requisite at present to constitute a state a potency, but without *liberty* neither the activity nor the industry, which could produce riches, has place. Instead of which in a poor nation great participation in the support of the commonwealth must be met with; which on the other hand is not otherwise possible, than when the citizens feel themselves therein *free*). — In process of time however the beginning luxury of the inhabitants of the city, but chiefly the art of pleasing, whereby the city ladies eclipse the dirty women of the woods, must have been a great allurement for those herdsmen (V. 2.), to enter into a conjunction with these, and to partake of the splendid misery of the city. Which then, by the incorporating of two nations formerly inimical to one another,

* The Arabian Bedouines still name themselves children of an ancient *Schech*, the founder of their tribe (as Beni Haled etc.). He is by no means their master, and can exercise no power over them at pleasure. For in a nation of herdsmen, where nobody has immoveable property, which he must leave behind, every family that is dissatisfied may easily separate itself from the tribe, in order to join and strengthen another.

another, with the end of all danger of war inevitably occasioned at the same time the end of all liberty, thus the despotism of mighty tyrants on the one side, with culture yet scarcely begun but soulless luxury in abject servitude, mixed with all the vices of the rude state, on the other, averted the human species from the progress of the cultivation of its predispositions to the good, pointed out to it by nature; and thereby rendered it unworthy of even its existence, as a species destined to rule over the earth, not to enjoy brutishly, and to serve slavishly (v. 17.).

Concluding Observation.

The man of reflection, when he computes the evils, which oppress the human species so much, and (as it seems) without hope of its growing better, feels a sorrow that can even become corruption of morals, of which the thoughtless knows nothing, namely, discontentment with Providence, who governs the course of the world on the whole. It is however of the greatest moment, *to be contented with Providence*, (though he has traced out for us in our terrestrial world a path so difficult): partly in order to resume courage still under the hardships, and partly in order, while we throw the blame on fate, not to lose sight of our own fault, which may perhaps be the only cause of all this evil, and to neglect the remedy in the self-amendment.

One must own, that the greatest evils, which oppress civilized nations, are brought on

on us by war, and indeed not so much by that which is present or past, as by the never remitting and even incessantly increased preparation for the future. To this are employed all the powers of the state, all the fruits of its culture, which might be used for a still greater culture; liberty is in so many places violated, and the maternal care of the state of single members transformed into an inexorable strictness of demands, yet this is justified by the apprehension of outward danger. But, would this culture, would this close conjunction of the ranks of the commonwealth to the mutual furtherance of their prosperity, would the population, nay, even the degree of liberty which, though under very restrictive laws, yet remains, be met with, if that war itself, which is always dreaded, did not extort from the heads of states this *reverence for humanity?* Only behold China, which from its situation has perhaps one day to fear an unforeseen attack, but no potent enemy, and from which therefore every trace of liberty is effaced. — On the step of culture, then, on which the human species yet stands, war is an indispensable mean to carry it higher; and but after a finished culture (God knows when) would an everduring peace be salutary for us and also by that only possible. Consequently, as to this point, we ourselves are the cause of the evils, of which we complain so bitterly; and the sacred record is perfectly right to represent the incorporating of nations into one society and their complete deliverance from all outward danger, as their culture was scarcely begun

begun, as a stopping of all further culture and a sinking into incurable corruption.

The second discontentment of men arraigns the order of nature with regard to the *shortness of life*. One must understand but very ill indeed the estimation of the value of life, if one can still wish, that it should last longer, than it actually does; for that were but a lenghtening of a play constantly struggling with mere difficulties. But a childish judgement needs not be blamed for fearing death, without loving life, and, whilst it is difficult for it to pass its existence every single day with tolerable satisfaction, never to have days enow to repeat this complaint. When however one but reflects, how much care of the means to passing away a life so short torments us, how much injustice is exercised with the hope of a future enjoyment, though of so short a duration; one must reasonably believe, that if men could prolong their lives to an age of 800 years and more, the father would scarcely be secure of his life against his son, the one brother against the other, or one friend beside another, and that the vices of a human species living so long would rise to such a heighth, that they would be worthy of no better a fate, than to be drowned in a universal flood (v. 12, 13.).

The third wish, or rather, empty longing (for we are conscious to ourselves, that we never can obtain what is wished for) is the shadow, the *golden age* so much praised by poets, where a deliverance from all imaginary wants, with which luxury loads us, a sufficiency

ciency with the mere wants of nature, a thorough equality of men, an everlasting peace among them, in a word, the pure enjoyment of a life free from care dreamt away in idleness or trifled away in puerile amusements; — an earnest desire, which makes the Crusoes and the voyages to the southsea islands so charming, but in general evinces the weariness, which the thinking man feels in the civilized life, when he seeks its value in *enjoyments* merely, and takes into the account the counterbalance of laziness, when reason by chance puts him in mind, to give a value to life by *actions*. The justness of the wish to return to that time of simplicity and innocence is sufficiently shown, when one is animated by the above representation of the original state: man cannot maintain himself therein, because he is not contented with it; still less is he inclined ever to return to it; so that he has always to attribute to himself and to his own choice the present state of troubles.

Advantageous to man and serviceable to instruction and to amendment is then such an exhibition of his history, which points out to him, That he must not charge Providence with the evils that afflict him; that he is not entitled to impute his own transgression to an original crime of his first parents, whereby a propensity in a manner to similar transgressions would be hereditary in the offspring, (for arbitrable actions can carry nothing with them possible to be communicated by inheritance); but that he in all justice has to acknowledge what has happened as committed

by himself, and to lay to his own charge entirely all the evils, which spring from the abuse of his reason, as he may be very conscious to himself, that in similar circumstances he would conduct himself in the same manner, and would make the first use of reason, to misuse it (even contrary to the hint of nature). The physical evils, when that point concerning the moral ones is cleared up, can then, in the balancing of merit and of guilt, hardly yield an odds to our advantage.

And thus the result of a most ancient history of man essayed by philosophy, is, Contentment with Providence and, on the whole, with the course of human affairs, which does not commence from the good and proceed to the bad, but developes itself gradually from the bad to the better; to which progress, then, every one is summoned by nature herself, to contribute on his part to the utmost of his abilities.

AN

INQUIRY

CONCERNING THE

PERSPICUITY OF THE PRINCIPLES

OF

NATURAL THEOLOGY

AND OF

MORAL.

IN ANSWER TO THE QUESTION WHICH THE ROYAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES IN BERLIN PROPOSED IN THE YEAR 1763.

Verum animo satis haec vestigia parva sagaci
sunt, per quae possis cognoscere caetera tute.

They who, from a mistaken zeal for the honour of Divine revelation, either deny the existence, or vilify the authority of natural religion, are not aware, that by disallowing the sense of obligation, they undermine the foundation upon which revelation builds its power of commanding the heart.

BLAIR, *On the Power of Conscience.*

INTRODUCTION.

The proposed question is of such a nature, that, when it is properly answered, the higher philosophy must thereby acquire a determinate form. When the method, according to which the greatest possible certainty in this species of cognition can be attained, is established, and the nature of this conviction well introspected, an immutable precept of method instead of the perpetual inconstancy of the opinions and sects of the schools, must unite the men of reflection in the like endeavours; in the same manner as NEWTON'S method in natural philosophy altered the licentiousness of the physical hypotheses to a sure procedure according to experience and to geometry. But what method shall this treatise itself have, in which is to be shown to metaphysics their true degree of certainty, together with the way, by which one arrives at it. If this propounding be metaphysical, its judgment is just as uncertain as has hitherto been the science, which thereby hopes to acquire firmness and stability, and every thing is lost. My treatise shall therefore be totally composed of sure positions of experience and immediate consequences therefrom drawn.

I will rely neither on the doctrines of philosophers whose insecurity is the very occasion of the present problem, nor on definitions, which are so often fallacious. The method I use shall be simple and cautious: Whatever may be found insecure will be of such a nature, as to be used for the explication only, but not for the proof.

AN

INQUIRY

CONCERNING THE

PERSPICUITY OF THE PRINCIPLES

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CONTEMPLATION THE FIRST.

UNIVERSAL COMPARISON OF THE MODE OF ATTAINING CERTAINTY IN THE MATHEMATICAL COGNITION WITH THAT IN THE PHILOSOPHICAL.

1.

The Mathematics attain all their Definitions synthetically, but Philosophy analytically.

EVERY one universal conception may be arrived at in two ways, either by the *arbitrable conjunction* of conceptions, or by separation from that cognition, which is made perspicuous by anatomizing. The mathematics never frame definitions, but in the first

 manner.

manner. Let one imagine, arbitrably, four straight lines, which enclose a plane, so that the opposite sides are not parallel, and name this figure a *trapezium*. The conception, which I explain, is not given before the definition, but springs first from it. Whatever signification a cone may elsewhere have, in the mathematics it arises out of the arbitrable representation of a rectangular triangle, which is moved round on one side. The explication here and in all other cases manifestly springs from the *synthesis*.

The definitions of philosophy are of quite another nature. There the conception of a thing is given, but confused or not sufficiently determined. I must dissect it, compare in all sorts of cases the separated criteria with the given conception, and render this abstract thought copious and determinate. For example, every body has a conception of *time:* this must be explained. I must contemplate this idea in all sorts of references, in order to discover marks of it by dissection, to connect different abstracted marks, whether they yield a sufficient conception, and are coherent, whether the one does not in part include the other in itself. Did I endeavour here to come to a definition of time synthetically, what a happy chance must it be, were this conception directly that, which fully expressed the idea given us.

But, it may be said, philosophers sometimes explain synthetically likewise, and mathematicians analytically. For instance, when the philosopher arbitrably conceives a substance

stance with the faculty of reason, and denominates it a spirit. My answer however is, such determinations of the signification of a word are never philosophical definitions, but if they are to be termed explications, they are but grammatical ones. For it is not at all the province of philosophy, to say, what sort of a name I shall give an arbitrable conception. LEIBNITZ imagined a simple substance, which has nothing but obscure representations, and named it a *slumbering monade*. Here he did not explain, but imagine, this *monas*; for the conception of it was not given to him, but created by him. Whereas mathematicians have sometimes explained analytically, I own it, but it was always a fault. Thus WOLF has considered with a philosophic eye the similitude in geometry, in order to treat under the universal conception of it that occurring in geometry likewise. He might have omitted it; for when I conceive figures, wherein the opposite angles, which the lines of the periphery enclose, are equal, and the sides that enclose them have the same relation, this may always be considered as the definition of the similitude of figures, and in like manner with the other similitudes of space. The universal definition of similitude in general signifies nothing to geometry. It is happy for the mathematics, that, when, by an ill-understood duty, the geometrician sometimes embarks in such analytical expositions, nothing is in fact inferred therefrom by him, or his next consequences constitute at the bottom the mathematical definition, else this science would be

exposed to the very same unfortunate discord, as philosophy.

The mathematician has to do with conceptions, which are often capable of a philosophical exposition; as for example with the conception of *space* in general. But he assumes such a conception as *given* according to its clear and common representation. Sometimes philosophical expositions are given him from other sciences, particularly in the applied mathematics, *exempli gratia*, the exposition of fluidity. Then however such definitions do not take their rise in the mathematics, but are only used there. It is the business of philosophy, to anatomise, to render copious and determinate, conceptions that are given as implicated; but of mathematics, to connect and to compare given conceptions of quantities, which are clear and secure, in order to see what can be inferred from them.

2.

The Mathematics contemplate in their Solutions, Demonstrations and Consequences, the universal among the Signs in the concrete, Philosophy the universal by the Signs in the abstract.

As we treat our propositions here but as immediate inferences from experiences, I refer on account of the present, *first*, to arithmetic, as well the universal of the undeterminate quantities, as that of the numbers, where the relation of the quantities it determined to a unity.

unity. In both are placed first, instead of the things themselves, their signs, with the peculiar marks of their augmentation or diminution, their relations etc., and afterwards proceeded with these signs according to easy and sure rules, by transposition, connexion or subtraction, and various alterations, so that the marked things themselves are hereby totally left out of thought, till finally at the conclusion the signification of the symbolical figures is deciphered. *Secondly*, in geometry, in order, for instance, to cognise the properties of all circles, one circle is described, in which, instead of all possible lines intersecting one another within it, two lines are drawn. By these are demonstrated the relations, and in these are contemplated the universal rule of the relation of all the lines *in concreto* crossing or decussating one another in all circles.

If the procedure of philosophy is compared with this, it will be found totally different. The signs of the philosophical contemplation are never any thing else, than words, which neither show in their composition the component conceptions, of which consists the whole idea that the word denotes, nor are able in their connexions to mark the relations of the philosophical thoughts. Hence in every reflection in this species of cognition one must have the thing itself in view, and is obliged to represent to one's self the universal *in abstracto*, without being able to use the great assistance of handling single signs instead of the universal conceptions of the things themselves.

selves. When, for example, the geometrician wishes to evince, that space is divisible to infinite, he takes a straight line, which stands perpendicularly between two parallels, and draws from a point of one of these parallel lines other lines, which bisect in the same manner. He cognises by this symbol with the greatest certainty, that the division must proceed without end. Whereas, when the philosopher wishes to evince, that every body consists of simple substances, he in the first place assures himself, that there is in general a whole out of substances, that in these the composition is a contingent state, without which they can exist, that therefore all composition in a body may be annulled in thought, in such a manner however, that the substances, of which it consists, exist; and, as that, which remains of a composite, when all composition in general is annulled, is simple, that the body must consist of simple substances. Here neither diagrams or figures nor visible signs can express the thoughts or their relations. Nor can any transposition of the signs be performed according to rules in the place of the abstract contemplations, so that the representation of the things themselves might in this procedure be permuted with the clearer and easier representation of the signs, but the universal must be pondered in the abstract.

3.

In the Mathematics there are but few insolvable Conceptions and immensurable Propositions, but in Philosophy innumerable.

The conception of quantity in general, of unity, of multitude, of space etc. is, at least in the mathematics, insolvable, their dissection and exposition belong not at all to this science. I am well aware, that many geometricians confound the boundaries of the sciences, and in the doctrine of quantity are sometimes inclined to philosophise, for which reason they endeavour to explain such conceptions, though the definition in such cases has no mathematical consequence whatever. But it is certain, that every one conception, which, whether it can be elsewhere explained or not, does not require it in this science at least, with regard to a discipline is insolvable. And I have already said, that there are but few such in the mathematics. But I go still farther and maintain, that indeed none at all can occur in them, namely, in the sense, that their exposition by dissection of the conceptions pertains to the mathematical cognition; suppose it were even possible. For the mathematics never explain by dissection a given conception, but by arbitrable conjunction an object, whose thought is just thereby first possible.

Does one compare herewith philosophy, what a distinction becomes evident? In all its disciplines, chiefly in metaphysic, every one dissection that can take place is necessary,

for as well the perspicuity of the cognition, as the possibility of sure inferences depends thereon. But it may be immediately foreseen, that it is unavoidable in the dissection to fall on insolvable conceptions, which will be so either in themselves or for us, and that there will be an immense number of them, as it is impossible, that universal cognitions of so great a variety should be composed but of a few fundamental conceptions. Hence many can almost not be resolved at all, for example, the conception of a *representation*, of *simultaneousness*, or of *successiveness*, others but in part, as the conception of *space*, of *time*, of the various *feelings* of the human soul, of the feeling of the *sublime*, of the *beautiful*, of the *disgustful* etc. without the precise knowledge and solution of which the springs of our nature are not sufficiently known, and where a careful observer perceives, that the dissection is by far not sufficient. I acknowledge, that the expositions of *pleasure* and of *displeasure*, of *appetition* and of *aversation* and numberless such like, have never been delivered by sufficient solutions, and do not wonder at this insolubleness. For with regard to conceptions of so different a nature distinctive elementary conceptions must form the basis. The fault, which some have committed, to treat all similar cognitions as such, which collectively admit of being resolved into a few simple conceptions, is similar to that, into which fell the ancient natural philosophers, to wit, that all the matter of nature consists of the four

four elements, commonly so named, which thought is annulled by better observation.

Besides, the mathematics are grounded but upon a few indemonstrable propositions, which, were they elsewhere even susceptible of a proof, are considered in this science as immediately certain. *The whole is equal to all the parts taken together; between two points can be but one straight line etc.* Such principles the mathematics are accustomed to lay down in the beginning of their disciplines, in order that it may be perceived, that none but such self-evident propositions are directly presupposed as true, for all the others are strictly demonstrated.

If one compares with this philosophy, and particularly metaphysic, I would be glad to see a table of the indemonstrable positions drawn up, which form the basis of these sciences through their whole tract. They would no doubt make up a plan that were immense; however in the investigation of these immense fundamental truths consists the most important affair of the higher philosophy, and these discoveries will never be brought to an issue, so long as such a sort of cognition shall extend itself. For whatever be the object, those criteria, which the understanding perceives in it at first and immediately, are the *data* to just as many indemonstrable positions, which then constitute the groundwork, from which the definitions can be discovered. Ere I prepare myself to explain, what space is, I clearly perspect, that, as this conception is given me, I must before all seek by anatomizing for those marks, which are first and immediately herein thought.

thought. Accordingly I observe, that therein there is much without one another, that these many are not substances, for my object is not to cognise the things in space, but space itself, that space can have but three dimensions etc. Such positions may be illustrated, by contemplating them in the concrete, in order to cognise them intuitively; but they never can be proved. For whence could this be done, as they make up the first and most simple thoughts, which I can have of my object, when I begin to think of it. In the mathematics the definitions are the first thought, which I can have of the explained thing, because my conception of the object springs first from the definition, and there it is absolutely absurd, to consider them as evincible. In philosophy, where the conception of the thing, which I am to explain is given me, what is immediately and first perceived in it must serve for an indemonstrable fundamental judgment. For as I have not yet, but first seek, the whole distinct conception of the thing, it cannot be shown from this conception, but it rather serves, to generate this distinct cognition and definition. Therefore I must have first fundamental judgments before all philosophical exposition of things, and in this no fault can be committed, but that I consider that as an original, which is but a derived, mark. In the following contemplation will occur things, which will put this beyond a doubt.

4.

The Object of Mathematics is easy and simple, but that of Philosophy difficult and entangled.

As quantity is the object of the mathematics, and in its contemplation it is considered but how often something is posited or laid down, so it is evident, that this cognition must rest upon few and very clear fundamental doctrines of the universal doctrine of quantity (which is properly the universal arithmetic). There may be seen springing out of simple and few fundamental conceptions the augmentation and diminution of the quantities, and their dividing into equal factors in the doctrine of the roots. A few fundamental conceptions of space effectuate the applications of this universal knowledge of quantity to geometry. For instance, in order to convince one's self one needs compare but the easy conceivableness of an arithmetical object, which comprises in itself a prodigious plurality, with the much more difficult comprehensibility of a philosophical idea, wherein one endeavours to cognise but little. The relation of a *trillion* to the unity is quite distinctly understood, while philosophers hitherto have not been able to render intelligible the conception of *liberty* from its unities, *id est*, its simple and known conceptions. That is, the qualities, which constitute the proper object of philosophy, are infinitely multifarious, whose distinction requires great exactness: as also it is much more difficult, to resolve implicated

cognitions by dissection, than to connect given simple cognitions by synthesis, and so to arrive at consequences. There are many, I know, who find philosophy very easy in comparison with the higher mathesis. But these name philosophy every thing that is contained in books, which bear that title. The distinction will be discovered by the issue. Philosophical cognitions have for the most part the fate of opinions, and are like meteors, whose lustre bespeaks not their duration. They vanish, but the mathematics are permanent. Metaphysic is no doubt the most difficult of all human introspections; but a metaphysic has never yet been written. The problem of the Academy shows, that there is reason to inquire after the way necessary to be taken, in order first to search for it.

CONTEMPLATION THE SECOND.

THE ONLY METHOD OF ATTAINING THE GREATEST POSSIBLE CERTAINTY IN METAPHYSIC.

Metaphysic is nothing but a philosophy on the first grounds of our cognition; therefore what was shown in the foregoing contemplation of the mathematical cognition in comparison with philosophy, will likewise be valid relatively to metaphysic. We have seen considerable and essential distinctions, which are to be met with between the cognition in both sciences, and in regard of which one may say with bishop Warburton, That nothing has been more pernicious to philosophy, than mathematics, namely, the *imitation* of them, in the method of thinking, where they cannot possibly be used; for as to the *application* of them in the parts of philosophy, where the knowledge of the quantities occurs, that is quite different, and the usefulness immense.

In the mathematics I begin with the definition of my object, for example, a triangle, circle etc., in the metaphysics I must never begin therewith, and the definition here is so little the first that I cognise of the thing, that it is rather almost always the last. In the mathematics I have no sooner a conception of my object, than the definition gives it; in the metaphysics I have a conception, which is

already given me, though intricately, I must seek its distinct, ample and precise one. How can I then begin with it? Augustinus said, I know well what time is, but if any body asks me, I know it not. Here must take place many operations of developing dark ideas, of comparison, subordination and limitation, and I dare venture to say, That, though many true and acute things have been said of time, the real exposition of it has never been given; for with regard to the nominal exposition, it is of little or no service to us, for without it one understands this word sufficiently, not to permute it. Had one as many right definitions as occur in books under this name, how certainly could one draw inferences and conclude therefrom. But experience teaches the contrary.

In philosophy and namely in metaphysic much may be cognised of an object distinctly and with certainty, also sure consequences be therefrom drawn, before one is in possession of its definition and even when one does not at all undertake to give it. Of every one thing we may be immediately certain of different predicates, though I do not yet know enough of them, in order to give the ample determinate conception of the thing, that is, the definition. Though I never explained what an *appetition* is, I could say with certitude, that every appetite presupposes a representation of the object of the appetite, that this representation is a prevision of the future, that with it is combined the sentiment or feeling of pleasure etc. All this every one constantly

stantly perceives in the immediate consciousness of the appetition. From such compared observations one might perhaps at last arrive at the definition of the appetition. But, as long as without it that, which is sought for, can be inferred from a few immediately certain marks of the same thing, it is unnecessary to risk an undertaking so hazardous. In the mathematics this is, as you know, very different.

The signification of the signs in the mathematics is certain, because one may be easily conscious to one's self of that which one wished to give them. In philosophy in general, and in metaphysic in particular, the words have their signification by the use of speech, except so far as it is more exactly determined to them by logical limitation. But as in very similar conceptions, which nevertheless involve a considerable hidden distinction, the same words are often used, great heed must be taken here in every application of the conception, though its denomination seems to accommodate itself exactly to the usage of speech, whether it is actually the same conception, which is here conjoined with the very same signs. We say, a man *distinguishes* gold from brass, when he cognises, that in the one metal there is not so much massiveness, as in the other. Besides one says, that brutes *distinguish* one food from another, when they eat the one, and leave the other. Here in both cases is used the word to distinguish, though in the former it signifies as much as to *cognise the difference*, which never can take place, without *judging*; but in

in the latter it denotes, only that the distinctive representation is *distinctively treated*, where it is not just necessary, that a judgment shall precede. As we then perceive but in brutes, That they are incited by different sensations to different actions, which is very possible, without their needing to judge in the smallest degree on either the agreement or the disagreement.

From this flow quite naturally the rules of that method, according to which the greatest possible metaphysical certainty can be solely attained. They are very different from those, which have been hitherto followed, and promise a happy issue, insomuch that, when they are brought to the application, such could never have been expected in another way. The *first* and chief *rule* is, that the beginning be not made from expositions, merely the exposition of the word must then be sought, for instance, necessary is that, whose opposite is impossible. But there are but few cases, where the clear determinate conception can be so confidently fixed directly at the beginning. Rather let that, which is immediately certain in the object, be sought with care, even before one has the definition of it. Draw consequences therefrom, and endeavour principally to acquire but true and quite certain judgments of the object, even without depending on a hoped for exposition, which must never be ventured, but, when it distinctly offers itself from the evident judgments, first granted. The *second rule* is, that the immediate judgments of the object relatively to what

is

is first met with in it with certitude be particularly noted, and, when it is certain, that the one is not contained in the other, that they, like the axioms of geometry, be let precede as the groundwork of all consequences. Hence follows, that in the contemplations of metaphysic that which one knows certainly, were it but little, be always particularly noted, though essays of uncertain cognitions may be made, in order to see, whether they do not conduct to the track of certain cognition, yet in such a manner, as not to mingle them with the former. I shall not mention the other rules of conduct, which this method has in common with every other rational one, but proceed to render it distinct by examples.

The genuine method of metaphysic is at bottom the same with that, which NEWTON introduced into natural philosophy, and which was there productive of such beneficial consequences. One ought, it is there said, by sure experiences, with the assistance of geometry, to search for the rules, according to which certain phenomena of nature happen. Though their first ground is not perspected in the bodies, it is certain, that they act according to these laws, and the involved events of nature are explained, when it is distinctly shown, how they are contained under these well-demonstrated rules. Just so in metaphysic. Seek by sure internal experience, that is, an immediate evident consciousness, those criteria, which certainly lie in the conception of some one universal quality, and though you do not know the whole nature or essence of the thing, you

you may use it with certainty, in order to deduce therefrom a great deal in the thing.

EXAMPLE

of the only sure Method of Metaphysic, in the Cognition of the Nature of Bodies.

For the sake of brevity I refer to a demonstration, which is shown in a few words in the first contemplation towards the end of the 2. paragraph, in order first to lay as a foundation here the proposition: Every body must consist of simple substances. Without making out, what a body is, I know for certain, that it consists of parts, which would exist, though they were not conjoined: and notwithstanding the conception of a substance is an abstract conception, it is without doubt of the corporeal things of the world. But it is not even necessary to name them substances, it is sufficient, that hence can be inferred with the greatest certainty, that a body consists of simple parts, of which the plain dissection is easy, but here too prolix. Now I can by means of infallible proofs of geometry show, That space consists not of simple parts, of which the arguments are well known. Accordingly there is a determinate number of the parts of every body, which are all simple, and a like number of the parts of space it takes up, which are altogether composed. Hence follows, that every simple part (element) in the body takes up a space. I now ask, What means, to take up a space? I perceive, without giving myself

self any trouble about the nature of space, that if a space can be penetrated by every thing, without any thing existing that resists it, one, if he chose, might say, there is something in this space, but never that this space is taken up by it. Whence I cognise, That a space is taken up, when something exists, which resists a moved body in the effort to penetrate it. But this resistance is the impenetrability. Therefore bodies take up space by impenetrability. Impenetrability, however, is a *power*. For it manifests a resistance, that is, an action opposed to an external force. And the power, which belongs to a body, must belong to its simple parts. Consequently the elements of every body fill their space by the power of impenetrability. But I ask farther, Whether the first elements then are not expanded, as every one in the body fills a space? Here I may adduce an exposition, which is immediately certain, namely, that is *expanded*, which posited of itself (absolutely) fills a space, as every single body, though I represent to myself, that there is nothing besides it, would fill a space. However if I contemplate an absolutely simple element, it is, when it is posited alone (without connection with others), impossible, that there should be much in it without one another, and that it absolutely takes up a space. Hence it cannot be expanded. But as a power of impenetrability applied to many external things is the cause, that the element takes up a space, I perceive, that thence flows a plurality in its external action, but no plurality relative to internal parts, by

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consequence it is not expanded, because it takes up a space in the body (*in nexu cum aliis*).

I shall bestow a few words still, in order to render evident, how shallow the proofs of metaphysic are, when it from its exposition once laid as a foundation, conformably to assuetude, boldly draws conclusions, which are lost, so soon as the exposition illudes. It is known, that most Newtoneans go still farther than Newton, and maintain, that bodies attract one another immediately, even at a distance (or as they denominate it, through the void space). I let the rightness of this proposition, which has certainly much reason on its side, remain undetermined. But I maintain that metaphysic at least has not refuted it. First, bodies are *distant* from each other, when they do not *touch* one another. This is exactly the signification of the word. If I inquire now, What do I understand by touching or contact? I perceive, that, without troubling myself about the definition, I always judge from the resistance of the impenetrability of another body, that I touch it. For I find that this conception springs originally from feeling, as I but presume by the judgment of the eyes, that one matter is in contact with another, but first know it certainly by the observed resistance of impenetrability. Thus, when I say, A body acts on a *distant* one immediately, this means, that it acts upon it immediately, but not by means of impenetrability. But it is not to be conceived, why this should be impossible, otherwise somebody must show, that either impene-

impenetrability is the sole power of a body, or that it can act at least with no other immediately, without doing it at the same time by means of impenetrability. But as this has never been demonstrated, and in all appearance will hardly ever be demonstrated, metaphysic has no proper ground for revolting against the immediate attraction at a distance. However let us hear the metaphysician's arguments. The first on the list is the definition, The immediate reciprocal presence of two bodies is contact. Hence follows, when two bodies immediately act upon one another, they are in contact with one another. Things that touch or are in contact with one another are not distant. Therefore two bodies never act immediately at a distance etc. The definition is surreptitious. Not every immediate presence is a contaction, but only that by means of impenetrability, and the rest is but built in the air.

From the above-mentioned examples it is evident, that a great deal may be said of an object with certainty, as well in metaphysic, as in other sciences, without having explained it. For here it has been explained neither what a body is, nor what space, and yet of both there are certain positions. That which I principally insist on is, That the procedure in metaphysic must be totally analytical, for its province is, in fact, to resolve implicated cognitions. If with this be compared the procedure of philosophers, as it is in vogue in all schools, how perverted will it be found? The most abstract conceptions, which reason naturally has at last in view, make

make with them the beginning, when they have once adopted the mathematician's plan, which they are absolutely determined to imitate. Hence a strange difference is found between metaphysic and every other science. In geometry and other cognitions of the doctrine of quantity the beginning is made from that which is easy, and one proceeds slowly to more difficult exercises. In metaphysic the beginning is made from the most difficult: from possibility and existence, from necessity and contingency in general, and so on, all conceptions, to which are necessary both great abstraction and attention, chiefly, as their signs in the application admit of many insensible varieties, whose distinction must not be neglected. The procedure must absolutely be synthetic. One explains therefore directly in the beginning, and infers therefrom with certitude. The philosophers of this taste felicitate one another that they have learned from the geometrician the secret of thinking solidly and profoundly, and do not at all observe, that he acquires it by *composed* conceptions, but they by *solution* only, which totally alters the method of thinking.

Whereas, as soon as philosophers will condescend to take the natural way of sound reason, first to investigate that which they know of the abstract conception of an object (*exempli gratia* space or time), without yet laying any claim to the expositions; when they conclude but from these sure *data*, when in every altered application of a conception they notice whether the conception itself, notwithstanding

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its sign is the same, be not here altered: they would not perhaps have so many introspections to offer to sale, but those, which they exhibit, were of a sure value. Of the latter I shall yet adduce an example. Most philosophers mention as an instance of obscure conceptions that, which we may have in a profound sleep. *Obscure* representations are those of which one is not conscious to one's self. Now some experiences show, that we have representations in even profound sleep, and as we are not conscious to ourselves of them, they are obscure. Here the *consciousness* is of a twofold signification. One is either not conscious to one's self of a representation, that one has it, or that one had it. The former denotes the obscurity of the representation, as it is in the mind; the latter shows nothing but that one does not remember it. The above-mentioned instance gives to cognise, only that there may be representations, which one does not remember waking, but whence by no means follows, that they in sleep should not have been clear with consciousness; as in Mr. Savage's example of a person seized with a catalepsis, or in the usual actions of a noctambulo. However by concluding far too easily, without having previously given at every time the conception its meaning by attention to different cases, a probable great mystery of nature is in this case passed over negligently, namely, that perhaps in the deepest sleep the greatest habit of the soul in rational thinking may be exercised, for there is no other ground for the contrary, than that one does not remember it

on

on waking, but which ground evinces nothing

It is not yet the time, to proceed synthetically in metaphysic, only when the analysis shall have helped us to conceptions distinctly and fully understood, will the synthesis be able, as in the mathematics, to subordinate the composed cognitions to the most simple ones.

CONTEMPLATION THE THIRD.

OF THE NATURE OF METAPHYSICAL CERTAINTY.

1.

The philosophical Certainty is in general of another Nature, than the mathematical.

One is certain, so far as one cognises, that it is impossible, that a cognition is false. The degree of this certainty, when it is objectively taken, depends on what is sufficient in the criteria of the necessity of a truth, but so far as it is subjectively contemplated, it is so much the greater, as the cognition of this necessity has more intuition. In both considerations the mathematical certainty is of another species than the philosophical. This I will show in the most evident manner.

Human understanding, like every other power of nature, is tied to certain rules. One does not err, because the understanding connects the conceptions irregularly, but because one negates that mark of a thing, which one does not perceive in the thing, and judges, that that *is not*; of which one is *not conscious* to one's self in a thing. Now the mathematics, *in the first place*, attain their conceptions synthetically and may say with certainty, that what they did not intend to represent in their object by the definition, is not therein contained. For the conception of the defined springs

springs first from the definition, and has no signification any farther, than what the definition gives it. If philosophy is herewith compared, and namely metaphysic, it will be found that it is far more insecure in its expositions, when it inclines to venture on any. For the conception of what is to be expounded is given. If one notices neither the one nor the other mark, which appertains to its sufficient distinction, and judges, that to the ample conception no such mark is wanting, the definition is false and illusory. We might exhibit such errors by innumerable examples, but I refer with regard to them to what is abovementioned of contact. *Secondly*, the mathematics contemplate in their consequences and demonstrations their universal cognition under the signs in the concrete, but philosophy together with the signs in the abstract still. This constitutes a considerable difference in the mode of both, to attain certainty. For as the signs of mathematics are sensible means of cognition, it may be known with the same certainty, as one is assured of what one sees, that no conception has been neglected, that every single comparison was made according to easy rules etc. Whereby the attention is much facilitated, as it has not to consider the things in their universal representation, but the signs in their single cognition which is sensible. Whereas the words, as the signs of the philosophical cognition, assist to nothing, but the remembrance of the denoted conceptions. Their signification must always be had immediately in view. The pure intellect

lect must be kept on the stretch, and how insensibly escapes a mark of an abstracted conception, as nothing sensible can manifest to us its omission, but then different things are held the same, and erroneous cognitions are brought forth.

Here now has been shown, That the grounds, whence may be deduced that it is impossible to have erred in a certain philosophical cognition, in themselves never equal those, which are to be had in the mathematical field. But besides this, the intuition of this cognition, as to the rightness, is so much greater in the mathematics, than in philosophy; as in those the object is contemplated in sensible signs in the concrete, but in this never but in universal abstracted conceptions, whose clear impression cannot be by far so great, as the former. In geometry, where the signs have over and above a similarity with the things marked, the evidence is by consequence still greater, though in algebra the evidence is just as certain.

2.

Metaphysic is susceptible of a Certainty sufficient for Conviction.

The certainty in metaphysic is of the very same sort, as in every other philosophical cognition, as this cannot be certain, but so far as it is conformable to the universal grounds, which the former furnishes. It is known through experience, That we can by grounds of

of reason, even besides the mathematics, in many cases become fully certain to conviction. Metaphysic is but a philosophy applied to more general introspections of reason, and it cannot possibly be otherwise circumstanced.

Errours arise not only because we do not know certain things, but because we undertake to judge, though we do not yet know all that is thereto requisite. A great many deceits, nay, almost all of them collectively, have this forwardness to thank for their origin. You know a few predicates of a thing certainly. Well, bottom your conclusions upon these, and you will not err. But you will absolutely have a definition; however you are not sure, that you know all that is thereto requisite, and as, notwithstanding that, you hazard it, you fall into errours. Hence it is possible to avoid errours; when one seeks certain and distinct cognitions, without however assuming so easily a definition. Again, you can with surety infer a considerable part of a certain consequence. But do not allow yourselves to draw the conclusion on the whole consequence, how small soever the difference may seem to be. I grant, that the proof is good, in whose possession one is, to show, That the soul is not matter. But beware to infer therefrom, that the soul is not of a material nature. For by this every one understands, not only that the soul is not matter, but not such a simple substance, which can be an element of matter. This requires a particular proof, namely, that this thinking being is not, like a corporeal element, in space, by impene-

impenetrability, nor can constitute together with others an extended body and a mass, of which indeed no proof has yet been adduced, which, were it discovered, would point out the incomprehensible manner, in which a spirit is present in space.

3.

The Certainty of the first fundamental Truths in Metaphysic is of no other Species, than that in every other rational Cognition, except the Mathematics.

In our days Crusius * imagined by his philosophy to give quite another form to metaphysical cognitions, by not granting the position of contradiction the prerogative, to be the universal and chief principle of all cognition, by introducing many other immediately certain and inevincible principles and maintaining, that this rightness would be comprehended from the nature of our understanding, according to the rule: What I cannot otherwise think than true, is true. To such principles is numbered among others: What I

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* I have found it necessary here to make mention of the method of this new philosophy. It is of late become so celebrated, it has also relatively to the better enlightening of many introspections a merit so much acknowledged, that it would be a real want, where metaphysic is treated, to pass it over in silence. What I here touch, is merely the method peculiar to it, for the difference in single positions is not enough to denote an essential difference of one philosophy from another.

cannot think as existing, has never existed; every thing must be somewhere and (if I may so say) somewhen etc. I shall in a few words show the true nature of the first fundamental truths of metaphysic, as also the true form of this method of Crusius, which in this point does not swerve so much, as one may imagine, from the philosophical cast of mind. Hence may also be deduced, in general, the degree of the possible certitude of metaphysic.

All true judgments must be either affirmative or negative. As the *form* of every *affirmation* consists in something's being represented as a mark of a thing, that is, as the same with the mark of a thing, so is every affirmative judgment true, when the predicate *is identical* with the subject. And as the *form* of every *negation* consists in something's being represented as colliding with a thing, a negative judgment is true, when the predicate contradicts the subject. The position, therefore, which expresses the essence of every affirmation, and by consequence contains the chief formule of all affirmative judgments, is, To every subject belongs a predicate, which is identical with it. This is the *position of identity.* And as the position, which expresses the essence of all negation, To no subject belongs a predicate that contradicts it, is the *position of contradiction*, so is this the first formule of all negative judgments. Both together constitute the chief and universal principles, in the formal sense, of all human reason. And the most have erred in granting the position of contradiction the rank,

rank, with regard to all truths, which it has but relatively to the negative. But every position, which is immediately thought under one of these chief principles, but cannot be otherwise thought, is inevincible; namely, when either the identity or the contradiction immediately lies in the conceptions, and cannot by dissection or must not by means of an intermedial mark be perspected. All others are evincible. A body is divisible, is a demonstrable proposition, for the identity of the predicate and subject may be shown by dissection and thus mediately: a body is *composed*, but what is composed, is *divisible*, therefore a *body* is divisible. The mediating mark here is, to be *composed*. Now in philosophy there are many inevincible positions, as has been aforementioned. Indeed all these rank under the formal first principles, but immediately, so far however as they at the same time contain grounds of other cognitions, they are the first material principles of human reason. For instance, *A body is composed*, is an indemonstrable proposition, so far as the predicate as an immediate and first mark can be thought but in the conception of the body. Such material principles, says Crusius with reason, constitute the groundwork and stability of human reason. For, as aforesaid, they are the matter for definitions, and the *data*, wherefrom, though there is no definition, may be surely concluded. And in this Crusius was in the right, when he blamed other schools of philosophers, for having passed by these material principles, and adhered

hered to the formal ones merely. For from these only nothing at all can be actually proved, because positions are required, which contain the middle term, whereby the logical relation of other conceptions must be able to be cognised in a ratiocination, and among these positions some must be the first. But one can never grant any positions the value of material chief principles, when they are not evident to every human understanding. But I hold that several of those, which Crusius mentions, even allow of considerable doubt.

With regard to the chief rule of a certainty, however, which this celebrated man thinks of preposing to all cognition, and consequently the metaphysical likewise, namely, What I *cannot otherwise think than true, is true* etc. it is easy to perspect, that this position never can be a ground of the truth of any one cognition whatever. For when it is owned, that no other ground of truth can be assigned, than because it cannot possibly be otherwise holden than true, one gives to understand, that no ground of truth at all is further assignable. Now there are, it is true, many indemonstrable cognitions, but the feeling of conviction relatively to them is an avowal, but not an argument, that they are true.

Metaphysic then has no formal or material grounds of certainty, which is of another species than that of geometry. In both the formal of the judgments takes place according to the positions of agreement and contradiction. In both are indemonstrable propositions, which

which make the groundwork of concluding. Only as the definitions in the mathematics are the first indemonstrable conceptions of the things demonstrated, so must in their place different inevincible positions in metaphysic furnish the first *data*, but which may be just as sure, and which offer either the matter for expositions or the ground of sure consequences. A certainty, of which metaphysic is capable, is just as sufficient to conviction, as that of which are susceptible the mathematics, only, the latter is easier and participant of a greater intuition.

CONTEMPLATION THE FOURTH.

OF THE PERSPICUITY AND CERTAINTY, OF WHICH THE FIRST GROUNDS OF NATURAL THEOLOGY AND MORAL ARE SUSCEPTIBLE.

1.

The first Grounds of Natural Theology are susceptible of the greatest philosophical Evidence.

It is both the easiest and the clearest distinction of a thing from all other things, when this thing is an only one possible of its kind. The object of natural religion is the sole first Cause; its determinations are so circumstanced, as not to be easily permuted with those of other things. But the greatest conviction is possible, where it is absolutely necessary, that these and no other predicates belong to a thing. For in contingent determinations it is for the most part difficult to find out the variable conditions of their predicates. Hence the absolutely necessary Being is an object of that nature, that when its genuine conception is once discovered, it seems to promise more security than almost any other philosophical knowledge. In this part of the problem I can do nothing but take into consideration the possible

possible philosophical cognition of God; for it would be much too prolix, to bring to the test the doctrines of the philosophers, who have already handled this subject. The chief conception, which presents itself here to metaphysic, is, the absolutely necessary existence of a being. In order to come to that it might be first inquired, *Whether it be possible, that nothing at all exists.* When it is now perceived, that then no *existence* whatever is given, and *nothing to be thought of*, and no possibility has place, only the conception of the existence of that which must form the basis of all possibility needs be investigated. This thought will enlarge itself and establish the determinate conception of the absolutely necessary Being. But, without my engaging particularly in this plan, as soon as the existence of the only most perfect and necessary Being is cognised, the conceptions of his other determinations will become more precise, because they are the greatest and the most perfect, and much more certain, as only those, which are there necessary, can be granted. I have, for instance, to determine the conception of the divine *ubiquity* or omnipresence: I easily cognise, that that Being, on whom all others depend, independent himself, determines by his presence the *place* of all other beings in the world, *but to himself* no place among them, as he would then belong to the world with them. Therefore God is properly at no place, but he is present to all things in all *places, where the things are.* In like manner do I perspect, that, as the things of

of the world subsequent to one another are in his power, he doth not thereby determine to himself a point of time in this series, consequently, that relatively to him there is nothing either past or future. When I then say, God foresees the future, this doth not signify, God sees that which is *relatively to himself future*, but what is future to certain things in the world, that is, follows a state of it. Hence is to be cognised, that the cognition of the future, of the past, and of the present relatively to the action of the divine understanding are by no means different, but that it cognises them all as actual things of the universe; and this foreseeing may be much more precisely and more distinctly represented in God, than in a thing which pertains to the whole of the world.

In all points, therefore, where an *analogon* of contingency is not to be met with, the metaphysical cognition of God may be very certain. But the judgment on his free actions, on Providence, on the procedure of his justice and goodness, as even in the conceptions which we have of these determinations in ourselves there is yet a great deal not developed, in this science can have but a certitude by approximation, or one that is moral.

2.

The first Grounds of Moral, according to their present Quality, are not yet capable of all the requisite Evidence.

In order to render this obvious I shall point out, only how little *obligation*, even according

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to the first conception, is known, and how far distant therefore one must be from delivering in practical philosophy the perspicuity and security of the fundamental conceptions and principles necessary to evidence. One *ought* to do this or that, and forbear the other thing; this is the formule, by which every one obligation is expressed. Now every *ought* expresses a necessity of the action, and is susceptible of a twofold meaning. I *ought* to do something, (as a *mean*) when I will something else (as an *end*); or I *ought immediately to do*, and to realise, something else (as an end). The former may be denominated the necessity of means (*necessitatem problematicam*), the latter that of ends (*necessitatem legalem*). The first species of necessity indicates no obligation at all, but only the precept as the solution of a problem, what are the means I must use if I wish to attain a certain end. Whoever dictates to another what actions he must either perform or forbear, if he would promote his own happiness, he might include among them perhaps all the doctrines of moral, but then they are no longer obligations, but so, as if it were an obligation, to describe two segments of a circle, when I intend to bisect a straight line into two equal parts, that is, they are by no means obligations, but only directions for a proper conduct, when an end is designed to be accomplished. As now the use of means has no other necessity, than that which belongs to the end, so are all the actions, which moral prescribes on condition of certain ends, contingent,

tingent, and, so long as they are not subordinated to an end necessary in itself, can never be named obligations. I ought, for instance, to forward the common perfection, or I ought to act agreeably to the will of God; to whichsoever of these two positions the whole practical philosophy were subordinated, this position, if it shall be a rule and ground of obligation, must command the action as immediately necessary, and not on condition of a certain end. And here we find, that such an immediate chief rule of all obligation must be absolutely inevincible. For it is not possible to cognise and to infer from any contemplation of a thing or of a conception, whatever it be, what ought to be done, if that which is presupposed, is not an end and the action a mean. This, however, it must not be, because it would then be no formule of obligation, but of problematical address.

And now I can declare in a few words, that after long reflection on this subject I am convinced, that the rule, Do what is the most perfect possible by thee, is the first *formal ground* of all obligation *to act*, in the same manner as is the position, Forbear that, whereby perfection, the greatest possible by thee, is hindered, relatively to the duty *to forbear*. And as nothing true flows from the first formal principles of our judgments, unless material first grounds are given, so flows from these two rules of the good alone no particular determinate obligation, unless inevincible material

material principles of practical cognition are therewith conjoined.

The beginning has been first made in our days to perspect, That the faculty to represent the *true* is that of *cognition*, but that to have a sense of the *good*, *feeling*, and that they must by no means be permuted.* As there are conceptions of the good not to be dissected, that is, that which is met with in the objects of cognition contemplated apart, so there is also an insolvable feeling of the good, (this is never met with in a thing absolutely, but always relatively to a feeling being). It is the province of the understanding, to resolve and to render perspicuous the composed and implicated conception of the good, by pointing out, how it springs out of simple feelings of the good. But, if this is simple, the judgment, This is good, is fully inevincible, and an immediate effect of the consciousness of the feeling of pleasure with the representation of the object. And as many simple feelings of the good are most certainly to be found in us, there are many such like insolvable representations. Accordingly when an action is immediately represented as good, without its containing in a concealed manner a certain other good, which may be therein cognised by anatomizing, and is on that account termed perfect,

* The reader will be pleased to remember, that this Treatise was written in the year 1763, twenty years at least before Kant's great works, namely, THE CRITIC OF PURE REASON, THE CRITIC OF PRACTICAL REASON, and THE CRITIC OF JUDGEMENT etc. which contain his systematical writings, and deeper introspections.

perfect, the necessity of this action is an inevincible material principle of obligation. For example, Love him who loves thee, is a practical position, which indeed ranks under the chief formal and affirmative rule of obligation, but immediately. For as it cannot be further shown by dissection why a peculiar perfection lies in mutual love, so this rule is not proved practically, that is, by means of reducing to the necessity of another perfect action, but immediately subsumpted under the universal rule of good actions. Perhaps my adduced example does not exhibit the matter distinctly and convincingly enough; but the limits of a treatise, like the present, which in all probability I have already exceeded, permit me not that completeness, which I could have wished. There is an immediate deformity in the action, which collides with the will of Him, from whom our existence and all good proceed. This deformity is clear, though the disadvantages, which may accompany as consequences, of such a procedure, are not considered. Hence the position, Do what is agreeable to the will of God, is a material principle of moral, which nevertheless ranks formally under the aforementioned chief and universal formule, but immediately. One must not either in the practical philosophy, or in the theoretical, so easily hold something, which it is not, inevincible. However these principles, which contain as postulates the groundworks to the other practical positions, are indispensable. Hutcheson and others have delivered, under the name of moral sentiment

or

or feeling, a beginning to beautiful observations.*

From this may be perceived, that, though it must be possible to attain the greatest degree of philosophical evidence in the first grounds of morality, the chief fundamental conceptions of obligation must first be more securely determined, in regard of which the want of the practical philosophy is still greater than that of the theoretical, as it must yet be first of all made out, whether the cognoscitive faculty merely or feeling (the first internal ground of the appetitive faculty) determine the first principles thereof.**

These are the thoughts, which I submit to the judgment of the Royal Academy of Sciences. I presume to hope, that the grounds here propounded are of some consequence to the desired elucidation of the object.

* But which Kant some years afterwards beautifully confuted. It is interesting to observe the progress of the human understanding, which is fully displayed by comparing this little Treatise with Kant's subsequent doctrines.

** Kant has since determined these in the most masterly and satisfactory manner.

WHAT MEANS,

TO ORIENT ONE'S SELF IN THINKING?

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Let us employ our conceptions ever so sublimely, and thereby abstract ever so much from the sensitive faculty, yet there still adheres to them *typical* representations, whose proper destination it is, to make them, which are not derived from experience, fit for the *use of experience.* For how could we procure signification to our conceptions, were they not built upon some one intuition or other (which at last must always be an example from some one possible experience)? When we afterwards leave out from this concrete act of the understanding the mixture of the type, first of the contingent perception by sense, then even the pure sensitive intuition in general; that pure conception of understanding, whose compass is now extended, and contains a rule of thinking in general, remains. In like manner is the universal logic itself brought to pass; and many *heuristic* methods of thinking lie perhaps still concealed in the experience-use of our understanding and of reason, which methods, if we understood to draw them carefully from that experience, might enrich philosophy, even in abstract cogitation, with many useful maxims.

Of this nature is the principle, which the late Mendelssohn expressly professed, as far as I know, but in his last writings (the Morning-hours, page 165—66, and the Letter to Lessing's Friends p. 38 and 67); namely, the maxim of necessity, in the speculative use of reason (to which with regard to the cognition of supersensible objects he trusted so much, even to the evidence of demonstration) to *orient* himself by a certain mean of guidance, which he sometimes termed *common sense* (Morning-hours), sometimes *sound reason*, and sometimes *sound understanding* (to Lessing's Friends). Who had thought, that this acknowledgment of the potency of the *speculative* use of reason would have been so pernicious in matters of theology (which in fact was inevitable); but even the common sound reason, on account of the ambiguity, in which he left the exercise of this faculty in contradistinction to speculation, would be in danger of serving as a principle of fanaticism and of the total dethroning of reason? And yet this happened in the dispute between Mendelssohn and Jacobi, chiefly by the by no means insignificant conclusions of the acute author of the *Results*;* however I will not impute to either the intention of introducing a cast of mind so pernicious, but rather consider the under-

* Jacobi's Letters on the Doctrine of Spinoza. Breslau 1785. — Jacobi against Mendelssohn's Accusation, concerning the Letters on the D. of S. Leipzig 1786. — The Results of the Jacobian and Mendelssohnean Philosophy critically investigated by a Volunteer. Leipzig, 1786.

undertaking of the latter as an *argumentum ad hominem*, which one is entitled to use as a mere defence, in order to profit by the adversary's weaknesses to his disadvantage. On the other hand I shall show, That in fact it is reason *merely*, not a pretended secret sense of truth, no transcendent intuition under the name of belief, upon which tradition or revelation may, without the consent of reason, be grafted, but, as Mendelssohn maintained steadfastly and with a just zeal, merely the proper pure human reason, whereby he found necessary, and recommended to orient one's self; though the great pretension of the speculative use of it, and chiefly its sole commanding authority (by demonstration), must be dropped, and, so far as it is speculative, nothing further left it, than the business of purifying the common conception of reason from contradictions and the defence against its own sophistical attacks on the maxims of sound reason. — The extended and more precisely determined conception of *self-orienting* may assist us to exhibit distinctly the maxims of sound reason in their elaborations for the cognition of supersensible objects.

To orient one's self, in the proper sense of the expression, is, From a given point (into four of which we divide the horizon) to find the other points, or the *orient* or east. If I see the sun, and know that it is at present twelve o'clock, I know how to find all the cardinal points, south, west, north and east. But for this purpose I absolutely require the feeling of a difference in my own subject, to wit, the

 right

right and left hand. I name it a feeling; because these two sides show no sensible difference externally in the intuition. Without this faculty, in the describing of a circle, I could not know, without needing in it some one difference of the objects, to distinguish the motion from the left to the right from that in the opposite direction, and thereby to determine *à priori* a difference in the situation of objects, nor whether I should put west to the right or to the left of the south point of the horizon, and so complete the circle through north and west to south again. I therefore orient myself *geographically* in all objective *data* in the heavens but by a *subjective* ground of distinction; and, if one day by a miracle all the constellations were altered in their direction, so that what was formerly eastern became western, though they preserved the same figure and the very same situation towards one another, no human eye would the next starlight evening remark the smallest alteration, and even the astronomer, if he attended to that merely, which he sees and not at the same time to what he *feels*, would unavoidably *disorient* himself. But the faculty of distinguishing by the feeling of the right and of the left hand, which is indeed bestowed by nature, but become familiar by frequent exercise, comes very naturally to his assistance; and he will, when he fixes the polestar, not only remark the alteration which has happened, but that notwithstanding, be able to orient himself. I may now extend this geographical conception of the procedure of orienting one's self,

self, and understand by it, To orient one's self in a given space in general, therefore merely *mathematically*. In the dark I orient myself in a room which I know, when I can lay hold of but one single object, whose place I remember. But here it is evident that nothing assists me but the faculty of determining the situations according to a *subjective* ground of distinction: for I do not at all see the objects, whose place I must find; and, if any one for the sake of a joke should place on the left side of a room all the objects which were before on the right, though in the same order among themselves, I, were the walls all alike, would not know what to make of the room. But I quickly orient myself by the mere feeling of a difference of my two sides, the right and the left. The same happens at night when I must walk and turn properly in dark streets, which I know, but in which I can distinguish no house. Finally I may extend this conception still more, where it would then consist in the faculty of orienting one's self, not merely in space, that is, mathematically, but in *thinking* in general, that is, *logically*. It may be easily devined, according to analogy, that this will be an affair of pure reason to direct its use, if it, setting out from known objects (of experience), is to extend itself beyond all bounds of experience, and finds no object of intuition at all, but merely space for it; as it is then no longer able, according to objective grounds of cognition, but merely according to a subjective ground of distinction, in the determination of its own faculty of judging,

ing, to bring its judgments under a precise maxim.* This subjective mean, which then remains, is nothing but the feeling of the proper *want* of reason. One may remain secure from all errour, when one does not undertake to judge, where one knows not so much, as is requisite to a determining judgment. Thus ignorance in itself is the cause of the limits, but not of the errors in our cognition. But, where it is not so arbitrable, whether one shall judge determinately or not on something, where an actual *want* and even such a one, as adheres to reason itself, renders judging necessary; and yet want of knowledge in regard to the points requisite to the judgment limits us; a maxim is necessary, according to which we pass our judgment; for reason will be satisfied. When it is then previously made out, that here there can be no intuition of the object, not even something homogenal with it, by which we could exhibit the object suitably to our extended conceptions, and thus secure them their real possibility; nothing farther is left for us to do, than, First *to prove* well the conception, with which we have a mind to venture beyond all possible experience, whether it be free from contradictions; and then to bring the *relation* of the object at least to the objects of experience under pure conceptions of understanding, whereby

* *To orient* one's self in thinking in general, is then, When the objective principles of reason are insufficient, to determine one's self in the holding-true according to a subjective principle of it.

whereby we do not at all render it sensible, but yet conceive of something supersensible, suitable at least to the experience-use of our reason: for without this precaution we could make no use whatever of such a conception, but instead of thinking extravagate.

However by the mere conception there is nothing yet effectuated with regard to the existence of this object and to the actual connection of it with the world (the complex of all objects of possible experience). But the *right of the want* of reason, as a subjective ground of presupposing and assuming something, which it dares not pretend to know by objective grounds, presents itself now; and consequently *to orient* itself in thinking, in the immense space of the supersensible that is filled for us with dark night, merely by its own want.

Many supersensible things may be conceived (for objects of the senses do not fill up the whole field of all possibility), where reason however feels no want to extend itself to them, and still less to suppose their existence. Reason finds employment enough with the causes in the world, which manifest themselves to the senses, (or at least are of the same sort, as those which manifest themselves to them),, not to stand in need, in their behalf, of the influence of pure spiritual beings of nature; whose supposition would rather be detrimental to its use. For, as we know nothing of the laws, according to which such beings may act, but of those, namely, the objects of the senses, we know, at least

we may hope to discover still, a great deal; the use of reason would rather be injured by such a presupposition. It is therefore by no means a want, it is rather mere curiosity, which tends to nothing but reveries, to search after them, or to play with such phantoms. The conception of a *first Being*, as supreme intelligence and at the same time as the chief good, is of a totally different nature. For not only, that our reason feels a want to lay as a foundation the *conception* of the unlimited to the conception of all that is limited, therefore of all other things;* but this want extends to the presupposition

* As reason requires to the possibility of all things to presuppose reality as given, and considers the difference of things by negations adhering to them but as limits; it finds itself necessitated to lay down originally as a foundation one single possibility, namely, that of the unlimited Being, but to consider all others as derived. As the thorough possibility of every one thing must absolutely be met with in the whole of all existence, at least the principle of the thorough determination renders possible the distinction of the possible from the actual of our reason but in such a way; so we find a subjective ground of necessity, that is, a want of our reason itself, to bottom all possibility upon the existence of a most real (supreme) Being. Thus arises the Cartesian proof of the existence of *God*, subjective grounds of presupposing something for the use of reason (which at bottom always remains but a use of experience) being holden objective ones, consequently want for insight. So is it circumstanced with this, and so are circumstanced all the proofs of the worthy Mendelssohn in his Morning-hours. They yield nothing for the behoof of a demonstration. But they are on that account by no means useless. For not to mention, the fine occasion which these extremely ingenious developements of the subjective conditions of the use of our reason give to the complete cognition of this our faculty; for the behoof of which they are permanent examples: thus is the holding-true from subjective grounds of the use of reason, when objective ones are wanting to us and we are nevertheless necessitated to judge, always of the greatest importance; only, we must not give out what is but extorted *presupposition, as free introspection*, in order not to lay ourselves

presupposition of its *existence*, without which it can give itself no satisfactory ground at all of the contingency of the existence of the things in the world, but least of all of the conformity-to-end and order, which is everywhere to be met with in a degree so admirable (in the small, because it is near us, still more, than in the great). Without assuming an intelligent Author, there cannot, without falling into mere absurdities, be assigned the *smallest intelligible* ground of those; and, though we cannot *evince* the impossibility of such a conformity-to-end without a *first intelligent Cause*, (for then we had had sufficient objective grounds of this assertion, and not required to appeal to the subjective one's); notwithstanding this want of insight, a sufficient subjective ground of supposition of it remains, namely, that reason *requires*, To presuppose something, that is intelligible to it, in order to explain by it this given phenomenon, as every thing else, with which it can combine but a conception, doth not supply this want.

But

selves open without necessity to the opponent, with whom we have engaged in *dogmatising*, who may use our weakness to our disadvantage. Mendelssohn certainly did not think, that *dogmatising* with pure reason in the field of the supersensible is the direct way to philosophical fanaticism, and that nothing but a critic of this faculty of reason can cure this evil radically. Indeed the discipline of the scholastic method (that of Wolf, for example, which he therefore recommended), where all the conceptions must be determined and every step justified by principles, may stop this mischief for a time; but by no means, withold it entirely. For with what right will one hinder reason, which, according to his own acknowledgment, has succeeded so well in that field, from going still further in the same? and where is then the boundary, where it must stop?

But the want of reason may be considered as twofold; *first*, in its *theoretical* use, and *secondly*, in its *practical*. The first want I have just mentioned; but it is obvious that it is but conditional, that is, we must assume the existence of God, if we *would judge* of the first causes of all that is contingent, chiefly in the order of the ends actually placed in the world. Far more important is the want of reason in its practical use, because it is unconditional, and we are then necessitated to pr suppose the existence of God, not only if we *would* judge, but because *we must judge*. For the pure practical use of reason consists in the precept of the moral laws. But they all lead to the idea of the *chief good*, that is possible in the world, so far as it is possible by *liberty* only, *Morality*; on the other side, to that, which does not concern human liberty merely, but nature, namely, the greatest *felicity*, so far as it is distributed in proportion to the first. Reason now requires to suppose such a *dependent* chief good, and for the behoof of it a supreme Intelligence, a chief *independent* good; not indeed to deduce from him the commanding authority of the moral laws, or the spring to their observance, (for they would have no moral value, if their motive were derived from any thing, but from the law only, which is of itself apodictically certain); but only, in order to give objectivereality to the conception of the chief good, that is, to hinder it together with all morality from being held a mere ideal, if that, whose idea

idea inseparably accompanies morality, existed nowhere.

It was therefore not *cognition*, but a felt* *want* of reason, by which Mendelssohn oriented himself (without his knowledge) in speculative cogitation. And, as this mean of guidance is not an objective principle of reason, a principle of introspections, but a merely subjective one (that is, a maxim) of the use allowed it by its limits only, a consequent of the want, and constitutes *of itself* only the whole determinative of our judgment on the existence of the supreme Being, of which it is but a casual use, to orient one's self in the speculative essays on the same object; so he no doubt failed in confiding so much in the faculty of this speculation, to effectuate every thing of itself only by the way of demonstration. The necessity of the former mean could have place but when the insufficiency of the latter was fully acknowledged: an acknowledgment, to which his acuteness would at last have brought him, if together with a longer life had been granted him the phansy of mind more peculiar to juvenile years, to alter easily an old familiar cast of mind according to the alteration of the state of the sciences. However the merit remains to him of maintaining, that the last touchstone of the admissibleness

* Reason feels not; it perspects its deficiency, and operates by the instinct of cognition the feeling of the want. It is with this as with the moral feeling, which occasions no moral law; for this arises entirely from reason; but it is occasioned or operated by moral laws, therefore by reason, as the moved and yet free will requires determinate grounds.

ness of a judgment here, as well as elsewhere, is nowhere to be sought, but in reason only, whether it be guided in the choice of its positions by insight or mere want and the maxim of its own profitableness. He denominated reason in its latter use the common reason of man; for this has always its own interest first in view, but one must have wandered from the natural track, to forget that, and idly to explore conceptions in an objective view, in order to enlarge one's knowledge merely, whether it be necessary or not.

But as the expression, *Decision of sound reason*, in the question on the carpet is still ambiguous, and may be taken, either, as Mendelssohn himself misunderstood it, to be a judgment from *insight of reason*, or, as the author of the Results seems to take it, a judgment from *inspiration of reason;* it will be necessary to distinguish this source of judgment by another denomination, and none is more apposite to it, than that of *a belief of reason*. Every belief, even the historical, must be rational (for the last test of truth is always reason); but a belief of reason is that which is built upon no other *data*, than what are comprised in pure reason. Belief is however a subjectively sufficient holding-true, but objectively with *consciousness* an insufficient one: it is therefore opposed to knowing (*scire*). On the other hand, when something from objective, though with consciousness insufficient, grounds is holden-true, consequently *opined* merely; this *opining* may nevertheless by a gradual completion in the same sort of grounds finally

finally become a *knowing*. Whereas when the grounds of holding-true, according to their species, are not at all objectively valid, the belief can never become a knowing by any use of reason. The historical belief, *exempli gratia*, of the death of a great man, of which several letters give notice, *may become a knowing*, when the magistrate of the place makes mention of it, of his burial, testament etc. Hence it is perfectly consistent, that something historical is held-true from testimony merely, that is, believed, for instance, that there is a city named Rome: and yet he, who never was there, may say, *I know*, and not merely, *I believe*, there exists a Rome. On the other hand, the *pure belief of reason* can never be transformed into a *knowing* by all the natural *data* of reason and of experience, because here the ground of holding-true is subjective merely, namely, a necessary want of reason, (and, as long as we are men, will ever remain) *only to presuppose* the existence of a supreme Being, but not to demonstrate. This want of reason for its *theoretical* use satisfying itself would be nothing else than a pure *hypothesis of reason*, that is, an opinion, that were sufficient to holding-true from subjective grounds; because another ground can never be expected to *explain* given *effects*, and yet reason stands in need of a ground of explanation. Whereas the *belief of reason*, which rests upon the want of its use in a *practical* view, may be named a *postulate* of reason; not as if it were an insight, which satisfied to a certainty every logical demand, but because this

this holding-true (when in man all is but morally well-disposed) according to the degree is inferior to no knowing,* though according to the species it is totally distinct from it.

A pure belief of reason is therefore the way-mark or the compass by which the speculative thinker may orient himself in his excursions of reason in the field of supersensible objects, but it can point out to the man of common yet (morally) sound reason his way, in a theoretical as well as a practical view, fully suitable to the whole end of his destination; and it is this belief of reason, which must form the basis of every other belief, nay, every revelation.

The belief in God, and even the conviction of his existence, can be met with in reason only, can arise but from it, and can be first awaked in us, neither by inspiration, nor by an account given, however great the authority may be. Should an immediate intuition happen to me of such a sort, as nature, as far as I know it, cannot at all yield; a conception of God must however serve as a rule to judge whether this phænomenon agree with all that which is requisite to characterise a divinity. I by no means introspect, how it is possible, that

* To the *firmness* of belief belongs the consciousness of its *immutability*. Now I may be fully certain that nobody can refute the position, THERE IS A GOD; for whence will he take this insight? Therefore the belief of reason is not of the same nature with the historical belief, in which it is still possible that proofs to the contrary may be found, and where it must always be in our power to alter our opinion, if our knowledge of things should enlarge itself.

that any one phenomenon should, even but according to the quality, exhibit that, which can be cogitated only, but never intuited; yet so much at least is clear that, in order but to judge whether that, which appears to me, which acts internally or externally on my feeling, be God, I must compare it with my idea of God and prove it accordingly, not whether it be adequate to this, but merely whether it be not inconsistent with it. In the same manner, if in all, whereby he discovered himself immediately to me, nothing repugnant to that conception were to be met with; yet this phenomenon, intuition, immediate revelation, or however such an exhibition may be named, can never evince the existence of a Being, whose conception (if it shall not be insecurely determined, and thereby subjected to the mixture of every possible fancy) requires *infinity* as to greatness for the distinction from all creatures, but to which conception no experience or intuition whatever can be adequate, consequently can never prove unambiguously the existence of such a Being. Nobody can therefore be *first convinced* of the existence of the supreme Being by any one intuition; the belief of reason must precede, and then perhaps certain phenomena or discoveries may give occasion to investigate, whether we are entitled to hold a divinity what either speaks to us, or presents itself to our view, and, according to circumstances, to confirm that belief,

If then the right to speak *first* belonging to reason in matters, which concern super-

sensible objects, as the existence of God and the world to come, be impugned; a wide gate is opened to all sorts of fanaticism, superstition, nay, even atheism. And yet every thing in the dispute between Jacobi and Mendelssohn seems to aim at this overthrow, I do not well know, whether merely the *insight of reason*, and of *knowing* (by opiniative strength in speculation), or even of the *belief of reason*, and on the contrary aims at the establishment of another belief, which every one may form at pleasure. One would almost conclude the latter, when he sees display'd Spinoza's conception of God, as the only one harmonizing with all principles of reason,* and yet rejectable

* It is not to be comprehended how these men of letters could find aid to Spinozism in the *Critic of pure Reason*. The Critic entirely clips the wings of dogmatism with regard to the cognition of supersensible objects, and Spinozism is in this so dogmatical that it vies with the mathematician even in respect of the strictness of demonstration. The Critic proves, That the table of the pure conceptions of understanding must contain all the materials of pure thinking; Spinozism speaks of thoughts, which think themselves even, and also of an accident, which at the same time exists of itself as subject: a conception, which is not at all to be found in the human understanding and is not possible to be framed by it. The Critic shows, that it by no means suffices for maintaining the possibility of a being conceived by one's self, that there is nothing contradictory in its conception (though it is then by all means allowed in case of necessity to suppose this possibility); but Spinozism pretends to perspect the impossibility of a being, whose idea consists of only pure conceptions of understanding, from which are separated all the conditions of the sensitive faculty, and wherein a contradiction can never be met with, and is not able to support this boundless pretension by any thing. For this very reason does Spinozism lead directly to fanaticism. Whereas there is no sure mean of extirpating all fanaticism, but that determination of the bounds of the faculty of pure reason. — In like manner another man of letters finds in the

rejectable. For though it is perfectly consonant to reason to grant, That speculative reason is not able to perspect the possibility even of a Being, such as we must conceive God; it cannot be consistent with any belief or with any holding-true of an existence, that reason can perspect the very *impossibility* of an object, and yet cognise from other sources its actuality.

Men of abilities and of enlarged sentiments! I honour your talents and love your feeling for humanity. But have ye well reflected on what ye are doing, and on what may be the tendency of your attacks on reason. No doubt ye are willing that the *liberty of thinking* shall be maintained unvexed; for without this there were soon an end of your free soarings of genius. Let us see what must naturally be the consequence of this liberty of thought, if such a procedure, as ye are beginning, should prevail.

The liberty of thinking is *first* opposed to the *civil coaction.* It is said, The liberty of *speaking*, or of *writing*, may indeed be taken from us by the chief power, but the

 liberty

the Critic of pure Reason a *Scepticism*; though the very design of that work is, to establish something certain and determinate *a priori* with regard to the compass of our cognition. As also a *dialectic* in the critical investigations; which is however employed in resolving and destroying for ever the unavoidable *dialectic*, with which pure reason exercised every-where dogmatically entangles and insnares itself. The new Platonists, who named themselves *Eclectics*, because they know how to find their own chimeras every-where in older authors, when they had previously imputed such to them, proceeded directly in the same manner; thus nothing new happens under the sun.

liberty of *thinking*, by no means. But, how much and with what justness would we think, if we did not think in a manner, in a community with others, to whom we communicate our thoughts, and who communicate theirs to us! Therefore it may well be said, that that external power, which robs men of the liberty of *communicating* their thoughts publicly, deprives them likewise of the liberty of *thinking*, the only jewel that, notwithstanding all the civil burdens, remains to us, and by which only counsel can be procured against all the evils of this situation.

Secondly, the liberty of thinking is taken in the signification too, that the *coaction of conscience* is opposed to it; where without any external power citizens in matters of religion set themselves up as guardians of others, and, instead of arguments, know, by means of prescribed formules of faith accompanied with anxious fear *of the danger of a proper investigation*, to banish by an early impression on the minds every trial of reason.

Thirdly, liberty in thinking signifies also the subjection of reason to no other laws, than *those it gives itself;* and its opposite is the maxim of a *lawless use* of reason (in order thereby, as genius fancies, to see farther, than under the restriction by laws). The consequence of which is naturally this, that, if reason will not be subjected to the law, which it gives itself, it must bend under the yoke of laws, which another gives it; for without some one law or other, nothing at all, not even the greatest nonsense, can play its part long.

Therefore

ing (an exemption from the limitations by reason) is this, That liberty of thinking is thereby lost at last, and, as it is not the fault of misfortune, but of true presumptuousness, in the proper sense of the word, *trifled away*.

The course of things is pretty nearly this: In the first place *genius*, as it has run out the clew by which it formerly directed reason, is very much pleased with its daring soar. It soon bewitches others by decisions of authority and great expectations, and seems now to have placed itself upon a throne, which slow unwieldy reason graced so ill; though it always continues to speak the language of reason. The then adopted maxim of the invalidity of a chief legislative reason we denominate, common FANATICISM of men; but the minions of bountiful nature, *illumines*. As however a confusion of tongues must soon happen even among these, since every one, as reason only can command with validity for everybody, follows at present his own inspiration; so there must arise at last from internal inspirations by testimonies of facts externally proved, from traditions, which were chosen in the beginning by one's self, in process of time *obtruded* records, in a word, the total subjection of reason to *facts*, that is, SUPERSTITION, because this may be reduced to a *legal form* at least and thereby to a state of rest.

But as human reason still aspires to liberty; its first use, of a long disaccustomed liberty, when it once breaks the fetters, must degene-

rate into abuse and audacious confidence in the independence of its faculty on all limitation, in a persuasion of the sole dominion of speculative reason, which supposes nothing, but what can be justified by *objective* grounds and dogmatical conviction, but boldly denies every thing else. The maxim of the independence of reason on its *own want* (renunciation of the belief of reason) is named UNBELIEF: not a historical unbelief; for one cannot at all conceive it as designed, therefore not as capable of imputation (because every one must believe, just as much as a mathematical demonstration, a fact that is sufficiently verified); but an *unbelief of reason*, a dangerous state of the human mind, which first deprives the moral laws of all the power of *springs* on the heart, and in process of time, even devests them of every authority, and gives occasion to the cast of mind, which is termed FREE-THINKING, that is, the principle, To acknowledge no duty whatever. Here now the magistrate interferes; in order that civil affairs may not fall into the greatest disorder; and, as the promptest and yet most energetic mean is directly the best for him, he totally annuls the liberty of thinking, and subjects it, like other trades, to the laws of the land. And thus *liberty in thinking*, when it is resolved to proceed independently on laws of reason, ultimately destroys itself.

Friends of the human species and of that which is the most sacred to it! Assume what appears to you the worthiest of belief after the most careful and most sincere trial, whether it

it be facts, or whether it be grounds of reason; but do not dispute reason out of that, which it makes the chief good on earth, namely, the prerogative of being the last test of truth.* Else ye will be unworthy of this liberty, will certainly lose it too, and besides, will bring this misfortune on the innocent part of mankind, who had otherwise been well-minded enough to use their liberty *legally*, and thereby conformably to the end of the public good!

* *Thinking for one's self* is to seek the chief touchstone of truth in one's self (*id est*, in one's own reason); and the maxim, to think for one's self at all times, is ENLIGHTENING. Thereto belongs not just so much, as those may imagine who take *knowledge* to be enlightening; as it is rather a negative principle in the use of one's cognoscitive faculty, and he, who is very rich in knowledge, is often the least enlightened in the use of it. To exercise one's own reason, means nothing more, than, relatively to every thing which one is to suppose, to question one's self, Whether it be feasable to constitute a universal principle of the use of one's reason the ground, why one supposes something, or also the rule, that follows from that, which one supposes? Every one may make this trial with himself; and immediately on this proof he will see superstition and fanaticism disappear, though he has by no means the knowledge to refute either of them from objective grounds. For he uses the maxim of the self-maintenance of reason merely. To found enlightening in *single subjects* by education is therefore very easy; one has nothing to do, but to begin early to accustom young understandings to this reflection. But to enlighten an *age*, is very wearisome; for there are many external hinderances, which partly interdict and partly render more difficult that mode of education.

AN IDEA

OF AN

UNIVERSAL HISTORY

IN A

COSMOPOLITICAL VIEW.

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Whatever be the conception of the *liberty of the will*, which one forms in a metaphysical view; its *phænomena*, human actions, are determined, just as well as every other event natural, according to universal laws of nature. It is to be hoped that the history, which is occupied about the narrative of these phenomena, however deeply concealed their causes may be, when it contemplates the play of the liberty of the human will *in the main*, will discover a regular course of it; and in such a manner, that that, which is obviously implicated and irregular in single subjects, will be cognised in the whole species as a continually progressive, though slow, unfolding of its original predispositions. Thus marriages, and the births and deaths arising from them,

* A passage among the short notices of the twelfth number of the *Literary Gazette of Gotha* of this year (1784) which was no doubt taken from my conversation with a man of science, on his travels, extorted from me this exposition, without which that passage would have no meaning possible to be comprehended.

them, seem, as the free will of men has so great an influence on them, to be subjected to no rule, according to which their number can be previously determined by reckoning; and yet the yearly tables of them in great nations evince, that they happen just as much according to constant laws of nature, as the so inconstant rains, whose happening cannot be previously determined singly, but which on the whole do not fail to maintain the growth of plants, the run of rivers, and other dispositions of nature in a uniform uninterrupted course. Individuals and even whole nations little think, that, while they, every one to his own mind and the one often contrary to the other, prosecute their own purposes, they go on unobserved, as if guided by a clew, in the design of nature that is even unknown to them, and labour at its furtherance, which design, were it known, would signify very little to them.

As men, on the whole, do not proceed in their pursuits conformably to instinct merely, like animals, and yet not according to a concerted plan, like rational citizens of the world; it seems that no history of them agreeable to a plan (as of the bees and beavers) is possible. One cannot forbear a certain indignation at seeing their actions represented on the great theatre of the world; and, notwithstanding the wisdom of individuals appearing now and then, at finding at last every thing in the gross composed of madness, of childish vanity, and frequently of childish wickedness and the rage of destruction: so that one is finally at a loss

what

what sort of a conception one ought to form of our species, so conceited of its preference. There is here no expedient for the philosopher, but, as he cannot at all presuppose in men and in their actions, in gross, any rational proper *design*, that of endeavouring to discover a *design of nature* in this nonsensical course of human affairs; from which a history of creatures, who proceed without a proper plan, is nevertheless possible according to a determinate plan of nature. — Let us see whether we shall succeed in finding a clue to such a history; and we shall then leave it to nature, to produce the man, who is able to compose it afterwards. She thus produced a KEPPLER, who subjected in an unexpected manner to precise laws the eccentric orbs of the planets; and a NEWTON, who explained these laws from an universal natural cause.

POSITION THE FIRST.

All the natural predispositions of a creature are destined, one time or other, to be developed completely and conformably-to-end. This is confirmed in all animals, as well by the external, as by the internal or dissecting, observation. An organ, that shall not be used, an arrangement, which does not attain its end, is a contradiction in the teleological Natural Philosophy. For, if we depart from that principle, we have no longer a nature acting legally, but a nature acting to no end: and comfortless chance steps into the place of the clew of reason.

POSITION

POSITION THE SECOND.

In man (as the only rational creature upon earth) those predispositions of nature, which tend to the use of his reason, must be completely developed in the species only, but not in the individual. Reason in a creature is a faculty, to extend both the rules and the designs of the use of all its powers far beyond the instinct of nature, and knows no bounds to its projects. It acts itself however not conformably to instinct, but requires essays, exercise and instruction, in order to proceed by little and little from one degree of insight to another. Hence a man would need to live to an extreme old age, to learn how he ought to make a complete use of all his natural predispositions; or, if nature has made his lifetime but short (as is actually the case), she requires perhaps an infinite series of generations, of which the one hands down their enlightening to the other, in order to force at last its germe in our species to that degree of developement, which is completely suitable to her design. And this point of time must, in idea at least, be the aim of his exertions, as otherwise the predispositions of nature must for the most part be considered as in vain or to no end; which would annul all practical principles, and thereby render nature, whose wisdom must serve for a principle in the judgment of all other dispositions, suspected in man as nothing but a childish play.

POSITION THE THIRD.

Nature has willed, that man shall unfold out of himself entirely every thing that surpasses the mechanical order of his animal existence, and partake no other felicity, or perfection, than what he has procured for himself, free from instinct, by his own reason. Nature does nothing superfluously, and is not lavish in the use of means to their ends. As she gave man reason and liberty of the will built thereupon; that was a clear proof of her design with regard to his establishment. He must not be guided by instinct, or provided with and instructed by knowledge communicated by the creation; he must rather develope every thing out of himself. The discovery of his food, of his clothing, of his external security and defence (to which she gave him neither the horns of the bull, nor the paws of the lion, nor the teeth of the dog, but merely hands), all the pleasures that can render life agreeable, his very insight and prudence, and even the good quality of his will, must be his own work entirely. She seems here in her greatest parsimony to have pleased herself, and to have measured her animal establishment so frugally, so exactly to the greatest want of an inceptive existence, as if she had a mind, That man, if he once raised himself by his own exertions from the greatest rudeness to the greatest address, internal perfection of the cast of mind, and thereby to felicity (as much as it is possible upon earth), should have the sole merit of it, and to thank himself only; as if she had disposed of every thing,

thing, more with a view to his rational *self-estimation*, than to a wellbeing. For in this course of human affairs there is a host of troubles and difficulties ready to assail mankind. But it seems not to have been the aim of nature, that he should live well; but, that he should exert himself to the utmost of his powers, in order by his conduct to render himself worthy of life and of wellbeing. It always remains amazing, that the earlier generations seem to execute their toilsome business but on account of the later, in order, as it were, to prepare a scaffold, by which these may still raise the building, to which nature has given the plan; and that, only the latest generations will have the good fortune to inhabit the edifice, at which a long series of their progenitors have laboured (though not intentionally), without being able to participate the good fortune, which they prepared. But, this enigma notwithstanding, it is at the same time necessary, when once it is supposed, that a species of animals shall have reason, and, as a class of rational beings, who all die, but whose species is immortal, attain a completness of the unfolding of their predispositions.

POSITION THE FOURTH.

The mean, which nature uses to bring about the developement of all her predispositions, is their antagonism in society, so far as it is at last the cause of a legal order. I here understand by antagonism the unsociable *sociableness* of

of men; that is, their propensity to enter into society, which is however combined with a thorough resistence, that constantly threatens to dissolve this society. The predisposition to this manifestly lies in human nature. Man has an inclination to associate with his fellow creatures; because he feels himself in such a state more than a man, that is, he feels the developement of his predispositions of nature. But he has a great propension also to dissociate (or isolate) himself; because he finds in himself at the same time the unsociable property, to wish to direct every thing according to his own mind, and, as he knows that he is inclined on his part to resistance against others, expects every-where resistance. It is this resistance, which awakens all the powers of man, makes him overcome his propensity to laziness, and, stimulated by either ambition, thirst after governing, or avarice, to procure himself a rank among his fellows, whom he can neither abide, nor quit. There are now taken the first true steps from rudeness to culture which properly consists in the social value of man; there is every talent unfolded by degrees, taste formed, and even by continued enlightening the beginning made to a foundation of a cast of mind, which in time may transform the coarse predisposition of nature to moral distinction into determinate practical principles and so a *pathologically* exacted agreement to a society, ultimately into a *moral* whole. Without those, in themselves indeed not just amicable, properties of unsociableness, from which arises

the resistance that every one must necessarily meet with in his selfish pretensions, all talents would, in an arcadian shepherd's life, in perfect concord, contentment and mutual love, remain for ever concealed in their germes: men, good like the flocks they tend, would scarcely procure to their existence a greater value, than have these their household animals; they, as rational nature, would not fill the void of the creation with regard to their end. Thanks be to nature for the incompatibility, for the envious emulating vanity, for the insatiable appetite to acquire, or even to rule! Without them, all the excellent natural predispositions in mankind would slumber to all eternity without being developed. Man wills concord; but nature knows better what is good for his species: she wills discord. He wills to live commodiously and contentedly; but nature wills that he shall quit the state of laziness and of inactive contentment, plunge himself into labour and difficulties, in order to find out means to extricate himself out of them with dexterity. The natural springs thereto, the sources of unsociableness and of thorough resistance, from which so many evils arise, but which incite to a new exertion of the powers, consequently to a greater unfolding of the predispositions of nature, sufficiently betray the direction of a wise Creator; and not the hand of a wicked spirit, who has either bungled in his glorious arrangement, or enviously spoiled it.

POSITION THE FIFTH.

The greatest problem for the human species, to the solution of which nature compels it, is the establishment of a universal civil society administering law. As but in society, and indeed in that which has the greatest liberty, therefore a thorough antagonism of its members, and yet the exactest determination and security of the bounds of this liberty, in order that it may be consistent with the liberty of others,—as but in society can be accomplished the chief design of nature in humanity, namely, the developement of all her predispositions, she wills that men shall procure this themselves, as well as all the ends of their destination; so must a society, in which is met with *liberty under external laws* in the greatest possible degree conjoined with irresistible power, that is, a perfectly *just civil constitution*, be the highest problem of nature, for the human species; because nature, only by means of its solution and the founding of that, can accomplish her other designs with our species. To enter into this state of coaction necessity compels men, otherwise so much captivated with licentious liberty; and indeed the greatest necessity of any, namely, that which men occasion to themselves, whose inclinations cause that they cannot exist long beside one another in a state of savage liberty. But in such an enclosure, as is a civil union, the very same inclinations have afterwards the best effect: as trees in a forest, by endeavouring to deprive one another of air and sun, force one another

to

to seek both above themselves, and thereby grow tall and straight; whereas those, which are at liberty and separated from one another, shoot out their boughs and branches at pleasure and grow crooked. All culture and art that adorn humanity, the most beautiful social order, are fruits of unsociableness, which is necessitated by itself, to discipline itself, and so, by extorted art, completely to unfold the germe of nature.

POSITION THE SIXTH.

This problem is at once the most difficult, and that which will be solved the latest by the human species. The difficulty, which even the mere idea of this problem lays open, is this, *Man is an animal, who,* when he lives among others of his own species, *stands in need of a master.* For he certainly will abuse his liberty with regard to others of his like; and, though he, as a rational creature, wishes for a law, which sets limits to the liberty of all; his selfish animal inclination misleads him to except himself, where he can. He therefore requires a *master*, who controls his proper will, and compels him to obey a universally valid will, whereby every one can be free. But whence does he take this master? Nowhere but from among the human species. But he is equally an animal, who likewise stands in need of a master. Let man go about it in any way he pleases, it is not possible to be conceived, how he can procure himself a head of public justice, who is himself just: whether he seeks him in one person only, or in a society of many persons

persons chosen for the purpose. For every one of them will always make a bad use of his liberty, when there is nobody superior to him, who exercises authority over him according to laws. But the chief head must be just *of himself*, and yet a *man*. Hence this is the most difficult of all problems; nay, its perfect solution is impossible; out of such crossgrained crooked wood, as man is made of, nothing can be timbered quite straight. Only the approximation to this idea is imposed on us by nature.* That it is that, which will be effectuated the latest, follows from this, that hereto are requisite right conceptions of the nature of a possible constitution, great experience and skill acquired by great knowledge of mankind, and more than all those, a good will prepared for their adoption; but three such points as these are very difficult to be united, and, when it happens, it is but very late, after many fruitless essays.

POSITION THE SEVENTH.

The problem of the establishment of a perfect civil constitution is dependent on the problem of a legal external relation of states, and cannot be solved without the latter. What boots it to labour at a legal civil constitution

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* The part, which men play, is therefore very artificial. What the situation and the nature of the inhabitants of other planets may be, we know not; but when we execute well this commission, with which nature has charged us, we may have reason to hope and to flatter ourselves, that we will bear no mean rank among our neighbours in the stupendous fabric of the universe. Perhaps every individual of these may fully attain his destination in his life. But it is otherwise with us; only the species can hope for this.

among single men, that is, at the order of a commonwealth? That unsociableness, which necessitated men to this, is the cause that every commonwealth in the external relation, that is, as a state relative to states, stands in unbridled liberty, and by consequence the one must expect from the other the very same evils, which afflicted individuals and compelled them to put themselves into a legal civil state. Nature has then used the incompatibility of men, even of great societies and of bodies politic, this sort of creatures, as a mean, in order to find out in their unavoidable antagonism a state of quiet and security; that is, she urges on, by wars, by the overstrained and never ceasing preparation for them, by the distress, which every state must ultimately feel internally, even during peace, at first to imperfect attempts, but at last, after many devastations, overthrows, and even through the exhausting of their internal power, to that, which reason could have told them without so many sad experiments, namely, To forsake the lawless state of savages, and to enter into a league of nations; where every one, even the smallest state may expect its security and rights, not from its own potency, or its own juridical judgment, but only from this great confederation of nations (*Foedus Amphictionum*), from a united potency, and from the decision according to laws of the united will. However fanatical this idea seems to be, and which was indeed derided as such in an *Abbé de St. Pierre*, or a *Rousseau* (perhaps, because they believed its execution too near); it is the inevitable

evitable mode of deliverance from the distress, into which men precipitate one another, which must compel states to the very same resolution (let them agree to it with ever so much reluctance), to which the savage was just as unwillingly compelled, to wit, To give up his brutal liberty, and to seek quiet and security in a legal constitution. — All wars are consequently so many efforts (not indeed in the design of men, but yet in the design of nature), to bring to pass new relations among states, and by the destroying, or at least by the crumbling of all, to form new bodies, but which cannot maintain themselves, either as states in themselves or beside one another, and therefore must suffer new revolutions; till one day, partly by the best possible order of the civil constitution internally, and partly by a common agreement and legislation externally, a state is finally established, which, similar to a civil commonwealth, can support itself like an *automaton*.

Whether it is to be expected from an *epicurean* concurrence of efficient causes, that states, like the particles of matter, by their fortuitous concussion try all sorts of figures, till at last *by accident* a figure succeeds which can maintain itself in its form (a change, which will scarcely ever come to pass); or whether one ought rather to suppose, that nature here pursues a regular course, to lead our species insensibly from the lowest step of animality to the highest step of humanity, and that by proper art though forced upon men, and to develope in this seeming wild order

quite regularly those original predispositions; or whether one rather wills, that from all these actions and reactions of men in the gross absolutely nothing, or at least nothing good, shall be produced, that every thing will remain as it has hitherto been, and that it cannot therefore be foretold, whether the discord, so natural to our species, will not at last prove for us a hell of evils, prepared in a state ever so cultivated, as it will perhaps annihilate this state and all former progressions in culture by barbarous devastation (a fate, which cannot be answered for under the government of blind chance, with which lawless liberty is in fact identical, if one does not secretly ascribe to it a guidance of nature connected with wisdom!)? That terminates pretty nearly in the question, Whether it be rational to suppose *conformity-to-end* of the disposition of nature in the parts, and yet on the whole *disconformity-to-end*? That which the state of savages disconformable-to-end did, by suppressing all the predispositions of nature in our species, and finally by the evils into which it plunged it, necessitated it to quit this state and to enter into a civil constitution, in which all those germes can be unfolded; the barbarous liberty of states already founded does likewise, by employing all the powers of the commonwealth in arming against one another, by the havock occasioned by war, and still more however by the necessity to hold themselves in constant readiness for it, the full developement of the predispositions of nature is impeded in its progress, but on the other hand the

the evils, which arise therefrom, necessitate our species to the resistance, in itself salutary, of many states contiguous to one another, which springs from their liberty, to find out a law of equilibrium, and a united power, that gives it weight, consequently to introduce a cosmopolitical situation of the public securiry of state; which must not be without all *danger*, in order that the powers of humanity may not fall asleep, but yet not without a principle of *equality* of their reciprocal *action* and *reaction*, that they may not destroy one another. Before this last step is taken (namely, the alliance of states), therefore nearly at the period, when they are but half cultivated, human nature suffers the greatest evils, under the deceitful appearance of external prosperity; and Rousseau was not much in the wrong, to prefer the state of savages, when this last step, which our species has still to ascend, is omitted. We are *cultivated* in the highest degree by art and science. We are *civilised*, to a troublesome degree, in all sorts of social politeness and decorum. But there is yet a great deal wanting to us to be holden *moralised*. For the idea of morality belongs to culture still; but the use of this idea, which extends but to what is similar to morals in the love of honour and in the external decorum, constitutes civilizing merely. So long however as states employ all their strength on their vain and violent projects of aggrandizement, and thus incessantly clog the slow endeavour of the internal formation of the cast of mind of their citizens and even

withdraw every support and assistance from them in this design, nothing of this sort is to be expected; because a long internal elaboration of every commonwealth is requisite to the formation and cultivation of its citizens. But all good, that is not grafted upon a morally good mind, is nothing but mere appearance and glittering misery. The human species, in all probability, will remain in this state, till it shall, in the manner I have mentioned, have extricated itself from the chaotic situation of its relations of state.

POSITION THE EIGHTH.

The history of the human species in the gross may be considered as the execution of a hidden plan of nature, in order to bring about an internally perfect constitution of state, and, to this end, an external one too, as the only state, in which she can fully unfold all her predispositions in humanity. This position is a consequent of the foregoing. One sees that philosophy likewise may have its *chiliasm;* but such a one, as may be very instrumental to the bringing to pass of its idea, though but very remotely, and which is therefore nothing less than fanatical. The question now is, Whether experience can discover any thing of such a course of the design of nature. I say, *very little;* for this circular course seems to require so long a time to be finished, that, from the small part, which humanity has accomplished in this view, the figure of its orbit and the relation of the parts to the whole can be

be determined with just as little certitude, as from all observations of the heavens till now the course, which our sun together with his whole army of satellites takes in the great system of fixed stars; though, from the universal ground of the systematical arrangement of the structure of the world, and from what little has been observed, with certainty enough to conclude the actuality of such a circular course. But human nature will have it so, not to be indifferent, even with regard to the most distant epochs, which may concern our species, when they can be expected but with certitude. Especially in our case it can happen the less, as it appears that we can, by our own rational preparation, bring about quicker this so joyous period for our posterity. For which reason, even the faint traces of its approximation are to us very important. At present states stand in so artificial a relation to one another, that neither can remit in the internal culture, without losing in potency and in influence relative to the others; therefore, if not the progress, at least the preservation of this end of nature, is pretty well secured, even by their ambitious views. Besides, civil liberty cannot just now be easily injured, without feeling the disadvantage of it in all trades, but chiefly in commerce, and thereby the diminution of the powers of the state in the external relation. But this liberty gradually extends farther. When the citizen is prevented from seeking his welfare in every manner agreeable to himself, that is consistent with the liberty of others; the briskness of the

the thorough traffic is impeded, and herewith the powers of the whole. Hence the personal restriction in actions is more and more removed, the universal liberty of religion allowed; and thus is produced by degrees, together with fancies and chimeras, *enlightening*, as a great good, which must rescue the human species, even from the selfish project of aggrandizement of its rulers, if they but understand their own interest. Enlightening, however, and together with it a certain cordial part, which the enlightened man cannot avoid taking in the good, that he perfectly comprehends, must gradually ascend to the thrones, and have influence on their principles of government. Though our governours of the world have no money left for public institutions of education, and in general for what concerns the public welfare, because every thing is destined to the future war; they would find their own advantage in not impeding at least the proper, though feeble and slow, endeavours of their nation in this point. Finally, war itself will be by degrees not only a so artificial, in the issue on both sides a so uncertain, and, by the subsequent misfortunes, which the state feels in a load of debt continually augmenting (a modern invention), whose interest even becomes immense, a so dangerous enterprise, and the influence, which every concussion of state in our part of the world, so closely concatinated by its commerce, has on all other states, so sensible; that these, urged by their own danger, though without legal authority, offer themselves as umpires,

and thus prepare every thing at a distance for a future great body politic, of which former ages can produce no example. These bodies politic subsist at present but in a very rough sketch, yet a feeling begins to be excited in all the members, every one of whom is interested in the support of the whole; and this gives hope, that at last, after many transformations, will be accomplished that, which nature lays as the chief design, an universal *cosmopolitical state*, as the womb, in which all the original predispositions of the human species will be developed.

POSITION THE NINTH.

A philosophical essay to compose the universal history of the world according to a plan of nature, which aims at the perfect civil union in the human species, must then be considered as possible, and even favourable to this design of nature. It is indeed a strange, and in appearance, absurd undertaking to think of composing a *history*, according to an idea, how the course of the world must proceed, if it shall be suitable to certain rational ends; it seems that, in such a view, nothing but a *romance* could be produced. But if it may be supposed, That nature, even in the play of human liberty, does not proceed without a plan and a final design, this idea may by all means become useful, and, though we are too shortsighted to penetrate the mysterious mechanism of her work, serve us as a clew to exhibit as a *system*, at least in the gross, an *aggregate*

aggregate of human actions otherwise without a plan. For, when one begins with the *Grecian history*, as that, whereby every other older or contemporary history has been preserved for us, must at least be credited;* when one traces its influence on both the formation and the deformation of the body politic of the *Roman nation*, which swallowed up the Grecian *states*, and the influence of the latter on the *Barbarians*, who destroyed it, to our own times; but superadds also *episodically* the political history of other nations, whose knowledge was gradually handed down to us by these enlightened nations: a regular course of the amendment of the constitution of state in our quarter of the globe will be discovered (which perhaps will one day or other give laws to all the others). By regarding but the civil constitution and its laws, and the relation of state, so far as both served, for a time, by the good which they contained, to raise and to illustrate nations (and with them arts and sciences), but by the imperfections, which adhered to them, to subvert them again, yet so, that there always remained a germin of enlightening,

* Only a *learned public*, which has continued uninterruptedly from its beginning to us, can confirm ancient history. Beyond that all is *terra incognita;* and the history of the nations, who lived without that, can be begun but from the time, when they entered into it. This happened to the jewish nation at the time of the Ptolomies, by the Greek translation of the Bible, without which one would give little credit to their accounts. Thence (when this beginning has first been sufficiently found out) may be followed upwards their narrations. And so with all other nations. The first leaf of THUCYDIDES (says Hume) is the only beginning of all true history.

enlightening which, more unfolded by every revolution, prepared a following step of melioration still higher: a clew will, I believe, be discovered, which may serve not merely to the explanation of the so confused play of human affairs, or to the political art of foretelling future alterations of state (an advantage, which has accrued from the history of men, though it was considered as an incoherent effect of an irregular liberty!); but a consolatory prospect in futurity will be opened (which cannot, without presupposing a plan of nature, be hoped for with reason), in which the human race is represented in a later period, how it has elevated itself by its own exertions to the state, in which all the germes, that nature laid in it, can be fully unfolded and its destination here upon earth fulfilled. Such a *justification of nature*, or rather of *Providence* is no insignificant motive to chuse a peculiar point of view of the contemplation of the world. For what does it avail to praise and to recommend the excellence and the wisdom of the creation in the irrational kingdom of nature; if the part of the great theatre of Supreme Wisdom, which comprises the end of all this, — the history of the human species — shall remain a continual objection against it, the sight of which forces us to turn our eyes away from it with indignation, and, while we despair of ever meeting therein with a finished rational design, brings us to that pass, to hope for it but in another world?

That I had a mind by this idea of a history of the world, which in some degree has a clew

[illegible] *à priori*, to supplant the elaboration of the history *empirically* compiled merely; were a misconstruction of my intention; it is but a thought of what a philosophical head (who must have a great knowledge of history) might try from another point of view. Besides, the circumstantiality otherwise laudable, with which the history of our times is at present composed, must naturally suggest to every body the difficulty that our late posterity will have to comprehend the load of history, which we shall transmit to them after a few centuries. No doubt they will estimate that of the most ancient times, of which the records may have long since been lost to them, but from the point of view of what interests them, namely, that which nations and governments have either performed or spoiled in a cosmopolitical view. But to have regard to this, and to the ambition of the heads of states, as well as of their ministers, in order to point out to them the only mean, that can deliver down to future ages their honourable and glorious memories, may be still a *small* motive to attempt such a philosophical history.

THE END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.